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Abstract 
 
This thesis is a comparison of the theory and practice of aesthetic politics in key works of 
Bertolt Brecht and William Blake. I argue that there are two separate temporal moments that 
define Brecht’s and Blake’s political aesthetics. The first moment is defined by a more direct 
engagement with the “nowness” and relative newness of their capitalist social world. Capitalist 
social relations bring out in each of the two a more directly engaging oppositional aesthetics. 
Given capitalism’s desire to create a form of experience that not only makes sense for its 
subjects’ own subjugation, while while also attempting to negate any possible alterative to itself, 
Brecht and Blake develop a political aesthetics that exposes and undercuts these dominant forms 
of experience. Using Walter Benjamin, I argue that Brecht and Blake posit an “oppositional 
aesthetics of the now” which takes seriously capitalism’s desires and successes in refashioning 
experience, but provides a means of both understanding this experience while counterposing and 
making desirable an oppositional form of existence. This political aesthetic response is grounded 
in contemporary social relations and responds using this as a framework of reference.  
The second moment under discussion examines the role of history and historical 
representation in Brecht and Blake.  The central focus is how Brecht and Blake continue the 
responsive project referenced in the first two chapters by making use of history in aesthetic-
political interventions in the present. I argue that they engage historical tropes and use history 
“against the grain” in the Jetztzeit (Now-Time), as Benjamin notes. Both repurpose history as a 
means to produce historical recoveries, making failures or losses in the past open for radical 
productive possibilities in the present. In this way forms of inherited experience or preconceived 
truths are placed in a space of contestation. Historical representation is another opportunity to 
cleave open an oppositional aesthetics and unsettle that which capitalism wishes to make silent.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The origins of this dissertation are located in a desire to understand how materialist (and 
non-materialist) cultural responses aim to integrate and interrogate the question of the politics of 
production in oppositional literatures. The absence of a full consideration of the aesthetics of 
production has resulted in a turning away from the social and economic problems asserting 
themselves both against and within a tradition of aesthetics that seeks to understand the social 
landscape which propels it and makes itself possible, and to respond in fully oppositional ways. 
This has predominantly encouraged a turning away, especially in the age of postmodernity, from 
oppositional aesthetics.1 Too often aesthetic interventions into the political imperatives of the day 
eschew an engagement with the actual political situation and respond with old answers to new 
questions. This has regularly come in the form of a realist aesthetics that presents the 
contemporary audience with a conception of veracity and devotion to totality2 that does more to 
obscure than illuminate, and even more so negates the role of agency through the assumption of 
objectivism in making cultural politics. As Fredric Jameson defines it, “traditionally in one form 
or another the central model of Marxist aesthetics as a narrative discourse...unites the experience 
of daily life with a properly cognitive, mapping, or well-nigh ‘scientific perspective.’”3 This form 
of cultural politics, rather than beginning from an aesthetics from below and of the now – 
wherein there lies a necessity for those oppressed and exploited to be integrated producers of the 
                                                        
1 The literature maintaining this critique is extensive, but most important here are Terry Eagleton, The Illusions of 
Postmodernism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996). David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1990).  Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (London: Verso, 1991). 
2 The primary exemplar of this tradition is Georg Lukacs, The Historical Novel (London: Penguin, 1962). A less 
intellectually sophisticated version is found in Christopher Caudwell’s Illusion and Reality (New York: International 
Publishers, 1973).  
3 Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1994): 104. 
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text – reproduces the textual dynamics of the society to which they are hoping to respond in 
critical ways.4 In contrast to this tendency, this dissertation argues that the works of Bertolt 
Brecht and William Blake, two of the most oppositional of oppositional cultural producers, are 
exemplary figures in articulating an aesthetics wherein the moment of the now, the contemporary 
moment, is the sine qua non of an aesthetics of production.  
An aesthetics of production, drawing from Walter Benjamin’s “The Author as Producer,” 
encourages a debate around the way in which that work relates to its own society. His text asks 
not “What is the attitude of a work to the relations of production of its time?,” but rather “What is 
its position in them?”5 What Benjamin raises in this analysis is the role of cultural production in 
the function of literary analysis. Cultural production has a long pedigree, and one of its clearest 
definitions is put forward by Pierre Bourdieu in his The Field of Cultural Production. He writes 
that: 
 
The space of literary or artistic position-takings, i.e. the structured set of the 
manifestations of the social agents involved in the field – literary or artistic works, of 
course, but also political acts or pronouncements, manifestos or polemics, etc. – is 
inseparable from the space of literary or artistic positions defined by possession of a 
determinate quantity of specific capital (recognition) and, at the same time, by occupation 
of a determinate position in the structure of the distribution of this specific capital. The 
literary or artistic field is a field of forces, but it is also a field of struggles tending to 
transform or conserve this field of forces.6  
 
                                                        
4 See in particular the discussion of the forms of realism in Ernst Fischer, The Necessity of Art (London: Verso, 
2010). 
5 Walter Benjamin, Reflections (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978): 222.  
6 Pierre Bourdieu, The Field of Cultural Production (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993): 30. 
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The concept of forces that Bourdieu encourages moves discussion away from mere “influence”7 
to bring in questions of cultural production and the larger forces at play with a given literary text 
on the one hand, but also a larger field of play that both structures and makes possible the 
production of literary and cultural documents themselves. In this regard, the “superstructure” is, 
as Terry Eagleton notes, “a relational term” in that it “designates the way in which certain social 
institutions act as ‘supports’ of the dominant social relation.”8  In this way an emphasis on 
cultural production puts the question of “literary technique”9 more firmly in relation to its 
technological and political determinants (what was possible, or deemed possible, at what time in 
literary history for instance, and also what questions were being pressed out into the open that 
necessitated an aesthetic response), which begins a form of investigation that puts into sharp 
contrast the literary text’s relation to its own “Jetztzeit” or “time of the now” and history. This is a 
most sincere political question10 and encourages the question as to what form of response a 
cultural producer is committed.11 A central point of departure where much of this work has 
stubbed its toe is on the distinction, already explicitly made use of here, between what the Welsh 
literary critic Raymond Williams terms oppositional and alternative cultures. 
In his “Base and Superstructure in Materialism and Culture,” Williams states that the 
degree of difference between oppositional and alternative cultures is subject to what he terms 
“constant historical variation.” Providing greater clarification into his own historical moment but 
also expressing a more generalizable perspective, Williams continues:  
  
                                                        
7 As expressed in Harold Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).  
8 Terry Eagleton, Ideology: An Introduction (London: Verso, 1991): 83.  
9 Benjamin, Reflections, 222. 
10 Benjamin, Reflections, 223. 
11 Using Theodor Adorno’s formulation, in contrast to “autonomous art.” See Theodor Adorno, “Commitment,” in 
Aesthetics and Politics, edited by Fredric Jameson (London: Verso, 1998).   
 4 
Thus, the effective decision, as to whether a practice is alternative or oppositional,  is 
often now made within a very much narrower scope. There is a simple theoretical 
distinction between alternative and oppositional, that is to say between someone who 
simply finds a different way to live and wishes to be left alone with it, and someone who 
finds a different way to live and wants to change the society in its light. This is usually the 
difference between individual and small-group solutions to social crisis and those 
solutions which properly belong to political and ultimately revolutionary practice. But it 
is often a very narrow line, in reality, between alternative and oppositional. A meaning or 
a practice may be tolerated as a deviation, and yet still be seen only as another particular 
way to live. But as the necessary area of effective dominance extends, the same meanings 
and practices can be seen by the dominant culture, not merely as disregarding or despising 
it, but as challenging it.12 
 
Despite the fact that this distinction is nearing its half-century mark, the prescience of this 
passage for our times should not be underestimated. As it stands now, there is no dearth of 
alternatives to the standing order of capitalism. Indeed, the so-called linguistic turn in the social 
sciences has witnessed an extraordinary heap of “deconstructions” of the cultural logics of 
capitalism which, although they attempt to rid societal formations of systemizing thoughts, have 
done little to withstand or aid in the struggle against one of the historically deepest entrenchments 
of capitalist power on an ever increasing and deepening scale. As E. San Juan Jr. notes in regards 
to contemporary cultural studies, “an emancipatory discipline producing testable knowledge 
cannot go beyond textualism without rejecting methodological individualism and its framework 
of idealist metaphysics. Linguistic analysis needs to be supplemented with a critique of 
ideological structures.”13  
                                                        
12 Raymond Williams, Problems in Materialism and Culture (London: Verso, 1980), pp. 41-2. 
13 E. San Juan Jr., Racism and Multiculturalist Ideology and the Politics of Difference (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2002): 234-5. 
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David McNally, in his Bodies of Meaning: Studies on Language, Labor and Liberation, 
has spoken to the inability of the contemporary trends in aesthetic theory to deal with societal 
structures as they are present today. He writes, “For the new idealism, there is no way out of the 
linguistic forms of thought or the social relations characteristic of Western capitalist society.”14 
Thus, the contemporary oppositions to the system specifically, if not always intentionally (or 
even willingly), rule out the problematics of opposition; all that remains is minor spaces or 
pockets of activity rather than any conception of a sustained challenge to the system’s logics. As 
such, while one can still name the institutional order as capitalism, an idea that one may imagine 
a world beyond it is seen as risible. Indeed, we have entered a period of “Capitalist Realism,” as 
Mark Fisher has termed it, wherein a systemic, “aggravated and chronic”15 logic dismisses any 
notion of opposition rather than alternative and as such systemic opposition appears as the 
greatest affront in the academia today.16 For this reason, Williams’ distinction is indispensable 
for a committed materialist criticism.  
In this text I will be arguing that Blake and Brecht represent high points of oppositional 
cultural production. In terms of their influence throughout the history of oppositional cultural 
practice, few authors have projected such a great influence in determining the major questions (if 
not always resulting in the same formation of answers) that subsequent producers have posed and 
sought to grapple with. They are two of the most significant archetypal producers of oppositional 
aesthetics in that the aesthetic strategies they employ (for Brecht read distancing effects, gestural 
                                                        
14 David McNally, Bodies of Meaning: Studies on Language, Labor, and Liberation (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 2001): p. 7.  
15 Mark Fisher, Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative? (London: Zero Books, 2009): 7. 
16 Recent works in this regard are Teresa L. Ebert and Mas’ud Zavarzadeh, Class in Culture (Boulder: Paradigm, 
2008), Teresa Ebert, The Task of Cultural Critique (Chicago: The University of Illinois Press, 2009), Dennis 
Dworkin, Class Struggles (London: Harlow, 2007): 75 Two historical critical texts in this regard are Richard Wolin, 
The Terms of Cultural Criticism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992) and Bob Hodge, “Labor Theory Of 
Language: Postmodernism and a Marxist Science of Language,” in Post-Ality: Marxism and Postmodernism, ed. 
Mas’ud Zavarzaadeh et al. (Washington: Maisonneuve Press, 1995). 
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politics and Epic Theatre and for Blake read an explosive yet complex verse full of inspiration 
and channeling of messianic energies) have become the models for a variety of expressions of the 
realities and problems faced by organisations and individuals throughout the history of the left.  
In this thesis I hope to provide a comparison of the two authors in order to examine how 
both sought to expose contemporary modes of oppression and exploitation in direct connection to 
the moment of the now, coupled with a Janus-like vision towards the past. In this latter moment 
they discarded the reproduction of an accurate version of historical reality and sought something 
much closer to Walter Benjamin’s famous analysis of an historical materialist approach to 
history. That is, when we take as read that, as Benjamin notes, “There is no document of 
civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism,” the mode in which we look 
towards and examine the past alters. In this context, a cultural producer is always in a space 
where the need for response is keen. Yet rather than reproducing historical truisms, or truths that 
do not sufficiently examine the terrains of history and the contemporary, the oppositional outlook 
proceeds differently. As Benjamin notes further in “On the Concept of History”: “A historical 
materialist therefore dissociates himself from [barbarism] as far as possible. He regards it as his 
task to brush history against the grain.”17 Benjamin’s argument itself is connected to the political 
landscape of his age, and is responding to a vision of progress that had haunted progressive 
forces in German Social Democracy, and therefore had deeply affected their ability to challenge 
seriously the admittedly immense weight and, it should be emphasized, capabilities of capitalist 
forces to respond to opposition and defeat it head-on or, if necessary, to co-opt them.18 
Nevertheless, the belief that the truth will out and justice will be won had led the working-class 
                                                        
17 Benjamin, Illuminations (New York: Schocken, 1968): 256-7. 
18 For a detailed discussion of Benjamin’s essay and its fragmentary nature (and how this reflected his political 
thought) see Andrew Benjamin, Working with Walter Benjamin: Recovering a Political Philosophy (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2013): 162-202. 
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movement into a position of existential and practical inactivity. In response to this, Benjamin 
postulated that what was necessary was not a return to those good old, specifically a-historical, 
arguments of progress and stability but a consideration of the role of experience in articulating a 
revolutionary politics or a “radical moving-forward.”19 Susan Buck-Morss, commenting on the 
introduction to Benjamin’s “Theses on the Philosophy of History” in her The Origin of Negative 
Dialectics, expresses this new form of historical investigation in the following: 
  
Now in this new methodological introduction Benjamin had stressed precisely the 
opposite moment, in which truth emerged only by the setting up of a critical distance 
between the material and the interpreter, and that meant standing at the present edge of 
history, on the dividing line between “now-time” (Jetztzeit) and the possibility for a 
radically different future. From this perspective history could not be affirmed or 
rationalized.20 
 
Benjamin suggests and tries to cleave open new pathways of responding to our time, and I wish 
to examine how Benjamin’s insights can be seen as reflected in Brecht and Blake’s aesthetic 
strategies and politics.  
There are two forms of temporal engagement that are expressed in Brecht and Blake that I 
would like to examine. On the one hand we have a specific notion on the moment of the now, one 
which develops from a deep understanding of the moment to which one relates oneself in the 
present. This relies on a Janussian moment found between that of the present and a “radically 
different future,” for better or ill. The present’s newness, as opposed to capitalism’s fake newness 
(the newness of the commodity, of false-novelty, old wine in new bottles), is an entire mess of 
                                                        
19 Gerhard Richter, Inheriting Walter Benjamin (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016): 113. 
20 Susan Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialectics: Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin and the Frankfurt 
Institute (New York: The Free Press, 1977): 169. 
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congruent and discordant impulses, concerns and motivations. True, these are always informed 
by history and determined by factors that constrain these impulses, concerns, and motivations in 
infinite ways. This is, as always, a structured moment, a moment of indeterminacy as well, and 
one which must, as much as possible, be understood so as to construct a counter-hegemonic 
force. This is required as capital is constantly remodelling and refashioning how we experience 
the world in its own image. In response to this conflagration, as committed cultural producers, 
Blake and Brecht argue for a political engagement with the structures at play in the interstices of 
indeterminacy. This is the moment of the now dealt with in the first two chapters.  
The second engagement occurs in a similar Janussian temporal space, but here between a 
collision of past and present. This moment, as elucidated by Buck-Morss above, occurs on the 
cusp of one’s historical position and the historical past writ large. Yet this is not a matter of 
precisely understanding one’s history and then drawing the links between the two. This would 
reproduce the folly that Benjamin seeks to have us steer clear of. Here, history takes on a far 
more malleable, plastic, form in the hands of the artist and the impulse is to release its potential 
against the current disasters, as opposed to locking it down and containing it, in essence making it 
safe. The emphasis is far less on understanding an historical moment, but rather imagining what 
can be usefully made of the past for the needs of the present. We move from history as “not so 
much a past reality as an unrealized possibility.”21 In this regard the present is still the focus, but 
during in their own specific moments characterized by historical loss (the failures of the French 
Revolution, the inability of the Russian Revolution to live up to its promise, etc.) Brecht and 
Blake seek to take inspiration from historical periods, singular moments or figures and transport 
them for their own purposes. The knowledge and use of history provides a refuge in that it offers 
                                                        
21 Michael G. Levine, A Weak Messianic Power: Figures of a Time to Come in Benjamin, Derrida, and Celan (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2014): 5.  
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a way of engaging with the contemporary moment by ushering in a re-immersion of agency in the 
course of contemporary-historical events.22 Its potential is uncapped and open to exploration and 
experimentation. What I am trying to locate in Brecht and Blake here is a shift away from a 
concept of the now and of history that negates this potential and in its place I argue that the basis 
of each author’s work is a highly productive and ultimately responsive theory of aesthetic 
practice.  
My principal aim in the following is to mobilize the works of Brecht and Blake in aid of 
rethinking the role of the artist in the contemporary moment. As specifically political 
interventionists who organise their works around the double strategy of the time of the now and 
use history as a device to reinforce and make clearer the moment of the now, Brecht and Blake 
offer a form of cultural response which stresses a sophisticated relationship between the audience 
and the producer.23 Such a relationship is centred upon the notion that the moment of the now 
must always be the focal point of the aesthetic, and that the moment of the now is at every 
moment haunted by history.  
Blake and Brecht provide a useful comparison for the analysis of oppositional aesthetics 
as they have often been seen on opposite ends of the aesthetic spectrum. It is particularly 
                                                        
22 As regards the relationship between the powerful Messiah and the knowledge that comes of the Messianic 
impulse, Benjamin Britt notes: “There is agency first of all in critical awareness, which Benjamin cultivated through 
a variety of philosophical and aesthetic categories, and which he eventually related to a politicized conception of the 
Messiah. This Messiah is not subject to human control, but awareness of the Messiah is not possible without 
awareness of tradition, which survives in modern culture.” Brian Britt, Postsecular Benjamin: Agency and Tradition 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2016): 135. Useful also in this regard in James R. Martel, Divine 
Violence: Walter Benjamin and the Eschatology of Sovereignty (London: Routledge, 2012). 
23 Although I will discuss this later, two contemporary critics have noted the response that both Brecht and Blake 
wish to draw. Firstly, Neil Larsen has described the interaction between Audience and Play in Brecht that “bringing 
into juxtaposition, not disparate images or objects, but rather the disparate attitudes towards actions on the part of the 
dramatic characters themselves, on the one hand, and on the part of the audience, on the other.” Neil Larsen, 
Determinations: Essays on Theory, Narrative and Nation in the Americas (London: Verso, 2001): 196. This suggests 
a conversation and activity that is also argued by John H. Jones in relation to Blake’s Milton that, “Blake wants his 
readers to from their own responses to the poem, each of which would recreate the poem anew.” John H. Jones, 
Blake on Language, Power, and Self-Annihilation (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010): 178. 
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tempting to literary theorists of all persuasions to erect a binary which places an impassioned, 
Blake (with his visions of Angels in trees, etc.) in counter position to the cold, emotionless, and 
almost hyper-rational Brecht. Yet while there may be a kernel of truth in each, it is far from clear 
where this may take us except into an unproductive dualism. Ironically, rarely have there been 
two oppositional cultural producers so convinced of the virtues or merits of a belief in production 
as Brecht and Blake. This productive aesthetics is frequently under question. The French 
philosopher Jacques Rancière, whose ideas have helped to redefine the political reading of 
cultural and literary texts,24 has cast doubt on art’s potential to create. He argues in an interview 
in the influential art magazine Artforum: 
 
In the time of politically engaged art, when critical models were clearly agreed upon, we 
took art and politics as two well-defined things, each in its own corner. But at the same 
time, we presupposed a trouble-free passage between an artistic mode of presentation and 
the determination to act; that is, we believed that the “raised consciousness” engendered 
by art – the strangeness of an artistic form – would provoke political action. The artist 
who presented the hidden contradictions of capitalism would mobilize minds and bodies 
for the struggle. The deduction was unsound, but that didn’t matter so long as the 
explanatory schemata and the actual social movements were strong enough to anticipate 
its effects. That is no longer the case today.25  
 
 
Rancière’s argument implies that oppositional aesthetics, such as those under investigation here, 
could not have offered a means to significantly alter the world in which they inhabit. While there 
                                                        
24 See principally The Emancipated Spectator (London: Verso, 2011); Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics 
(London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2010); The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible (London: 
Continuum, 2006). 
25 Jacques Rancière, interviewed by Fulvia Carnevale and John Kelsey, “Art of the Possible,” Artforum, (March 
2007): 258-59. 
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is an partial yet obvious truth to this, to argue that art alone could not do so is to ignore the 
unique and complicated relationship between cultural production and social struggle. Just as for 
E. P. Thompson argues that “class happens,”26 so to does the making of culture. There is no easy 
causal relationship between oppositional culture and effect, but to deny one altogether would be 
to miss the larger point regarding social and cultural interactions and formations. 
In what follows, I have three broad, overarching objectives. The first is, through a series 
of close readings, to suggest how the logic of the texts leads towards a deep penetration of the 
author’s society’s contemporary ideologies (particularly in Chapters 2 and 3) and how the 
mobilization or renewal of lost history is carried out with the intent of highlighting further the 
contradictions that are increasingly apparent in their contemporary society’s ideologies (Chapters 
4 and 5). I aim to provide a clear account of the intensity and sophistication that the 
contemporary impulse plays in both author’s texts and to further explain how the focus on a 
response to the contemporary moment organises and motivates Brecht and Blake.  
My second objective will be to highlight the central role of experience and 
experimentation and reinforce the potential of determining human action in the authors’ work as 
a central structure around which their texts move. What has been lost in the discussions of Brecht 
and Blake as individual cultural producers (as of yet there is no fuller length academic study of 
the two that has been published)27 as they have become to a greater degree institutionalised is that 
                                                        
26 E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (London: Penguin, 1982): 8. Still one of the most 
useful theoretical texts on the connections between society and cultural forms remains Raymond Williams, Culture 
(Glasgow: Fontana, 1981). E. P. Thompson’s later edition of his William Morris: Romantic to Revolutionary 
(London: Merlin, 1976) is a further attempt in articulating the detailed historical connections between the art and 
politics.  
27 One recent exception to this is Diane Piccitto’s Blake’s Drama: Theatre, Performance and Identity in the 
Illuminated Books (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). This text offers some connections between Blake and 
Brecht as regards similarities in promoting active spectatorship, but is not a comparative study. Despite the 
contention that Blake constructs “a Brechtian alienation that jars us out of our complacency,” there is too little 
substantive engagement with Brecht’s theatrical theory (as evidenced in the critically unspecific notion of Brechtian 
alienation”). See Piccitto, Blake’s Drama, 54. 
 12 
both authors placed a great deal of emphasis on the role of reception and the ways in which one 
might encourage an active reading of their works and an active readership more generally. How 
to help spawn a way of seeing the world in a different light, so as to recognise and help to 
flourish an understanding of art that is good in itself but also inculcates productive creative 
producers of the audience themselves? In this way, I will further argue, experimentation and 
reserving a space with which one can maintain and produce a critical gaze is not a mere positive 
trait in the work of each author but rather a necessary condition of the greater logic behind their 
work. The experimentation of the artist is to mirror the experimentation of the artist’s productive 
readership.  
My third objective is to place Brecht and Blake together, two operators working at very 
different conjuctures, in order to argue for a mode of criticism and practice that seeks to empower 
useful and productive analysis that is geared towards an oppositional aesthetic that is itself 
ultimately productive. This will also act as a theory of literary production of each that not only 
registers and explores the role of aesthetics in creating new forms of experiences (and tapping 
into and expressing nascent yet existing forms of experience), but is also directly attuned to the 
key problems of oppositional movements. A central part of this project is to advocate an 
oppositional aesthetics that offers resistance, and I will attempt to show how in each of the 
chapters resistance to exploitation and oppressions is a driving force in the two’s works. It is 
important to understand and reflect on the particular characteristics and determinations of one’s 
dominant society,28 yet failure to explore how one can challenge this (even if it be to encourage 
the reader of the text to take the contradictions upon themselves) is insufficient for both Brecht 
and Blake. 
                                                        
28 See in particular Terry Eagleton, Criticism and Ideology: A Study in Marxist Literary Theory (London: Verso, 
1976): 11 – 43.  
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In Chapter 2 the key focus will be on the earlier works on Brecht, at least up until shortly 
before his exile in 1933. The focus for this section will be to highlight first of all the key motif 
working within these works: that there is, Brecht would argue, a new in/human way of being 
formed. Brecht saw himself living at the end of the creation of a decidedly remarkable transition 
in the history of social contact and behaviour of class forces and he sought to access these new 
forms of living so as to follow their logic and their ways of being in the world on stage and film. 
Yet because of the particular logic involved in this creation, particularly as regards the 
Expressionist focus on the new individual and new individualities that capitalist modernity 
produces,29 this necessitated an aesthetic response beyond merely what theatre and the dramatic 
arts had hitherto articulated. The response from a political aesthetic perspective necessary for this 
was to stretch out to other newly and often formally unexplored media and incorporate these new 
technologies into his overall aesthetic strategy.30 Perhaps most fundamental in this regard is 
Brecht’s Mann ist Mann.  
In Chapter 2 I will attempt to address the scant attention given to this early work by 
teasing out the key contradictions of the play so as to locate the tendencies present at a time 
which were fundamental for the development of his aesthetic. I will argue that in Mann ist Mann 
Brecht is working out the relationship between a temporal-political question, the modern worker 
and her ability to respond as an individual to capital’s remodeling of such people in their own 
desired image,31 and the capacity of the theatre to respond to such a question both politically and 
                                                        
29 For a useful response to this process, and to its gendered content, see Della Pollock, “New Man to New Woman: 
Women in Brecht and Expressionism,” Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism 4 (1989): 85 – 107. Pollock 
argues “…no critic has fully recognized the extent to which Brecht develops the emergent but stalemated figure of 
the “New Woman” in late expressionism.” Pollock, “New Man to New Woman,”, p. 85. 
30 A helpful text here is Roswitha Mueller’s Bertolt Brecht and the Theory of Media (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1989), in particular 1 – 21.  
31 This has also at times been misrepresented, or at least misunderstood. “Brecht’s enthusiasm for the transformative, 
revolutionary potential of the commodification process in modern society may seem naïve today, considering the 
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aesthetically. The importance of this process – a process which involved experimentation almost 
unparalleled in Brecht’s career as well as level of revision beyond anything that Brecht will later 
perform – will be shown to be absolutely indispensable in framing the problematics of change in 
this formation of the new human and the contradictions of capitalism.32  
The focus in this chapter will not only be to delve into the contradictions and internal and 
external workings of this one play. This chapter also aims to present a continuum of practice in 
Brecht’s pre-1933 works, and will thus use the reading of Mann ist Mann as an attempt to grasp a 
better understanding of this new society and the changeable human left without options, and 
argue that the conclusions that Brecht came to from his work on this play informed his highly 
productive and much acclaimed work of the period from 1929 – 1933. This work represents a 
more confident socialist alternative to the concept of changeability and attempts to propose a 
productive way beyond the twin evils of Capitalism and Fascism. Kuhle Wampe and Die Heilige 
Johanna der Schlachthoefe are answers to the specific nature and mode of production of 
meanings and forms of thought that Brecht so brilliantly displays in Mann ist Mann. 
What shall be made clear throughout this chapter is that Brecht framed his work as a 
response to the contemporary moment.33 His attention to experimentation underlies his 
                                                        
homogenising, totalising effects of global capitalism and the apparent limitations of collective as well as individual 
resistance and activism. But Brecht’s positive evaluation of the capitalist labour process has to be understood within 
the framework of Marxist thought, which considers the economic system of capitalist society only as a transitory, 
indeed necessary, stage towards a total functional transformation (Umfunktionierung) of life.”  Karoline Gritzner, 
Adorno and Modern Theatre: The Drama of the Damaged Self in Bond, Rudkin, Barker and Kane (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2015): 67. While Brecht was indeed fascinated with the ability of capital to change, this was not due to a 
resigned acceptance of capitalism’s benefits, but an attempt to work through the system as it is, rather than what 
you’d like it to be. In a similar way, Brecht hastens to Lukacs “Is there no solution then? There is. The new 
ascendant class shows it. It is not a way back. It is not linked to the good old days but to the bad new ones. It does 
not involve undoing techniques but by developing them. Man does not become man again by stepping out of the 
masses but by stepping back into them.” This is the response against “capitalism in its fascist phase.” Bertolt Brecht, 
“Against Georg Lukacs,” in Aesthetics and Politics, Jameson ed., p. 69.  
32 Anthony Squiers and Norman Roessler, “Rethinking Brecht,” Communications from the International Brecht 
Society 40 (2011): 119 – 133. 
33 This “usefulness”, as Jameson notes, “would have delighted” Brecht. Fredric Jameson, Brecht and Method 
(London: Verso, 1998): 1.  
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commitment to an understanding of the Jetztzeit – the moment of the now. Whereas several of the 
key studies of Brecht sought, as Anthony Squiers notes, “to provide formalistic approaches”34 
with an implied extraction of and derision towards the political impulses of his work and frame 
him as an innovator of the purely aesthetic – i.e. as someone chiefly in conversation with and 
opposed to the Aristotelean tradition – in this Chapter I will argue that these strategies were part 
and parcel of a larger political-cultural moment which saw the audience member as a producer of 
the text themselves and a producer of the means of further cultural and social production. As 
such, I will argue that Brecht’s work before 1933 was moving towards a consistent whole, and 
that his work is both responsive to his own society’s political and economic culture, but also 
attempted new methods of engaging his audience so as to encourage oppositional forms of 
thinking in his audience.35  
In Chapter 3 my attention will turn to William Blake. Given the comparative nature of 
this project, my aim is to place Brecht and Blake side-by-side in chapters 2 and 3 to highlight the 
commonalities (and to a lesser extent, the differences) of how each explored the time of the now, 
albeit at this earlier point in their respective careers without reference to history or overt historical 
themes. Alongside any discussions of the moment of the contemporary will necessarily be a 
discussion of the role of experimentation in Blake’s works. Experimentation here does not refer 
to a narrow definition of “trying new things” but to a greater ontological framework that Blake 
attempts to make known in his work, typified in the opening line of David Erdman’s collection, 
                                                        
34 Anthony Squiers, An Introduction to the Social and Political Philosophy of Bertolt Brecht: Revolution and 
Aesthetics (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2014): 14. The studies referred to here include John Willett’s The theatre of Bertolt 
Brecht: A study from eight aspects (London: Eyre Methuen, 1977), Eric Bentley’s Bentley on Brecht (New York: 
Applause, 1999) and Martin Esslin’s Bertolt Brecht (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969).   
35 In this way Brecht invites us “to act as a political subject rather than be exploited as a political object.” Ellis 
Shookman, “Barthes’s Semiological Myth of Brecht’s Epic Theatre,” Monatshefte 81 (1989): 459. For an 
examination of Barthes’s treatment of Brecht recommended is Jim Carmody, “Reading Scenic Writing: Barthes, 
Brecht, and Theatre Photography,” Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism 5 (1990): 25 – 38. 
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that “As the true method of knowledge is experiment, the true faculty of knowing must be the 
faculty which experiences.”36 My entrance into Blake will be his most common entry point for 
modern readers, the cycle Songs of Innocence and Songs of Experience. 
Although these sets of poems were written a few years apart, the Chapter will read the 
two songs cycles in conversation with each other. What the poems offers is a unique dialectical 
examination of Blake’s England. Blake constructs two opposing forms of living in the world, 
both built around the response to a potential fulfilling and nurturing form of life. In the song 
cycle Blake constructs a yawning excoriation of the logics of contemporary capitalism, “a world 
in which the mind and the senses are completely ensnared by fallenness.”37  Unlike Brecht, 
however, Blake’s references involved a specific lived relation to God in the world, a worldview 
of God that could never truly be disentangled from our lived relations with ourselves and the 
natural world of which we are part. The problem for Blake, as I will argue, was that the dominant 
forces of his day were attempting to poison the waters which made life so creative and 
nourishing. Blake understood the political power of God in the world, especially as the dominant 
ideologies of his day sought to consolidate their power and make strange the freeing nature of life 
that could be, and the potentialities that such a life could release and inspire in others. This is then 
a culmination of Blake’s poetics.38  
 Blake sought to argue in the Songs that we could make of life a continuous experiment, 
where the true depths of our engagement would reveal, constantly, new ontological relations 
between all created and creative beings.39 This potential was being denied and deformed, and 
                                                        
36 David Erdman ed., Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake (New York: Doubleday, 1988): 1. 
37 Nicholas Williams, Ideology and Utopia in the Poetry of William Blake (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998): 26. 
38 The chief texts that will be dealt with this here are Saree Makdisi, William Blake and the Impossible History of the 
1790s (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003) and E.P. Thompson, Witness Against the Beast. 
39 While Makdisi will deal with this point extensively, John H. Jones articulates this process using Mikhail Bahktin: 
“Blake’s creative process, then, can be seen as based on what Bahktin would later call dialogue. In order for a poet’s 
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thus we see a conversation beginning in Innocence and Experience, between, as the subtitle 
reads: “Shewing the Two Contrary States of the Human Soul.”40 In Innocence Blake constructs, 
or as he might see it, explores and taps into, a mode of relating to the world in its most admirable 
state. This is not ideal in the sense of never possibly existing, as Blake suggests it is this form of 
being that is necessary. Yet while Experience is the other of Innocence, its inverted other, 
Innocence attempts not only to provide a model for a form of life after the dominance of 
Experience has ended, but tries to show that Innocence enacted becomes a form of resistance and 
resisting inspiration.  
 While Blake and Brecht have different aesthetic strategies, and are defined very much by 
their relation to the aesthetic traditions they inherited, not to mention the political-economic 
contexts/moments that determined their texts, there was a combined commitment for both to 
understand their moments and also respond in oppositional ways that could both engage with 
their historical moments, and articulate an aesthetics of resistance. In this way they have a unique 
but overlapping strategy to stand on the edge of their respective historical conjunctures, between 
understanding and what one makes of this understanding, between engaging with structures of 
dominance, and locating ways of unlocking them. 
Whereas in Chapter 2 the focus is centred on the role of the newness and Jetztzeit of 
Brecht’s contemporary society, the works dealt with in Chapter 4 are those which are important 
for his use of history. Yet this is not, as mentioned, history “wie es eigentlich gewesen ist.” 
Rather, Brecht articulates consistently a redemptive “political hermeneutics”41 of history that he 
                                                        
discourse to be inclusive, to be more than a single, subjective viewpoint, the poet must restrain his impulse toward 
Selfhood and engage the world dialogically.” John H. Jones, “‘Self-Annihilation’ and Dialogue in Blake’s Creative 
Process: Urizen, Milton, Jerusalem,” Modern Language Studies 24 (1994): 8-9. 
40 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 7. 
41 Nicolai Krejberg Knudsen, “Redemptive Revolutions: The Political Hermeneutics of Walter Benjamin,” Crisis 
and Critique 1 (2014): 167. 
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formed in his discussions with Benjamin in the late 1930s, capturing that which he finds fruitful 
and using it to his own ends in order to engage productive material for the struggles of his 
present.42  This is not, let us be clear, a use of history in order to rewrite it, or as a means to right 
historical wrongs. Rather, Brecht’s tasks are to make known those voices which have been 
written out of ruling-class models of historiography43 and to make what is known (setting aside 
historical veracity) of history in the public consciousness – what Raymond Williams has termed 
residual cultures44 – as a means of conveying an argument about the contemporary world. 
Chapter 4 will begin with an examination of Brecht’s most famous history play, Mutter 
Courage und ihre Kinder. Despite the mirage of historical accuracy, the firm dates listed 
throughout the text, the map that was originally used to show Courage’s movements across 
northern Europe, and the backdrop of an historical war, I argue that the play uses these to evoke 
the image of the peasant as she is generally registered as occupying the most pitied position of 
all. The peasant is useful for Brecht because she, in popular imagination, clearly signifies and 
associates with decidedly clear forms of exploitation and oppression while also being the terrified 
subject of war and famine.45 Yet, despite the fact that Courage is not herself a peasant – her 
particular lesson is that of the peasant turned contemporary small businessperson – the play relies 
heavily on depictions of historical forms of oppression and exploitation to make clear the death 
drive of the plague of Nazism and to argue that the interchangeability of national and religious 
identity can be a useful force for opposition to contemporary forms of exploitation and 
                                                        
42 Although the definitive text on Brecht and Benjamin remains, in my view, Wizisla’s, a useful chapter that rethinks 
on the level of philosophy the relationship of the two is “Walter Benjamin and Bertolt Brecht Discuss Franz Kafka: 
Exilic Journeys,” in Freddie Rokem, Philosophers and Thespians: Thinking Performances (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2010). 
43 Robert Vork, “Silencing Violence: Repetition and Revolution in Mother Courage and Her Children,” 
Comparative Drama 47 (2013). 
44 Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977). 
45 Jameson, Brecht and Method. 
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oppression. History is therefore not that which has happened, but continues to happen. Here the 
play allows for the audience member to be a producer of alternate meanings and history (for the 
present), a strategy that Brecht further developed in exile.46   
A similar process is at work in the Caucasian Chalk Circle where Brecht uses a 
traditional biblical moral narrative as a means of engaging in the question of land distribution in 
post-WWII Eastern Europe. By drawing on the biblical story of Solomon, Brecht attempts to 
make arguments about the right of production over tradition, interestingly by using traditional 
tropes as the process for doing so. Brecht uses then what is available to him (in true bricolage 
fashion), yet he uses it as a means of articulating a possible political project. In using the fable 
form, Brecht reaches back and performs a redemptive hermeneutic of the form and mixes it with 
the techniques that he had fostered in his earlier work, particularly as regards engaging the 
audience.47  
This political intervention also provides the backdrop behind the writing of Galileo 
Galilei. As in Mann ist Mann, Galileo Galilei was subject to numerous revisions and 
incarnations. As is seen in other works, Brecht uses an historical figure or setting in order to 
make an argument about the present. Yet here Brecht uses history as a means to argue against the 
mistakes or errors that others have committed and to distance the audience from these histories.48 
In all three textual analyses I will show how history is used as a means of both distancing the 
audience from the actions of their own circumstances while at the same time making the actions 
                                                        
46 As Raymond Williams notes: “Deprived of such a public, and having tried and largely failed to produce a drama 
which could confront Fascism directly, Brecht moved, both in technique and in choice of subject, towards new and 
deliberate forms of distance.” Raymond Williams, The Politics of Modernism: Against the New Conformists 
(London: Verso, 1996): 90.  
47 Joachim Fiebach, “Brecht: Gestus, Fable, Attitude-cum-Stance,” Modern Drama 42 (1999): 207 – 213.  
48 As Michael Sprinker notes while quoting Althusser: “The confrontation of two entirely distinct temporalities in 
Bertolazzi’s play ‘is in essentials also the structure the of plays such as mother Courage and (above all) Galileo.’” 
Imaginary Relations: Aesthetics and Ideology in the Theory of Historical Materialism (London: Verso, 1987): 278. 
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on stage connected to their own experiences. The role of history is absolutely central to Brecht’s 
developing oppositional aesthetics and serves to entrench further the necessity of accessing the 
reality and contradictions of the now.  
Chapter 5 will speak to the role of history in Blake’s work and in this regard it will be in 
conversation with Chapter 4. Here I will be building on the work of E. P. Thompson’s classic text 
Witness Against the Beast: William Blake and the Moral Law. While this seminal text offers a 
profoundly incisive way of reading Blake’s more directly politically engaging work from the 
1790s, Thompson’s focus stops there. My work will branch off of Thompson’s and connect 
further with Benjamin. I will examine a larger piece of Blake’s, his epic Milton, in order to locate 
how this work of historical re-investigation puts forward a philosophy of connecting the present 
to the past in order to illuminate what it is that the present lacks (and why the present  lacks it) 
and presenting an oppositional alternative to the dominant ideologies and structures of his 
society.  
For Blake, what is involved in his recovery of history is a proto-Benjaminian attention to 
the messianic impulse in history, except in this case it is not only the stakes allotted in Blake’s 
work for the “redeeming” vision of Christ. It is not enough that the messianic may enter at any 
point, but rather the messianic impulse offers a mode of historical re-fashioning for cultural 
history as well. In other words, for Blake the problem becomes not simply about creating an 
oppositional ideology of being in the world but one of undoing the historical injustices that have 
led to the present circumstance, especially those involved in the figure of Milton himself.49 As 
                                                        
49 Thomas J. J. Altizier notes succinctly the stakes here for Blake: “Blake's most revolutionary vision revolves 
around an absolute reversal of Milton's Satan, a reversal in which Satan is envisioned as the absolute Lord and 
Creator…” “That reversal occurs through an absolute death, but that death in crucifixion is apocalypse itself…” 
“Yes, Blake is a visionary of eternal death, but an eternal death that is an apocalyptic death, and precisely so as the 
eternal death of Satan. Only that eternal death realizes an absolute compassion or the compassion of Christ, a 
compassion truly reversing all Satanic judgment and repression, but a compassion in actual apart from that reversal; 
hence the absolute necessity of Satan, the absolute necessity of Satan for apocalypse itself, and the primacy of Satan 
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history is filled with loss, a resurrection of historical failures (Milton’s own feature prominently 
here) is therefore always a fundamental part of Blakean aesthetics. The resurrection is always 
already fundamentally political and therefore up for grabs by the contending parties of class 
society. Building on Chapter 3’s exegetical reading of the Songs, it will be shown how the time 
of the now is inextricably intertwined with historical reinvestigation and rediscovery.  
Such a gesture necessitates a return to history and locates the radical tradition as a real 
and always openly radical oppositional alternative. History and its recovery are not, however, a 
returning to a comfortable point in history before the new evils of capitalism and religious 
orthodoxy. It is not a setting right of things by setting them back, something akin to a nostalgic 
formulation. Rather, the position that Blake argues for is one where the questions around the 
organisation of the everyday are merely made visible and possible by the contrasting of history 
against the contemporary. As Thompson writes, Blake is arguing for “not a place at all, but a way 
of breaking out from received wisdom and moralism, and entering new possibilities.”50 This need 
not occur only through an articulation of the moment of the now, even though extra-historical 
notions of time make the leap into new possibilities out of the past.  
Despite the attention to Blake’s version of history (a history which is always around us), I 
will investigate the way in which Blake uses various notions of labour (broadly defined) to 
articulate a politics that –  while acknowledging that we are historical creatures – is always 
attuned to providing a way out of contemporary oppression. In this regard I will focus on the 
metaphors of labour and production in the text, arguing that while the historical situation may not 
                                                        
in all apocalyptic vision, and the fuller the apocalyptic vision, the fuller the vision of Satan.”  Thomas J. J. Altizer, 
“The Revolutionary Vision of William Blake,” The Journal of Religious Ethics 37 (2009): 37. 
50 Thompson, Witness Against the Beast, 20. 
 22 
have allowed it, Blake was fixated on advancing a redemptive politics of history that was placed 
firmly in the time of the now.  
The dissertation closes with an analysis of the comparative strategies of Blake and Brecht. 
While much of the dissertation has as a central focus the comparison of the two strategies, given 
that each of Chapters 2 through 5 has a specific focus on either Brecht or Blake, the conclusion 
will provide a more thoroughgoing comparison particularly on the forms of experience that each 
puts forward as a means of thinking through, and beyond, contemporary dynamics. 
Such an understanding of oppositional aesthetics must stretch back to its principal figures 
in order to understand its position today. Brought together, Brecht and Blake offer a powerful 
argument for a contemporary political aesthetics which both seeks to witness and to lay bare the 
destructive contradictions of capitalism. By laying bare they are not merely skirting around 
capitalism’s contradictions but rather offering a powerful analysis of the system straight through 
its heart. Thus, it is not merely a rejection of the system, although it is most definitely that as 
well, but a productive attempt to both understand capital’s movements, its abilities consistently to 
create new meanings and produce new avenues of exploitation and production, in order to make 
something revolutionary out of it. This criticism is always a nascent criticism which takes 
seriously the movements in the contemporary to express a living aesthetic.  
To be clear, I am not merely reproducing here the problematics of other oppositional 
criticisms which retreat into those moments when they were in power or in the ascendancy. That 
is, I am not going back to the “Good old Times,” as Benjamin once recorded a comment of 
Brecht’s. Rather, I am arguing that these past works can provide much needed useful direction 
and succour at a moment when the left needs it most. Following Benjamin, the non-chronological 
method adopted in the dissertation (starting with Brecht, then moving to Blake, and then again in 
Chapters 4 and 5) mirrors my argument about history. This procedure is “constellative” in 
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Benjamin’s sense, that is bringing both Brecht and Blake (as well as Benjamin) into a non-linear 
but rather constellated relationship, in which each is read in the light projected by the other. The 
connection to what was then, and what was before then, is dialectical in nature and a clear 
attempt to gather the interpreted images of Blake and Brecht, characterized and defined as they 
are in relation to differing historical projects (the modernist and romantic) and provide an 
alternate reading, very much against the grain of literary history.51  
 
 
                                                        
51 This focus on a constellative approach is also taken up by Adorno in his “The Actuality of Philosophy,” where he 
refers to the “to the manipulation of conceptual material by philosophy, I speak purposely of grouping and trial 
arrangement, of constellation and construction.” See Theodore Adorno, “The Actuality of Philosophy,” Telos 31 
(1977): 131. 
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Chapter 2: Brecht and the Now 
 
A Brechtian maxim: “Don’t start from the 
 good old things but the bad new ones.”52 
 
 In this chapter I will be comparing three of Brecht’s earlier texts, all three written pre-
exile from Nazi Germany. I will be arguing that in Mann ist Mann, Die heilige Johanna der 
Schlachthoefe, and Kuhle Wampe, Brecht was motivated in providing responses to the key, and 
to varying degrees nascent, political questions/quandaries facing the socialist left of his day. 
Further, I will argue that rather than advance a propagandistic approach, Brecht sought to 
navigate these questions with a highly developed (yet itself always developing) formal aesthetic 
politics. While each of the three texts (two plays and a film) attempts to deal with a specific 
problem on its own, taken together the three share a unified and complementary response to the 
larger issues that confronted Brecht as a committed cultural producer. By complementary I mean 
that each text builds on and follows from each text that precedes it, and provides a fuller analysis 
of Weimar capitalism than any one single work could achieve. Although I am not arguing that 
these three texts represent a prescribed path on which Brecht was determinedly moving, that is, 
that the order of the texts necessarily had to follow the order they did, these three works 
nevertheless represent a coherent attempt to deal with the myriad political, social and economic 
problems of his time on a deeper and deeper level, and dealt with these three issues in more 
integrative ways – coming to terms in more direct and aggressive ways with the core 
problematics of the time period, as his works progressed. In this way, as I mentioned in the 
                                                        
52 Walter Benjamin, Understanding Brecht (London: Verso, 1998): 121. 
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Introduction, following Benjamin, Brecht sought to engage radically his present to make possible 
a radically engaged future.  
 I will investigate the key problematic in each text. For Mann ist Mann, I will focus on the 
formation of what Brecht terms the “bad collective” and its relation to forming (or perhaps de-
forming and then re-forming is more accurate) a new individuality and also new class formations 
in Weimar capitalism. I will then shift gears and focus on Die Heilige Johanna, a play which 
deals with the new class (or the ability of the system, at a time of considerable economic and 
social crisis, to integrate and control those whom it exploits) and its relation to the disastrous 
financial system. Finally, the chapter will end with a discussion of Brecht’s first major film (as 
ever, in collaboration with others) Kuhle Wampe: Oder wem gehört die Welt? in order to show 
how oppositional groups must respond to this financial system which oppresses them and also 
how, given that this new system is a class system, must respond as a class. Brecht responds, in 
light of these earlier works, in ways that subvert the system he analyses, while also going through 
it.  
 In these texts Brecht addresses dynamics that capitalism itself creates on both an 
immediate and largely historical scale, its crises and its political responses (most important here 
are the rise of fascism in terms of the social construction of the modern individual/class and the 
breakdown/reconfiguration of the capitalist order, and the appropriate political action needed to 
halt it and construct a viable socialist alternative). While later in the dissertation I will be 
examining Brecht’s use of history, here I will be exploring how Brecht constructs an aesthetic 
politics of the now. These three texts are deeply complex investigations of the contemporary 
moment and all three in their own way provide not merely a critique of Brecht’s own society but 
speak to a deep-seeded interest, or, more appropriately, opposition to the current order. For this, it 
was necessary for Brecht to understand the motives and potentials of what this world could 
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produce. In Mann ist Mann, as I will present shortly, this is the menacing figure of the “bad 
collective” and the uses and abuses of its continued reproduction. 
 
Mann ist Mann: The Right Question and the Precision of Time 
 
Despite the fact that Benjamin wrote the words that open this chapter as late as 1931, I 
would like to argue that they apply equally well to Brecht before his oft-cited transformation into 
a full-fledged Marxist thinker, however overblown this transformation is made out to be.53 I 
believe there is a constant in Brecht, at the very least from the point of the first productions of 
Mann ist Mann onwards, to involve himself wholeheartedly in an exhaustive, and at times 
exhausting, experiment of the present. This experiment begins with an understanding of the 
contemporary moment, but the notion of experiment involves a far more thoroughgoing 
appreciation and playing with the often under-appreciated and under-theorized impulses that are 
necessary in maintenance of the contemporary order. This exercise, this practice, is not one which 
ends at any one point in Brecht’s life’s but rather continues until the end of his work.54 
                                                        
53 This is a serious problem in Brecht scholarship. Efforts have been made to locate the specific point in Brecht’s 
political development when his political outlook became Marxist. The fault in this investigation seems to be the 
placing of a specific point in time that Brecht read Marx’s works. Rather, I would like to shift focus from this to a 
more complex view of this process, a view which sees Marxism not as a formal endpoint that one arrives at, but 
rather a process which helps to make sense of one’s society. Brecht himself seemed to share in this outlook as noted 
when he states that “When I read Marx I understood more deeply my own work…this man Marx was the only 
spectator for my plays I’d ever come across.” Bertolt Brecht, Brecht on Theatre: The Development of an Aesthetic 
(London: Methuen, 1978): 24-25. This remark suggests Brecht was at the very least already posing those questions 
that Marx’s work can inspire, but also make sense of. Also, Brecht’s comment that he hadn’t as of yet found the 
spectators for his plays is in some way substantiated in that Brecht’s Mann ist Mann, along with other early, were 
often dismissed as a “satirical polemic against bourgeois value systems.” See Dorothee Ostmeier, “The Rhetorics of 
Erasure: Cloud and Moon in Brecht’s Poetic and Political Texts of the Twenties and Early Thirties,” German Studies 
Review 23 (2000): 275.  
54 Fredric Jameson has very usefully referred to a “Brechtian doctrine of activity” which is similar to what I am 
describing here. It is particularly apt, given its Luxembourgist connotations, something which Brecht would have 
himself been very sympathetic to. See Jameson, Brecht and Method, 4.  
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Evidence of this preoccupation with the contemporary moment is perhaps no more clearly 
present than in the full title of Mann ist Mann. In its entirety it reads Die Verwandlung des 
Packers Galy Gay in den Militaerbaracken von Kilkoa im Jahre 
neunzehnhundertfuenfundzwanzig.55 The full script version, including the exact date of 1925, 
denotes the intentional laying down of a marker of time. This suggests precision in a specific 
moment in time above all else. The inexact qualifier “Packer” – which shares the exact spelling 
and inexact meaning of the English equivalent – stands in contrast with such an explicit moment. 
When given the attention it deserves, the term Packer is translated as “Dockarbeiter” or, in 
English, “Stevedore” or “Docker.” This is an interpretation of exactitude, losing the broad 
generality which the term Packer entails, and such a translation provides an opportunity for the 
audience member/reader to get her head around the social codes and locations involved in the 
popular imagination of such a profession. The sense of specificity in the space and time of 
continual change – that is, who one is, for whom one is, and where one stands in relation to 
others – will become the central dialectical relation in Brecht’s play. Indeed, there are many 
instances throughout Brecht’s works where the predominance and overt highlighting of the exact 
intervention, particularly as regards specific dates, is apparent, and I will endeavour to show this 
in each of the Brecht chapters. Mann ist Mann, which Brecht once admitted he had rewritten no 
                                                        
55 The English translation of the subtitle reads The transformation of the packer Galy Gay in the military Cantonment 
of Kilkoa during the year nineteen hundred and twenty five. 
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less than ten times,56 provides a fruitful starting point as the history of this play and its various 
productions mirrors the history of the development of Brecht’s Marxist aesthetic praxis.57  
Let us then begin with perhaps the most prevalent reading of the play. As has been the 
case in many other non-materialist interpretations of avowedly materialist texts, critics have 
(either willingly or unwillingly, consciously or unconsciously) attempted to extract the class 
politics out of Brecht’s early work and to reinforce the image of the playwright as being 
essentially an operator in formal matters. An example of this can be found in the following: 
 
Since all things in nature change, it may be assumed that man is also changeable and 
capable of being changed, capable even of changing himself. ...The issue, as Brecht sees 
it, is much more pragmatic; it is a matter of sizing up situations in terms of flux, of tracing 
the course of events by which change manifests itself, and then of gauging the 
possibilities (including those in human nature itself) for alteration. In short, the problem 
of change, measured by its effects, becomes the problem of method – of selecting the 
proper means for controlling the direction of change in order to bring about the results 
one desires.58  
                                                        
56 “I feel myself I must still, must always, learn. From what I learned from the audience that saw it, I rewrote Mann 
ist Mann ten times, and presented it at different times and in different ways – for example, in Darmstadt in 1926, at 
the Berlin Volksbuehne in 1927, at the Berlin Federal Theatre in 1929. We worked with different means and in 
different strata of society. These experiments were theatrical performances meant not so much for the spectator as for 
those who were engaged in the performance. It was, so to speak, art for the producer, not art for the consumer.” 
Bertolt Brecht, Werke (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1993), Band 22.2: 943. 
57 What is perhaps interesting in this regard is that there is that Brecht encouraged others to make concrete 
interventions with the play as well. As Brecht wrote in 1936 in regards to an interest from London in re-staging the 
play in Nazi Germany, “Die Parabel Mann ist Mann kann ohne grosse Muehe konkretisiert werden. Die 
Verwandlung des Kleinbuergers Galy gay in eine “menschliche Kampfmaschine” kann statt in Indien in Deutschland 
spielen. Die Sammlung der Armee zu kilkoa kann in den Parteitag der NSDAP zu Nurnberg verwandelt werden. Die 
Stelle des Elefanten Billy Humph kann ein gestohlenes, nunmehr der SA gehoerendes Privatauto einnehmen. Der 
Einbruch kann statt in den Tempel des Herrn Wang in den Laden eines juedischen Troedlers erfolgen. Jip wuerde 
dann als arischer Geschaeftsteilhaber von dem Kraemer angestellt. Das Verbot sichtbarer Beschaedigungen 
juedischer Geschaefte waere mit der Anwesenheit englicher Journalisten zu begruenden.” Brecht, Werke, Band 24: 
51. 
58 Leroy Shaw, The Playwright and Historical Change: Dramatic Strategies in Brecht, Hauptmann, Kaiser and 
Wedekind (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970): 146-7. This analysis of the play is also (albeit more 
adroitly and complexly) offered by Jan Knopf in his “Die Austauschbarkeit Individualitaet” section on Mann ist 
Mann. See Jan Knopf, Brecht Handbuch I: Stuecke, (Stuttgart: Verlag J. B. Metzler, 2002): 156. A further criticism 
of the type of position held by Shaw is advanced by Frederic Jameson when discussing Manipulation theory. 
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From this passage, seasoned with an oddly Aristotelian flavour given Brecht’s 
pronounced aversion to this in his statements on Epic Theatre, one could be misled into thinking 
that the lead character of the play, Galy Gay, is the classical “universal” figure, existing at any 
time and in any place. Change here is a concern not of content, of a specific type of determined 
historical change, but an abstracted one of methodology. The play though offers several ways in 
which this abstracted reading is bucked by the motivations and, importantly, pressures of change 
in the text and its production. Not least significant in this regard is the role of Widow Leocadia 
Begbick, a key character in the play and the play’s only female character. It is interesting to note 
here that Begbick is the only character in the play who operates under her (or his) own rules and 
volitions (as much as that is possible given the military settings). Whereas all the male characters 
in, as a common English translation of the title goes, “A Man’s a Man,” are representative of the 
inability to shape their own lives, Begbick, as Margaret Setje-Eilers notes, “remains 
paradoxically stable in each version.” Begbick “resists manipulation and influences others for her 
purposes.”59 In this way, the form of change or remodeling of humanity that the play offers is 
specifically gendered.60 Our notions of agency and mobility are constantly being confronted by 
changing notions of life in a world dominated by gender norms. 
                                                        
Important to note in the following is the move away from abstraction. Jameson notes that “Manipulation theory 
implies a psychology, but this is all very well and good: Brecht taught us that under the right circumstances you 
could remake anybody over into anything you liked (Mann ist Mann), only he insisted on the situation and the raw 
materials fully as much or more than on the techniques.” See Fredric Jameson, “Reification and Utopia in Mass 
Culture,” Social Text 1 (1979): 140-141. 
59 Margaret Setje-Eilers, “A Man's a Man, but What about Woman? Widow Leocadia Begbick in Bertolt Brecht's 
Play (1926-2006),” Women in German Yearbook: Feminist Studies in German Literature & Culture 24 (2008): 97. 
Indeed, Setje will link the peculiar position of Begbick’s power in the film to growing achievements for feminists 
during the Weimar period as an explanation for Begbick strength in the play.   
60 Adding to this, before Galy Gay leaves, his wife assures him that she will not leave the kitchen so as not to be in 
danger of coming into contact. Yet as we learn, it is Galy Gay, not his wife, who is in danger. Here the gendered 
version of the title – it is not Mensch ist Mensch or a Person’s a Person – suggests that men are more in danger than 
women if they are determined to not act upon their interests. 
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The play is further brought down to earth in that we learn that what sets Galy Gay out on 
the path to becoming re-functioned is a concrete pursuit of material goods, specifically a fish for 
the family’s dinner. This basic impetus to the action in the play has more or less been lost for 
critical engagement. The specificity of the position not only of worker but yet again of the task of 
buying food is central in assessing the role of the lead character. The materiality of the act, and 
the importance of that materiality in determining or limiting direction in the unravelling of the 
play, is key. In this regard it is useful to recall one of Brecht’s most famous aphorisms, “Erst 
kommt das Fressen, dann die Morale (First comes eating, then morals).” It is first in the basic act 
of reproducing himself and surviving that Galy Gay will be subject to his transformation. In this 
regard, his class position is also vital in analysing his unenviable, but explainable, shift in 
persona. It is a simple motivation, yet one that determines his action and that of those around 
him. 
While this may resemble a straightforward fulfillment of the oft vulgarized and highly 
static base/superstructure metaphor – whereby the economy determines all aspects of politics and 
human emotions – one should be cautious about such an interpretation. I am dealing with 
something more important in the Brechtian aesthetic than the foregrounding of materiality, 
although this is fundamental to Brecht’s aesthetics. It is the foregrounding of precision (which 
will propel Brecht to experiment in order to meet this level of exactitude) that is the focus. 
Precision here is the fullest understanding of a moment in time which necessitates a full-blown 
process of continual reinvestigation of the bare grounds on which Brecht as a cultural producer 
stands, but also of the ground upon which we all stand. The process itself, due to its historical 
specificities, will never allow for a moment of stasis. The aesthetic which Brecht seeks to shape 
will be necessarily in flux. At a later stage in Brecht’s cultural production, when a fuller and 
deeper understanding of Marxism forces him to rethink his political trajectory (most obvious here 
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is the rewriting of the play Die Dreigroschenoper into novel form), he will revisit his earlier 
work in order to make the texts more prescient for contemporary interventions. Yet what will 
stick with Brecht will be this always already moment of precision or accuracy at a temporal and 
spatial point when, paradoxically, it is at its most elusive, i.e. in medias res.  
Due to this positioning, the task of the aesthetic producer must therefore be quick, but 
open to specific political developments and revisions. For this reason, the Mann ist Mann 
document (i.e. the physical text) is that which is perhaps the least relevant for a Brechtian 
aesthetic. It is this new form of aesthetic response that Walter Benjamin argued was so difficult 
for professional theatre reviewers to get their collective heads around, a reading which I will 
address shortly. Thus, the first productions of the play bear the mark of a working-class 
movement that had been under the threat of imperialism and militarism, and would soon be 
confronted with their uglier sibling, Nazism. The question for Brecht is how could such a 
situation arise? What would make the victory of such a “movement” possible and realisable? 
While it would be dangerous to state that Nazism was a fait accompli as early as 1923 or even 
1926, Brecht was clearly grappling with the implications of the potential for such a movement, 
and these implications were later made the guiding principle of the play. Brecht writes:   
 
I turned to the comedy Man Equals Man with particular apprehension. Here again I had a 
socially negative hero who was by no means unsympathetically treated. The play’s theme 
is the false, bad collective (the “gang”) and its powers of attraction, the same collectivity 
which Hitler and his backers were even then in the process of recruiting by an exploitation 
of the petty-bourgeoisie’s vague longing for the historically timely, genuinely social 
collectivity of the workers. Before me were two versions, the one performed at the Berlin 
Volksbuehne in 1928 and the other at the Berlin Staatstheater in 1931. I decided to restore 
the earlier version, where Galy Gay captures the mountain fortress of Sir El-Djower. In 
1931 I had allowed the play to end with the great dismantling operation, having been 
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unable to see any way of giving a negative character to the hero’s growth within the 
collectivity. I decided to leave that growth undescribed.61 
  
Brecht began writing the earliest version of the play shortly after the First World War in 1919, 
and the impulse for writing a play about a passive character who is co-opted and transformed into 
a “menschliche Kampfsmachine” (human fighting machine)62 is not difficult, at least in 
hindsight, to ascertain.63 Yet the first production of the play comes only in 1926 when a new 
“dangerous affair” was rearing its head, something which Brecht himself was aware of. Yet what 
should interest us most in the quote above is the notion of “schlechte Kollektiv,” or the bad 
collective, which has interests that run counter to those of the working class but could also 
transform these people who, as Galy Gay, “can’t say no.” In this sense Brecht’s play is a valuable 
heuristic model and parable, a piece that from its very beginning allows itself to act out the 
spoken and silent moments in which the potentials of the future, but more importantly of the 
present, are to be made known.64 It is for this reason – that the present is always with us but never 
                                                        
61 This translation can be found in Douglas Robinson’s Estrangement and the Somatics of Literature: Tolstoy, 
Shklovsy, Brecht (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 2008): 245. The original German reads as follows: “An die 
Lektuere des Lustspiels Mann ist Mann machte ich mich mit besonderen Befuerchtungen. Auch hier hatte ich wieder 
einen sozial negativen Helden, der nicht ohne Sympathie behandelt war. Das Problem des Stückes ist das falsche, 
schlechte Kollektiv (der Bande) und seine Verfuehrungskraft, jenes Kollektiv, das in diesen Jahren Hitler und seine 
Geldgeber rekrutieren, das unbestimmte Verlagen der Kleinbürger nach dem geschichtlich reifen, echten sozialen 
Kollektiv der Arbeiter ausbeutend. Es lagen zwei Fassungen vor, die in 1928 in der Berliner Volksbühne und die 
1931 am Berliner Staatstheater gespielte. Wiederherzustellen, fand ich, war die erste Fassung, in der Galy Gay die 
Bergfestung Sir el Dchowr erobert. Ich hatte 1931 das Stueck nach dem grossen Montageakt enden lassen, da ich 
keine Möglichkeit sah, dem Wachsum des helden im Kollektiv einen negativen Charakter zu verleihen. So hatte ich 
lieber auf die Beschreibung des Wachtums verzichtet.” See Brecht, Werke, Band. 23: 244-5. 
62 The reference to the “menschliche Kampfmaschine” is the description given to Galy Gay at the end of the play 
(but before the elephant calf). See Brecht, Werke, Band 2: 157. 
63 It is also important to note, as Kate Elswit argues, that the reassembly of the character Galy Gay is similar to the 
way in which many “disfigured” WWI veterans were rebuilt with prosthetics after the war. See Kate Elswit, The 
Some of the Parts: Prosthesis and Function in Bertolt Brecht, Oskar Schlemmer, and Kurt Jooss, Modern Drama 51 
(2008): 389-410.  
64 I am using the notion of the unspoken or silence as that expressed by Pierre Macherey a notion which attempts to 
get at what a work “refuses to say” or “what a work cannot say.” See Pierre Macherey’s A Theory of Literary 
Production (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1978): 87. 
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fully understood nor understandable – that Brecht relies on many levels of experimentation and 
revision. One cannot “know” the ground upon which one stands, and so chances need to be taken. 
This was something that Walter Benjamin understood very well. Benjamin was, of 
course, a very significant analyst of the play in its early 1930’s iterations, and was unequivocal in 
his positive reading of the play. However, what I would like to note specifically about 
Benjamin’s view of these versions of the play is the emphasis on understanding the key 
contradictions and “newness” of the piece. Benjamin, in his “What is Epic Theatre?” argues for 
the importance of that understanding and presentation in Mann ist Mann. He writes: 
 
The plays of a Toller or a Lampel do not take this detour [via Epic Theatre]; exactly like 
the works of German pseudo-classicism, they “award primacy to the idea, and all the time 
make the spectator desire a specific aim, creating, as it were, an ever-increasing demand 
for the supply”. Such writers attack the conditions in which we live from the outside; 
Brecht lets the conditions speak for themselves, so that they confront each other 
dialectically. Their various elements are played off logically against one another. The 
docker Galy Gay in Brecht’s A Man’s a Man is like an empty stage on which the 
contradictions of our society are acted out.65 
 
Benjamin’s reading of Mann ist Mann is written in the context of an analysis of Epic Theatre as a 
whole, and his reading is inevitable as the central tenets of this aesthetic approach are articulated 
thoroughly in the play.66 The key contribution of Brecht is an attempt to do what others do not, 
that is, attack the conditions in which we live from the inside in order to some degree to be 
                                                        
65 Benjamin, Understanding Brecht, 8. 
66 What is interesting to note here is that while professional critics attacked Brecht, they also sought to make it 
difficult for his supporters to be heard in defending the merits of his play. This included Benjamin himself, whose 
piece “What is Epic Theatre?” was blocked from being published by, among others, no less a figure than Siegfried 
Kracauer. See Erdmut Wizisla, Walter Benjamin and Bertolt Brecht: The Story of a Friendship (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2009): 114.   
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useful. This approach to cultural production is one which asks us to think differently our 
connection to the “real.” As Terry Eagleton writes: 
 
Brecht’s practice is not to dispel the miasma of “false consciousness” so that we may 
“fix” the object as it really is; it is to persuade us into living a new discursive and practical 
relation to the real. “Rationality” for Brecht is thus indissociable from scepticism, 
experiment, refusal and subversion.67  
 
The idea of not attempting to fix the object, or perhaps for our purposes the object could be read 
as a moment in time, is vital in understanding how the Brechtian aesthetic seeks not to capture an 
overall picture, but to understand a dialectical image of capitalism. The refusal to which Eagleton 
refers represents what is at stake in the play. Galy Gay is introduced to us at the very outset as a 
man “who can’t say no” and for this he must work through the imperatives that capitalism and 
war place upon him, not by chance or exception but rather by the fullest of determinations, 
impulses and rules. The inability to say no is what makes the structural contradictions absorb 
Galy Gay so definitively, rendering him vulnerable to the unique demands and general rules of 
the dominant societal impulses. Benjamin again: “And so it happens that the wise proletarian 
Galy Gay, the man who keeps himself to himself, agrees to join the berserk ranks of the British 
colonial army, thereby consenting to the denial of his own wisdom.”68  
In stressing the class position of the lead character, Benjamin employs and grounds his 
argument with a distinct notion of contemporality here. The contemporary moment manifests 
itself (always already) in the relationship between the audience and a politicisation of the cultural 
producer. This itself is made possible only through a combination of the analysis/interpretation of 
                                                        
67 Terry Eagleton, Walter Benjamin, or, Towards a Revolutionary Criticism (London, Verso, 1994): 85. 
68 Benjamin, Understanding Brecht, 9. 
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the contemporary moment and the form of theatre put forward by Brecht.69 Astrid Oesmann has 
commented on the centrality of the question of positionality in her 2005 book Staging History: 
Brecht’s Social Concepts of Ideology. In it she writes:  
 
This vision of social existence informs Brecht’s changing political vision and becomes a 
formative element in his teaching plays, in which every question is negotiated in a strictly 
defined space. This renders political problems as questions of social positioning: “Wo 
stehst du und wie stehst du zu uns?” (Where do you stand and how do you stand toward 
us?).70  
 
The question of where one stands in relation to the other, both in terms of an individual to a 
social group, or one social group to another, is fundamental to Brecht’s Epic Theatre. The posing 
of the question of this relationship gets at the heart of Brecht’s politics and aesthetics.  
Brecht’s interest here is to design an ongoing project that will most clearly illuminate the 
current historical moment in which he operates. This project is larger than any one moment, and 
becomes a philosophy of agency. As Brecht noted on this play:  
 
It does not make the hero the victim of an inevitable fate, nor does it wish to make the 
spectator the victim, so to speak, of a hypnotic experience in the theatre. In fact, it has a 
purpose of “teaching” of the spectator a certain quite practical attitude; we have to make it 
                                                        
69 “Brecht’s theatre, Benjamin now argued in “What is Epic Theatre? (1),” changed the function of theatre from 
entertainment to knowledge, whereby the political thesis-play was superseded. This change exploded at a stroke the 
“functional relationship between stage and public, text and performance, direction and actor.” Wizisla, Walter 
Benjamin and Bertolt Brecht, 112. 
70 Astrid Oesmann, Staging History: Brecht’s Social Concepts of Ideology (Albany: State University of New York, 
2005): 95. An important note to make here is that there is a growing refusal or partial rejection in recent Brechtian 
scholarship which argues, as I do here, that rather than provide a periodisation of Brecht – the experimental Brecht, 
Brecht in exile - or even to try and locate or dissect the precise moment when Brecht has reached Marxism, Brecht’s 
works are full of continuities and are better judged as a unity of central ideas and unfolding practices.  
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possible for him to take a critical attitude while he is in the theatre (as opposed to a 
subjective attitude of becoming completely “entangled” in what is going on).71 
 
Behind this is an entire aesthetic philosophy trained towards agency, whereby one attempts to 
delve as deeply as possible into our social situation and from that position articulate a politics 
from which we can make visible to a larger audience the current state we find ourselves in. 
Brecht’s cultural project (because it suggests it is larger than a project for theatre) is obliged to 
create formal techniques designed to show how individuals and collectives are 
socially/economically structured and that how they can act (or, as is more common in Brecht, fail 
to act) is not pre-determined, and is decisive for social outcomes.72 This theatre of the now (or, 
alternatively, a political aesthetics of the now) must be continually updated (as societies change 
so must oppositional movements) and be open to experimentation and the intricate materiality of 
the current historical moment.  
Yet the foregrounding of materiality in Mann ist Mann and the development of Epic 
Theatre are deeply intertwined.73 What one also loses in “an abstracted Brecht” is a fuller 
understanding of the piece and the greater political impetus of the play. Through the character 
                                                        
71 Brecht, Werke, Band 22.2: 941.  
72 On the question of Galy Gay’s own repeated transformations, Eugene Lunn notes that this is evidence that “it 
would be anachronistic to see him as alienated from himself in these roles: his “self” is in each of the 
transformations.” The point here is that there is great potential in such a transformation, “total changeability 
encourages the hope that things can be very different. The issue for Brecht was not any inevitable psychic 
depersonalization in the modern, collectivist age—a common traditionalist reading of the theory of alienation—but 
the question of how technology is used and to whose advantage.” See Eugene Lunn, “Marxism and Art in the Era of 
Stalin and Hitler: A Comparison of Brecht and Lukács,” New German Critique 3 (1974): 27.  
73 Brecht would remark that his first full Epic Theatre text is in fact Mann ist Mann. “Ja, diese Theorie vom epischen 
Drama ist allerdings von uns. Wir haben auch versucht, einige epische Dramen herzustellen. Ich habe Mann ist 
Mann, Bronnen hat den Ostpolzug und die Fleisser hat ihre Ingolstaedter Dramen in epischer Technik verfasst. Aber 
die versuche, episches Drama herzustellen, sind schon viel frueher dagewesen. Wann began sie? Sie begannen zu der 
Zeit, wo der Wissenschaft ihren grossen Start hatte, im vorigen Jahrhundert. Die anfaenge des Naturalismus waren 
die Anfaenge des Epischen Dramas in Europa.” Brecht, Werke, Band 21: 273. 
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Begbick, the play offers the reader a midway summary of what Brecht would like the audience to 
take from the piece. The last four lines of her “Zwischenspruch” read as follows: 
 
Herr Bertolt Brecht hopes you’ll see the ground on which you stand 
Slither between your toes like shifting sand 
So that the case of Galy Gay the porter makes you aware 
Life on this earth is a hazardous affair.74 
 
These four lines offer two different yet possible avenues for reading Brecht’s work. The first two 
lines seem to match very neatly the reading of the play which focuses only on an abstracting 
changing of humanity. “The ground on which you stand / Slither between your toes like shifting 
sand,”75 is akin to the unrelenting change that is so much the part and parcel of human existence. 
But this reading only fits neatly if we stop there. The last two lines, however, point towards 
something decidedly less abstract. “So that the case of the porter Galy Gay will make you aware / 
Life on this earth is a dangerous affair.” These last two lines bring us down from the abstract to 
the specific, which is what I would argue is a necessary turn for Brecht. These last two lines bring 
us into the realm of history, and of one’s precise historical moment and the stakes involved for its 
main actors. This is the chief point of the bad collective. There is simply no other option but to 
confront the bad collective for what it is and those who militate against it, and to examine the 
ways in which this entity seeks to multiply itself, manipulate contemporary experience (and 
forms of experience), and ward off other alternatives in order to meet its own needs. Not only 
                                                        
74 Bertolt Brecht, Man Equals Man and The Elephant Calf (New York: Arcade, 2000): 38. 
75 This dialectic relationship is reflected in the staging of the actors. As Olga Taxidou notes in her analysis of Mei 
Lan-fang, a Chinese actor who influenced Brecht at an early stage. She notes: “In the Brechtian world this dialectic is 
never fully resolved and points towards an endless “changeability” as the actor’s body denotes ‘this way of 
changing.’” Olga Taxidou, Modernism and Performance: Jarry to Brecht (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007): 142. 
 38 
must the bad collective reproduce itself, it must consume anything that provides for a possibility 
that another form of being in the world can exist. 
If we take Brecht’s use of “hazardous” seriously here, the abstracted reading of the play 
comes off as inadequate. By shifting discussion from merely the malleability of humans to the 
specific historical conditions of the play’s production, we are obliged to take into consideration 
Brecht’s interventionist strategy. In this regard, the vaguely unspecific nature of Galy Gay (he is 
an empty vessel, besides the markers mentioned earlier) poses a difficult question for Marxist 
analysis, that is how does capitalism not merely reproduce workers for its own purposes, but then 
reproduce differently on disparate trajectories? Brecht’s play is not an abstract interpretation of 
the general re-formation of humans but rather of the potential for the capitalist class to make 
workers into killing machines (this is the bad collective making true on Brecht’s promise that life 
is dangerous).76 The position of worker, however, needs to be highlighted here. As opposed to 
earlier forms of relatively fixed identities based on one’s work, the modern worker in capital’s 
logic must re-imagine herself and the way in which she “fits” into the market. In this sense Galy 
Gay’s transformation is mirrored by capitalism’s drives, crises and needs. This is a structured 
“reassembling,” wherein one aimed to be “the right man in the right place, ‘der rechte Mann am 
rechten Platz’ (Benjamin’s own adaptation of a Taylorist catchphrase).” This restructuring bears 
serious similarities to the problems of “re-functioning” for theatrical and cinematic production, as 
both Brigid Doherty and Lucia Ruprecht note throughout in their useful essays.77 I needn’t have 
                                                        
76 Marc Silberman sees this in more purely economic class terms. He writes: “Galy Gay in Man Equals Man is the 
most extreme example of this class mobility. He has no individual personality but conforms to the changing 
circumstances around him because he simply cannot say no.” Marc Silberman, “Bertolt Brecht, Politics, and 
Comedy,” Social Research: An International Quarterly, 79 (2012): 178. 
77 Brigid Doherty, “Test and Gestus in Brecht and Benjamin,” MLN 115 (2000): 442-481. Lucia Ruprecht further 
argues that the use of Gestus in the play is also evident in shaping and being shaped by “the gestural aesthetic of 
silent film,” and Brecht was involved in using video in his many productions of the play. Lucia Ruprecht, 
“Ambivalent Agency: Gestural Performances of Hands in Weimar Dance and Film,” A Journal of Germanic Studies 
46 (2010): 271. 
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the same purpose, but if the nature of capital is to refashion completely the specific class 
structure, the oppositional cultural response must itself respond. In this way, this response is 
fundamentally linked with Brecht’s ability and desire to make an intervention. This is what 
makes Brecht’s theatre so fundamentally political, even in the earlier, “non-Marxist,” phase. The 
reactions against this political rethinking of the theatre were found in Brecht’s own time, as seen 
in the critical reaction to the 1931 production (but not, if we believe Benjamin, the audiences), as 
the critics were either unable and/or unwilling to locate the real importance of the play, notably as 
they sought to maintain cultural production’s safe distance from the now. Benjamin articulates 
this in his analysis of Mann ist Mann: 
 
For the difficulties encountered by epic theatre in achieving recognition are, after all, 
nothing other than an expression of its closeness to real life, while theory languishes in 
the Babylonian exile of a praxis which has nothing to do with the way we live.78 
 
Benjamin’s emphasis on the “closeness to real life” embodies more than a politics of 
intervention, it must be said. Yet without an ultimate location/theatre/stadium wherein the 
importance of intervention is taken into account, the potential of this closeness will remain 
unresolved.  
The fulfilling of this potential is of course no simple business and something I shall 
address shortly. Suffice it to say, however, that the intervention, in order for it to be meaningful, 
requires a deep understanding of the situation one is in. To this end, as times changed, Brecht 
relied heavily on a sustained interrogation and re-examination of his work. This constant re-
examination of one’s own work further belies a theory and practice of production that 
                                                        
78 Benjamin, Understanding Brecht, 3. 
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undermines the notion of a work of art being a totality in itself and forms of prescriptive practice. 
Terry Eagleton very usefully notes that Brecht offers a “suggestive model[] for the notion of the 
literary text as practice rather than object.”79 The emphasizing of the notion of ongoing process in 
a creative piece as opposed to a reified, static text may seem, in today’s conjuncture at least, a 
less than dramatic statement. In Brecht’s own time the situation could not have been more 
different, especially so for a cultural producer (and such an influential one) of the left. While 
visiting Brecht in exile in Denmark, Benjamin notes Brecht’s reaction to the growing influence of 
Stalinist literary policy. Dogmatic socialist realists, Brecht contends,  
 
…are, to put it bluntly, enemies of production. Production makes them uncomfortable. 
You never know where you are with production; production is the unforeseeable. You 
never know what’s going to come out. And they themselves don’t want to produce. Every 
one of their criticisms contains a threat.80  
 
There is a deep connection that exists between Brecht’s aesthetic politics of the now and 
the notion of production that he uses in the above passage. While this notion of production is 
influenced by his visits to the Soviet Union in the 1930s,81 I would argue that Brecht was 
developing this concept earlier, as evidenced by his work with Mann ist Mann. Important in this 
regard is how production is coterminous with a specific cultural labour/work process, which 
                                                        
79 Terry Eagleton, “Ideology, Fiction, Narrative,” Social Text 2 (1979): 66. 
80 Brecht in Benjamin, Understanding Brecht, 118. 
81 It is important to note Brecht’s politics aesthetics were influenced by Sergei Tretjakov, who as Eugene Lunn notes, 
also “was developing…an aesthetics of “production” from which Brecht would learn in formulating his own Marxist 
cultural theories in the 1930s.” See Eugene Lunn, Marxism and Modernism: An Historical Study of Lukacs, Brecht, 
Benjamin, and Adorno (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982): 102. It should be noted that Brecht was 
mutually admired by Tretjakov, and the two had been planning a production of Die Heilige Johanna in the Soviet 
Union, although that production never was produced. See David Pike, Lukacs and Brecht (Chapel Hill, NC: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1985): 200. 
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demands of the producer a continual self-reflexivity.82 Yet the production was not univocal – that 
is, it was not one of the producer directed towards the audience. In order for production to be 
successful it must also make the most of the productive capacities of the audience involved. In 
this way the audience produces itself and produces part of its own history. This process rejects 
the naturalistic passive audience – (in the field of language studies this passive process is 
reminiscent of Valentin Volosinov’s notion of uniaccentuality – a process which extinguishes the 
way in which signs are struggled over by all social actors) as opposed to Brecht’s theatre, which 
acknowledges the agency of the audience (this would be similar to Volosinov’s corresponding 
concept of the multiaccentual sign – “a sign that maintains its vitality and dynamism and the 
capacity for further development”83) and is directed towards a multi-vocal response. In this way 
production for Brecht centres on showing how audiences might actively produce themselves and 
their history (interestingly, Brecht noted that a particular audience also included the actors 
involved in this performance). History, while structured, cannot be known in advance, since 
history itself is always open-ended. 
 Brecht was clearly not averse to experimentation and continually rethinking his work. In 
fact, as aforementioned, Mann ist Mann went through at least ten rewrites, and continually 
revised the work in order to be able address the current conjuncture as directly as possible. 
Suggestively, Brecht also considered renaming the subtitle for the play to match the year it was 
presented – for example, the transformation of the packer Galy Gay in the military barracks of 
                                                        
82 As Lunn notes specifically on Mann ist Mann “Brecht’s theatre became an experimental self-reflexive workshop 
in which humans and social reality were shown to be constructions capable of being “reassembled” (ummontiert).” 
Lunn, 103. While I disagree slightly with Lunn’s chronology, I am sympathetic to his focus on production. He 
continues: “Soon after working out the rudiments of a new theatre, Brecht began to develop (after 1928) a conception 
of “production aesthetics”, which he formed with a Marxism filtered through constructivist lenses: e.g., he viewed art 
as an aspect of material labour; as a construction based on the formal principle of technological modes of production, 
such as montage; and as an activity which was tied to new mechanical media, such as film and radio.” Lunn, 103. 
83 See Valentin Volosinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996): 
23. 
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Kilkoa in the year 1925 (or 1926 or 1930 depending on the year of the performance).  This 
reworking was not an empty gesture. Besides the continual rewriting, Brecht showed the play to 
audiences of different social classes in an effort to understand as deeply as possible the structures 
of contemporary society and the place for his contribution in relation to them, which manifested 
also in questioning the appropriate form of intervention into the social order. In order to reach a 
wider audience, Brecht produced a radio version of the play, broadcast in 1927. What’s more, on 
the basis of this work Brecht was moved to change the form of the play from a lustspiel or 
comedy,84 to what Benjamin refers to as a parable.85 This is especially interesting as the switch 
speaks to Brecht’s changing response to the rise of fascism, the threat of which was obviously 
much clearer in 1930. Where the need was more urgent, Brecht opted for the more direct method 
of a Lehrstuck (or didactic learning piece) in order to structure his intervention. 
Despite the many revisions, what Brecht took seriously throughout the whole project was 
the development of the “new man” (sic). Rather than assuming an audience, a fault he analysed in 
the modern theatre of the time, Brecht attempted to work through modern society in order to 
engage with an audience which would question and mobilise around these developments. In awe 
of the modern sports spectator, Brecht sought to realise a cultural space where the audience’s 
reaction was to question what they were seeing rather than be simple consumers and passive in 
                                                        
84 Brecht would come back to the comic form in other circumstances, especially in his exile plays. There he began to 
use comedy as distancing effects, linked with the almost incomprehensible devastation of the post war-era. This is a 
politicized comedy, as Marc Silberman notes: “Brecht’s experiments sought to develop a kind of thinking that can 
understand the process of historical change and the changeability of human behavior. Naturally, he understood 
human behavior to be historically contingent, neither universal nor anthropologically based. Because the comic 
depends on the incongruous, the paradoxical, and the absurd in behavior and situations, it generates that distance so 
crucial to Brecht’s aesthetic strategies: opening up a space for historical cognition while rendering visible the 
contradictions in society that make the status quo impossible. This is comedy in the service of disillusionment.” Marc 
Silberman, “Bertolt Brecht, Politics, and Comedy,” 185. 
85 Doherty, “Test and Gestus,” 448. 
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reception. Brecht’s cultural politics of production acknowledged the multiaccentuality involved 
in his theatrical practice.  
Given this alternate strategy of reading Mann ist Mann, it is useful to suggest an answer 
to the problem of the bad collective. In 1931, at around the same time that Brecht was putting on 
the production of Mann ist Mann that so influenced Benjamin, Brecht was heavily involved in the 
production of the film Kuhle Wampe, Wem gehört die Welt?. In this film we see an alternative to 
the bad collective as it is depicted in Mann ist Mann. This is also an intervention beyond 
abstraction. Mann ist Mann calls for practical consideration based upon the needs and limits of a 
contemporary moment. Drawn to its conclusion, as Bert Cardullo argues, it necessitates a 
response to the system. Cardullo notes: “A change for the worse, or no change at all in already 
bad conditions, as in Mann ist Mann, can only lead ultimately to further deterioration in the 
relations among men. Unless, that is, a man takes action.”86  
Because Brecht seeks to hammer the current situation on the head, the response to any 
historical moment must be an accurate one. There is no way in which looseness can be allowed to 
slip into the precise task of meeting the historical conjuncture with a political aesthetic. All 
political debates of progressive change are subject to the determination, or framing, of a political 
historical moment. Even the supposed logic of the societal structure is to be ruthlessly examined. 
In this regard we have the problems that I will be dealing with in this chapter – of exactitude and 
generality, of precision and flexibility, of recourse to specific events and the simultaneous 
evocation of broad struggle, of a Marxist aesthetic science of sorts, and of making the problems 
of the individual worker the problem of every worker. 
                                                        
86 Bert Cardullo, “A World in Transition: A Study of Brecht’s Mann ist Mann,” The German Review: Literature, 
Culture, Theory 59 (1984): 263. 
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 All of this makes the notes of Walter Benjamin on Mann ist Mann very important, given 
that he would have seen the production in its various opening stages, as well as in 1931. 
Benjamin was in this regard perhaps Brecht’s greatest reader, and his ability to carefully parse 
out Brecht’s work can only with difficulty be overstated. The work during this period was 
marked by a crucial experimentation meant to deal concretely with the intense challenges that 
were presented to the working-class movement of the time, and not to fall into the trap of German 
Social Democracy. And Mann ist Mann is a play that is specifically attuned to begin a project 
that could understand and respond to these challenges.  
 
The Knowing Johanna 
 
Because I praised the useful, which 
In my day was considered base 
Because I battled against all religions 
Because I fought oppression or 
For another reason87 
 
 As with Mann ist Mann, there has been an approach to interpreting Brecht’s work which 
attempts to abstract it from the intense materiality in which it is based. By rejecting such an 
approach, I am not suggesting the impossibility of locating or positing a philosophy of Brecht, 
nor am I disputing the presence of a Brechtian method, a topic made mostly clearly in Frederic 
Jameson’s excellent offering. Rather, I am arguing that to isolate Brecht from the political nature 
of his project and to remove the connections to his own time, place, and strategic imperatives (to 
be useful, for instance) is to obfuscate and misunderstand both the nature and potential of his 
                                                        
87 Bertolt Brecht, “Why Should My Name Be Mentioned?,” in Collected Poems, Poems 1913 – 1956, edited by John 
Willett and Ralph Mannheim (London: Methuen, 1979): 264. 
 45 
work.88 While the opposite approach has been largely confined to non-materialist theories and 
criticisms, another version of this approach has been advanced by professed materialist theorists.  
This vein of criticism has sought to view the play (and others at the time) as a distilled 
explication of the workings of capitalism, and, because the explication was insufficient, Brecht 
failed (usefully or unusefully) in its chief pursuit. In part, such explanations have been sourced 
from Brecht’s biography. The narrative runs that during the period of 1926-1929 Brecht began to 
study Marxism with the noted theorist Karl Korsch, author of the renowned, Marxism and 
Philosophy, and that through these studies Brecht became a Marxist.89 That Korsch had a 
profound effect on Brecht’s formulation and conception of Marxist economics should not be in 
dispute. The problem, I believe, runs when the suggestion becomes that through his work with 
Korsch, Brecht on the one hand “found Marxism” and that, as a result, he decided that it was 
necessary to teach Marxian economics on stage.90 As Jameson notes, the play “has so often been 
taken as Brecht’s most comprehensive initiation into Marxian analysis.”91 This has also, it has 
                                                        
88 In opposition to this argument, and while I would take issue with the heavy handed nature of the claim, there is 
something very important to defend in Patty Lee Parmalee’s argument that: “St. Joan of the Stockyards, the first 
major play since A Man’s a Man, is in every sense the culmination of Brecht’s early work.” Patty Lee Parmalee, 
Brecht’s America (Miami: Ohio State University Press, 1981): 244. 
89 This argument, while well rehearsed, is put forward in various ways. Mark Clark puts it forward here: On the 
notion that Brecht “found Marxism” “In the early 1930s Brecht not only reinterpreted his earlier plays through a 
Marxist lens, but also wrote a series of Lehrstuecke or didactic plays, which were meant to be models of political 
commitment for children.” Mark W. Clark, Beyond Catastrophe: German Intellectuals and Cultural Renewal after 
World War II, 1945 – 1955 (Oxford: Lexington, 2006): 132.  
90 Another vital moment in Brecht’s life seems to have been witnessing first hand a worker’s demonstration, 
although there is little attention paid to this. As a group of Communists protested a ban on public meetings, Brecht 
witnessed the violence meted out by the police response while at the apartment of his friend Fritz Sternberg. 
Sternberg writes: “As far as we could make out, these people were not armed. The police fired repeatedly. We 
thought at first that they were firing warning-shots. Then we saw several of the demonstrators falling, and later being 
carried away on stretchers. At that time, as far as I remember, there were more than twenty dead among the 
demonstrators in Berlin. When Brecht heard the shots and saw that people were being hit, he went whiter in the face 
than I had ever seen him before in my life. I believe it was not least this experience which drove him ever more 
strongly towards the Communists.” See Fritz Sternberg quoted in Wizisla, Walter Benjamin and Bertolt Brecht, 5-6. 
Also worthy of note is the fact that the police chief at the time, Karl Zoergiebel, was a Social Democrat. This would 
have given Brecht another reason to shift his support more firmly towards the more clearly oppositional 
Communists. 
91 Jameson, Brecht and Method, 148.  
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been argued, been the main fault line of the piece. An alternative approach, put forward by Marc 
Silberman, is that “What appealed to him about Marxism was neither the theory of political 
economy nor the history of the proletariat but rather its power as a cognitive method that 
understands social conditions as processes and pursues their contradictions.”92 Astrid Oesmann’s 
otherwise excellent Staging History has advanced this line of argument, arguing that when read in 
such a way the play necessarily loses the specificity that was such a fundamental aspect of Mann 
ist Mann. She writes:  
 
His plays grow hazy, however, when he seeks to present the workings of capitalism 
outside of social interaction by stagings the working of capital itself. Brecht’s claim that it 
is incomprehensible how, exactly, processes are not  presentable on stage in Die Heilige 
Johanna der Schlachthöfe (Saint Joan of the Stockyards), the trading of money and meat 
is mentioned, but it never becomes part of the performance.93 
 
The odd formulation here states that when we abstract Brecht’s work into a space where he 
merely seeks to represent capitalism (a typically “unuseful” Brechtian project) Brecht then fails 
to understand class struggle (or “social interaction” as Oesmannn somewhat ambiguously states). 
Yet Oesmann is not alone here. Die Heilige Johanna is also seen thus by Frederic Jameson. He 
writes:  
 
But in the great representations of capitalism – particularly in the two fundamental 
Brechtian works St Joan and the Three-Penny Novel – these last are reduced to 
Dickensian misery, lumpen status (Peachum’s beggars) or desperate objects of charity. It 
is as though in Brecht’s works that radically different temporality of peasant life had 
                                                        
92 Marc Silberman, “Bertolt Brecht, Politics, and Comedy,” 174. 
93 Oesmann, Staging Brecht, 108. 
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absorbed the actantial position of the “proletariat”, the position of the oppressed and 
exploited in capitalism, of the dominant class. 94  
 
Here the problem is restated but the belief is the same, and that is that Die Heilige Johanna fails 
in its task to represent capitalism effectively.  
 I do not wish to suggest that the play is not fundamentally concerned with trying to get to 
terms with the larger capitalist economic system. On the contrary, essential to the play’s structure 
is Joan’s movement throughout different socio-economic settings, from an initial point of naivety 
as to the intentions of the capitalist class (through the delightfully horrible character of Mauler) to 
a Marxian understanding of the role of profit in Mauler’s life, and how this forms the basis of the 
misery of the lead characters in the play.95 As with the progress of Galy Gay before, the point to 
stress here is the social aspect of Joan’s journey and then further (in only the latter’s case) the 
lesson it has for her ultimate rejection of the capitalist system.96 In this way it “is a play about 
how ideology is used to obscure reality. Simultaneously, its effect on the audience is to teach 
them how to see through the ideology to the reality…”97 This may be over-stating the analysis 
somewhat, but there is a clear attempt to distinguish between capitalism’s outer and inner layers 
                                                        
94 Jameson, Brecht and Method, 151. 
95 Karl-Heinz Schoeps notes that the issue of Die Heilige Johanna’s naiveté is central to not only this text, but also 
continues in much of Brecht’s work. “The fact that Brecht used a Saint Joan figure [a naïve figure – my note] in three 
of his plays (Saint Joan of the Stockyards, The Visions of Simone Machard, and The Trial of Joan of Arc at Rouen 
1431) highlights the particular importance he attached to this character.” While I disagree with Schoeps’ negation of 
Epic Theatre’s centrality to Brecht’s work, his argument about the centrality of the naïve in Brecht I find useful. See 
Karl-Heinz Schoeps, “From Distancing Alienation to Intuitive Naiveté: Bertolt Brecht's Establishment of a New 
Aesthetic Category,” Monatshefte 81 (1989): 196. 
96 Interesting in this regard is a recent essay on the play by noted Brazilian poet Roberto Schwarz. In the essay 
Schwarz continues along the same lines of Jameson and Oesmann that the representability of capitalism is the key 
issue throughout. Schwarz further argues that capitalist system has fundamentally changed in the way it represents 
itself and thus the play loses an important currency. He writes “Today, the picture has changed. Economic 
determinism has switched sides and functions as an explicit ideology of the dominant classes, a justification for 
social inequality.” While Schwartz further criticizes the suitability of a “revolutionary exit” as a contemporary option 
that the play offers – a position I would agree with – his dilution of the play’s representation of capitalism is 
something that I take issue with in this chapter. See Roberto Schwarz, “Brecht’s Relevance, Highs and Lows,” New 
Left Review 57 (2009): 85 – 104.  
97 Parmalee, Brecht’s America, 246. 
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as they are expressed in social understanding. For Joan, nothing could be a more concrete 
instantiation of capitalism than the bourgeoisie’s profiting off of the working poor. And the 
emphasis on the concreteness of this socio-economic relation is exactly the problem for Brecht; 
how to construct a theatre that recognizes this relation and responds by promoting the primacy of 
establishing what he called a “critical attitude.”98  
 The development of such a viewpoint begins with the title of the play and its often 
problematic English translation. The German title is Die Heilige Johanna der Schlachthöfe.99 The 
play has most routinely been translated as St. Joan of the Stockyards.  A less common translation, 
although I would like to argue one truer to Brecht’s purposes, is St. Joan of the 
Slaughterhouses.100 A stockyard is literally a storage point, a building or set of buildings 
normally adjacent to the slaughterhouse. A slaughterhouse requires no mediation. 
Slaughterhouses are about the deed of killing, of pre-mediated and systematic carnage for the 
sake of producing food and its sale. The slaughterhouse is the more exact location for Brecht, as 
it is killing, its product, and the reasons for killing which are important and undergird the 
structure of the play.  
                                                        
98 On this point Brecht is quite explicit. He writes, “In fact, it has a purpose the “teaching” of the spectator a certain 
quite practical attitude; we have to make it possible for him to take a critical attitude while he is in the theatre (as 
opposed to a subjective attitude of becoming completely “entangled” in what is going on). Some of my plays in this 
type of dramaturgy are St. Joan of the Stockyards, Mann ist Mann, and Round Heads and Pointed Heads. See Brecht, 
Werke, Band 22.2: 941.  
99 It is perhaps interesting to note that the play that Brecht found so hard to produce over the years has been subject 
to a renewed interest in Germany at least (other production figures are unavailable), with more productions of the 
play in the 1990’s or 2000’s than in all other decades combined. Jan Knopf, Brecht Handbuch 2, 286. For 
information on the problems that Brecht encountered in putting on the play see Gisela Bahr, Bertolt Brecht: Die 
Heilige Johanna der Schlachthöfe, Bühnenfassung, Fragmente, Varianten (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1971): 211-
231. 
100 Interestingly, as Brecht develops further his aesthetic, there is also a strong shift in the focus of his work to places 
of production, and the question of how gender is used to represent labour. As Laureen Nussbaum notes, “All through 
his previous work Brecht had mainly identified bourgeois society with male predominance. Now, working for 
change, he developed new, self-reliant, and politically conscious roles for proletarian women.” Die Heilige Johanna 
and Anni from Kuhle Wampe are clear examples of this shift. See “The Evolution of the Feminine Principle in 
Brecht's Work: Beyond the Feminist Critique,” German Studies Review 8 (1985): 228.  
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 In this regard, seeing as the play revolves around the slaughterhouses, meat acts as a 
metaphor which organises the play.101 On the most basic level flesh is the stuff upon which 
fortunes sink or soar. The key economic downturn is in part a product of Mauler’s (the play’s 
chief capitalist) playing with the stock market, and the way in which he makes the value of meat 
abstract. This abstractness of meat is, and can be only, partial, however, as Mauler’s toying with 
the price of meat is in fact his toying with human life itself, as evidenced throughout the play.102  
 As a metaphor, meat embodies and personifies the human in the play. This happens in a 
few ways. Firstly, workers are meat in that they are, like the cattle which they are supposed to 
kill, the commercial good that is routinely easily bought and sold. They are manipulated so as to 
disregard or negate solidaristic feeling or independent thought, and promoted to become passive 
creatures worried only about their next meal. As such they are similar to the beasts they look over 
and ultimately slaughter. Brecht, when referring to workers eating, uses the German word 
“fressen” to describe their eating – a word which translates to a specific form of animalistic 
eating, or devouring. They will eat anything that will satiate their hunger. In one bizarre case (but 
only bizarre when one doesn’t understand the system), a man literally becomes meat.  
Luckerniddle, a worker in the slaughterhouse, falls into the “bacon maker” and is 
processed into canned meat. The brutality of the situation is compounded when his wife comes to 
                                                        
101 The depiction of the butcher as Urkapitalist was previously shown in Pabst’s Die freudlose Gasse. The dancer 
and cabaretist Valeska Gert had worked on the film, and subsequently on Brecht’s Die Dreigroschenoper.  See 
Alexandra Kolb’s Performing Femininity: Dance and Literature in German Modernism (Berlin: Peter Lang, 2009) 
for a discussion on this connection and Gert’s influence more generally. The film also puts the lie to the idea of the 
gullible, helpless “young girls”, and features an act of revenge against the callous butcher. For more on the 
connection between Brecht and the role of sex work and Brecht’s filmic work, see Jill Suzanne Smith, “Just how 
Naughty was Berlin? The Geography of Prostitution and Female Sexuality in Curt Moreck’s Erotic Travel Guide,” in 
Spatial Turns: Space, Place and Mobility in German Literary and Visual Culture, edited by Jaimey Fisher, Barbara 
Mennel (New York: Rodopi, 2010). 
102 In this case, however, Mauler as capitalist seems to know and understand what the price of meat is. Brecht will 
also use to great comedic and didactic effect the capitalist who has no idea what his products are. See for instance the 
“Song of Supply and Demand” in which the character Trader sings “What is a man actually, Do I know what a man 
is? / God knows what a man is! / I don’t know what a man is / I only know his price!” See Bertolt Brecht, The Jewish 
Wife and Other Short Plays (New York: Grove Press, 1992): 95-96.  
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enquire about his whereabouts. She is advised to drop any case she may have for the price of 
twenty lunches. As she has not eaten in two days, she accepts the offer. Yet whereas meat is 
literally a matter of life and death for workers, actual meat knows only one referent for the 
capitalist. The lead capitalist, Mauler, when he has a bad spell on the market, consoles himself by 
having a steak prepared for him. Almost as soon as the meat touches his lips, Mauler is brought 
back into a good humour. Here meat acts as an elixir for the ruling classes. Its substance and its 
abstracted value bring only them pleasure and sustain them.  
 By using meat as this structuring metaphor, Brecht makes clear that what may seem to be 
abstract to one is also that which is the most concrete for another. While Luckerniddle’s widow is 
made the offer of food for forgetting, Joan watches in the wings. Playing the intermediary 
“witness” to this, she is able to spot the connections between the abstract workings of the 
financial system and the bare processes of workers being chewed up, not of their own volition but 
by compulsion, by and for the system. Darko Suvin expresses this point succinctly in his To 
Brecht and Beyond. He notes:  
 
…the Marxist political economics undoubtedly present in Saint Joan (the labour theory of 
value, and the crisis theory) happens in the flesh and blood of the workers and packers, 
Mauler and Joan. Political economics determining the existential destiny of all strata of 
society represent here a first, basic exchange-system or code.103 
 
The rejection of the body, of abstracting the body from its material conditions, will thus be Joan’s 
final position. Joan has understood the fundamental barbarity of the system and its lived class 
oppression. In her final lines, Joan rails against her former position and beliefs and calls out for 
                                                        
103 Darko Suvin, To Brecht and Beyond: Soundings in Modern Dramaturgy (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1984): 148.  
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an end, a violent end, to the system of religion (as a former Salvation Army worker she notes its 
particular importance) and its complicity in reproducing capitalism. She exclaims: 
 
 And those preachers who tell the people they can rise in spirit 
 Even if their bodies are stuck in the mud, they too should have their heads 
 Bashed against the sidewalk. The truth is that 
 Where force rules only force can help and 
 In the human world only humans can help.104 
 
While there is little doubt that this is the position Brecht would wish his audience to be won over 
to, he realises that such a simple transference is a) not possible and b) would only provide a 
partial answer. The point of the audience’s discovery is then not what is presented but what is 
missing. To locate this we must see the reaction of the cast to Joan’s radical statement. For the 
first time in the play the cast sings out in unison, attempting to drown out Joan’s final words 
before she dies. The Cast sings out:  
 
 Shower the rich with Thy treasure! Hosanna! 
 And virtue and leisure! Hosanna! 
 Pile high the rich man’s plate! Hosanna! 
 Give him the city and state! Hosanna! 
 Give to the winner in full measure!105  
 
Over these “declamations” are broadcast disastrous headlines from Brecht’s time, including: 
“EIGHT MILLION UNEMPLOYED IN THE USA!” “BRAZIL DUMPS A WHOLE YEAR’S 
COFFEE CROP INTO THE OCEAN!” “EVERY BANK AND STOCK EXCHANGE IN 
                                                        
104 Bertolt Brecht, Saint Joan of the Stockyards (Methuen, London, 1991): 108. 
105 Brecht, Saint Joan, 108 
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GERMANY CLOSED BY GOVERNMENT ORDERS” “POLICE BATTLE UNEMPLOYED 
OUTSIDE HENRY FORD’S DETROIT FACTORY.”106 The point here is to explicitly state that 
the point of knowing is not enough. While individual knowing is highly recommended (we are 
clearly better for knowing), there is little doubt that an individual knowing amid chaos is not 
enough. One must be able to know and then use that knowing to alter the system in which one is 
living. This is what Brecht himself did with his own studying of Marxist economics. As Mann ist 
Mann was a warning of the bad collective, Die Heilige Johanna argues that merely knowing must 
be met with effective (or useful) practice. 
When the disastrous news over the loudspeakers has sunk in, there is an exchange of 
vituperative exclamations wherein the competing groups gather on stage seeking to place the 
blame for the crisis on each other. “‘The middlemen are to blame for the high price of meat!’ 
‘The grain profiteers are to blame for the high price of livestock!’ ‘It’s all the fault of the 
railroads with their freight rates!’”107 The material and pressing nature of the situation will 
require an extra-individual response, a response that the individual alone cannot advance, no 
matter how knowledgeable about capitalism she becomes. This response is of an organised 
knowing. A knowing which seeks to change as Joan notes, in “the human world where only 
humans can help.”108 This is the response that will be offered in Kuhle Wampe. 
                                                        
106 Brecht, Saint Joan, 108-9. 
107 Brecht, Saint Joan, 109. 
108 Julie Stone Peters’ article is very useful in noting that despite the obvious different political attitudes of George 
Bernard Shaw (the author of Saint Joan, a piece first produced in the early 1920s examining the trial of Joan of Arc) 
and Brecht, there are similarities between the two uses of the Joan of Arc trope. She notes that “each nonetheless 
offered a critique of the international sphere order that saw past its subterfuges to the possibilities beyond.” Julie 
Stone Peters, “Joan of Arc Internationale: Shaw, Brecht, and the Law of Nations,” Comparative Drama 38 (2005): 
374. What is more interesting for our purposes, however, is the way in which the article focuses on how the “taken-
for-granted” world that Joan initially inhabits is part of “wordless oppression does not equal peace.” Peters, “Joan of 
Arc Internationale: Shaw, Brecht, and the Law of Nations,” 367.  
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 While Mann ist Mann was an endeavour which set Brecht off on a course towards a fuller 
Epic Theater, Die Heilige Johanna was an expression of his further understanding of his society, 
but also his place within that society as a politically committed cultural producer. As he himself 
notes: 
 
Simply to comprehend the new areas of subject-matter imposes a new dramatic and 
theatrical form. Can we speak of money in the form of iambics? “The Mark, first quoted 
yesterday at 50 dollars, now beyond 100, soon may rise, etc.” – how about? Petroleum 
resists the five-act form; today’s catastrophes do not progress in a straight line but in 
cyclical crises; the “heroes” change with the different phases, are interchangeable, etc.; 
the graph of people’s actions is complicated by abortive actions; fate is no longer a single 
coherent power; rather there are fields of force which can be seen radiating in opposite 
directions; the power groups themselves comprise movements not only against one 
another but within themselves...109 
 
It is interesting to note that the play that Brecht was working on when he wrote the above 
theoretical piece was Die Heilige Johanna, as it suggests further evidence that Epic Theatre was 
taking a step away from simply modern sociality to a specifically capitalist structured and 
capitalistically dialectical form. Epic theatre at this stage is falling even further from the sky of 
the abstract and plummets to earth (on this note the emphasis on religion in the play is especially 
noteworthy). When it lands (or has it always been there?), it finds a scenario far more akin to 
Benjamin’s analysis of Paul Klee’s celebrated Angelus Novus.110 I will explore the meaning of 
the painting and its importance for Brecht’s theatre of history at the end of the next chapter. What 
                                                        
109 Brecht, Brecht on Theatre, 30. 
110 Such a connection should not seem a stretch by any means. Brecht and Benjamin were great collaborators, and it 
is useful to note that Brecht also was helped in the writing of the text of Saint Joan by Benjamin himself. A 
collaborator of Brecht’s, Margarete Steffin, “often brought variants of the text or plot to Benjamin; the experience of 
working together on the text, as in the case of the Saint Joan play, or the crime novel, aroused hope of a useful 
response.” See Wizisla, Walter Benjamin and Bertolt Brecht, 147. 
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we should take now, however, is that as with the painting itself, what is emphasized is not the 
single solitary moment of discovery but the larger repetitive disaster beneath it. In such a setting, 
we find St. Joan, caught adrift in the winds of catastrophe wherein, by witnessing the horrors 
beneath, she rejects all that she sees from above. Yet in this way Brecht also eschews a crude 
didacticism and recognizes that the potential for such events to recur is not small. Yet 
recognizing that such events can continue, simultaneously allows for us to acknowledge that the 
moment where we apply the brake on endless disaster is also at hand only if we work through the 
contemporary moment. The moment of historical recognition – this has happened and it could 
happen to us – allows for a moment of change – only if we grasp the historical structure of our 
moment. This is particularly characteristic of Brecht’s aesthetics of the now. 
 In his lengthy mapping out of the logics and dynamics of Die Heilige Johanna, Darko 
Suvin is at pains to note the highly stratified positions that exist in the work. These positions 
stretch from the “New York friends” and Mauler at the “Empyrean” and “Sardonic Heavens” 
levels respectively, down to “Cold Hell” occupied by the “Strike Leaders, Workers, Ranchers and 
Cattle.” In Suvin’s arrangement, Joan is not at the bottom (even though we are clear that Joan 
does not have much money) but in “Limbo” along with “Newsmen” and the Salvation Army-like 
Brigade called the “Black Straw Hats.”111 St. Joan in this setting belongs to the intermediary 
professional class that includes intellectuals and those whose overall social position the 
intellectual occupies, yet her position is very much up for grabs. She can reside comfortably in 
the position of what Brecht would later call the “Tuis,”112 or she could align herself with the 
                                                        
111 Suvin, To Brecht and Beyond, 135. 
112 From the German word IntellekTUellen), those who understand the real cause of social problems yet seek to 
divert attention to other, less directly political factors. Martin Jay in his discussion of the Frankfurt School (otherwise 
known as the Institute for Social Research): “To Brecht, the Institut consisted of “Tui-intellectuals,” who prostituted 
themselves for American foundation support.” Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt 
School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923-50 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996): 201 – 202.   
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workers. Her position is in Limbo (Limbo as in both the state between the heavenly state of the 
Black Straw Hats and the earthly reality of the workers and the state of the undecided 
intellectual). While workers and Mauler are defined and “locked-in” to their social positions, St. 
Joan is free (or freer) to choose her position.  Yet it is this position which will be Joan’s downfall 
as she stands in for a classic “petit-bourgeois intellectual.” This person, a person of the “rational” 
mind who dismisses the complexities of the ideology of the conjuncture, must fail.113 We learn 
from her failure. As Suvin notes:  
 
The only attempts at communication and pressure going from below upward come from 
Joan and the strike leaders (Communists). The ideological failure of the former and the 
pragmatic failure of the latter are complementary; the reasons for that complimentarity are 
not explained in the universe Saint Joan, and would have to be inferred from the larger 
context of Brecht’s opus.114 
 
While the last point here is somewhat contestable (but may well prove correct), the important 
aspect to note is the ideological failure. This failure of the intellectual was understood quite 
deeply by a collaborator of Brecht’s.115 A few years after Die Heilige Johanna was written, 
Walter Benjamin presented his views on the subject in his important foundational text, “The 
Author as Producer.” The last few lines of the text read as follows: 
 
The mind, the spirit that makes itself heard in the name of fascism must disappear. The 
mind which only believes in its own magic strength will disappear. For the revolutionary 
                                                        
113 Suvin, To Brecht and Beyond, 151. 
114 Suvin, To Brecht and Beyond, 150. 
115 For a much fuller examination which highlights just how fully Brecht and Benjamin were involved in each other’s 
work, and also displays how each was seen as co-creating the others work, see Wizisla, Walter Benjamin and Bertolt 
Brecht. 
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struggle is not fought between capitalism and mind. It is fought between capitalism and 
the proletariat.116 
 
Benjamin echoes quite neatly the “plumpes Denken” (crude thought) of Brecht. And this, as we 
learn, is St. Joan’s central error. This is not a merely subjective error (one of pure agency) but 
rather a question of her only realising her agency too late and thus no blame is attached to her. 
Indeed, we may sympathise with her, and most definitely are meant to, but we also must learn 
that she did not succeed and examine why, in the same way that we are to learn from the 
transformation of Galy Gay as a portent from the present. We are not to come to this realisation, a 
stance of knowing, alone. The play rejects the mere presentation of the abstract functioning of 
capitalism, and thus to “represent capitalism,” and rather focuses on capitalism’s wreckages and 
how not to respond to them (St. Joan, for all her labours, dies).  The point in this regard is to 
produce a committed intellectual project which has a class politics as its engine. On this level the 
rejection of the social position of the “petit-bourgeois intellectual” (and the worldview that is 
associated with it) and what it is replaced by is the key issue for Brecht. This is the task in Kuhle 
Wampe. 
 
Kuhle Wampe and the Good Answer 
 
It is interesting to note that given Brecht’s numerous misgivings with the cinematic 
production of the Three Penny Opera, misgivings which went as far as initiating a lawsuit to stop 
its airing as well as the writing of a novel to counter both the play and film, it is that work, and 
not his ideologically and aesthetically coherent and preferred Kuhle Wampe: Oder wem gehört 
                                                        
116 Benjamin, Understanding Brecht, 103. 
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die Welt? (Kuhle Wampe: Or who owns the World), that has received the larger amount of 
scholarly attention and public interest, perhaps ironically despite the film’s ideologically 
achievement in Brechtian practice.117 Continuing on from my discussion of Mann ist Mann and 
Die Heilige Johanna, I would like to argue that while Kuhle Wampe carries forward Brecht’s 
move from abstract to the real refunctioning of individuality in capitalist society, and whereas in 
the previous two texts we learn from the mistakes of those on stage (we will see this also very 
clearly in the analysis of Mutter Courage), here we witness that the collective response, 
specifically through a recognition of the power of organised oppositional activity, is the logical 
reaction to capitalism.  
If the chief problem in Mann ist Mann was dealing with the relation of the bad collective 
and the individual in capitalist society, and if Die Helige Johanna articulates the worker’s 
understanding of the functioning of that society and the way economic functions are made known 
in the life of the worker, Kuhle Wampe provides the organised left’s answer. Brecht’s left 
response is not to deal abstractly with the theoretical “worker” but rather to meet the worker 
where not only “he” is, but, and this is vitally important as regards the gender politics of the film, 
where “she” is as well. Thus, while I have argued that in Die Helige Johanna we witnessed not 
an attempt at a representation of capitalism, but of the way in which capital feeds off workers, in 
this same way Kuhle Wampe is not about concretising the extraction of surplus value (although 
this may have merit for a Marxist cultural producer) but rather show how the lived relations of 
working people are slowly destroyed and systematically ground down. In this regard we have a 
                                                        
117 For an analysis of the influence of Brecht’s problems with the Three-Penny Opera film see Steven Giles’ Bertolt 
Brecht and Critical Theory: Marxism, Modernity and the Threepenny Lawsuit (New York: Peter Lang, 1997). 
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necessary examination of class, wherein issues of choice, marriage, employment and 
unemployment all intermingle and intersect with each other.  
Individuality here is refracted through the lens of the social, yet the individual must first 
of all be seen, at least partly.118 For Brecht, the theory of classes was lacking an understanding of 
the individual or of the viewpoint of the individual and her relation to the social. As he was to 
state of “Me-Ti” in his 1930s theoretical text Book of Changes (published in English only in 2016 
under the title Me-Ti: Book of Interventions in the Flow of Things) “Me-ti found few enough 
indications in the writings of the classics about the behaviour of individuals. Most often they 
spoke of classes or of other large groups of people.”119 While the latter sections of the film 
provide an at times stunning depiction of the depths of alternative organisations active in Weimar 
Berlin, the first of the three acts of the film provides a dynamic exercise in the relation of the 
individual to the social, and the abstract to the concrete. 
In the opening scenes of the film the frantic spinning of wheels dominates the screen. 
Workers speed on bicycles from factory to factory in the hopes of finding a day’s work. At this 
stage we see only a group of workers, a blur of disappointment and despair as they are told again 
and again that there is no work available. Here the workers are without names and while the 
locations may have been known to Berlin audiences, no attention is paid to carve out meaning in 
the buildings, other than the occupants have no need for workers. Seen from capital’s perspective 
                                                        
118 This is valid at the level of the social world, but also at an aesthetic level. Angelos Koutsourakis argues that in 
Brecht’s filmic strategy, he understood that “cinema challenges the understanding of art as a reflectionist process, 
and the medium’s political efficiency is grounded in its ability to engage with the material reality, so as to point to 
structures that are not necessarily comprehended even by the filmmaker. The prerequisite for the radical employment 
of the medium is that the story is an epiphenomenon. What matters most is the ability to use the technological 
apparatus so as to engage with the social reality and point to social mechanisms beyond the narrative world.” 
Angelos Koutsourakis, “Utilizing the ‘Ideological Antiquity’: Rethinking Brecht and Film,” Monatshefte 107 (2015): 
252. Koutsourakis is examining the connections between Brecht and Walter Benjamin’s famous essay “The Work of 
Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.” For more on the similarities between the two see Marc Silberman, 
“The Politics of Representation: Brecht and Media,” Theatre Journal 39 (1987): 448 – 460.  
119 Brecht in Jameson, Brecht and Method, 36. 
 59 
they are a mass of unproductive labour, even though they are all literally “on their bikes.” Soon 
we will learn the effects of this abstract unemployment. Particularly through the story of the son 
of the Boenike family, Franz, we see how unemployment makes itself felt on individual workers, 
while Brecht also displays how this problem is anything but individualisable. Although the young 
son’s mother and father seem intent on personalising his unemployment, his communist sister 
defends him against the complex causes that exist outside of the individual’s door. Hers is a 
social perspective, and one representative of a generation of young workers who see no hope that 
capitalism can rescue itself and provide anything like lasting employment, no matter how 
economical one is.120  
In his narrowing in on the Boenike family, however, Brecht is wary of creating a possible 
predominant emotive response (that is, emotionally identifying with Franz) to this situation. He 
does not desire for us to have pity for the young character but rather to examine what is going 
wrong in these scenes and then to approach it on that basis. In order to achieve this, Brecht 
utilises distancing techniques to break the audience from the habit of emotional identification. 
One way of accomplishing this, as Bruce Murray notes, was to introduce each act in such a way 
as to “interrupt the narrative flow and encourage the audience’s intellectual engagement. They do 
so by commenting ironically on the unfolding, by foreshadowing what will transpire and, in 
every case, by minimizing the potential for building suspense.”121 This negation of suspense 
building is particularly effective and acts as a barrier to the acceptance of official responses to 
Franz’s death. The police officer’s statement of “unknown” as the cause of Franz’s suicide marks 
                                                        
120 This sentiment will be succinctly expressed in Brecht’s Die Mutter as follows “über das Fleisch das die in der 
kuche faellt, waer nicht in kueche entschieden.” The English translation of the above reads as follows: “The meat not 
there in your kitchen / won’t get there, if you stay in your kitchen!” Bertolt Brecht, The Mother (New York: Grove 
Press, 1965): 39. This translation seems to arrive at only part of the point, however. There is also the suggestion in 
this sentiment that the reasons for there not being enough food are not because you are not thrifty enough.   
121 Bruce Murray, Film and the German Left in the Weimar Republic: From Caligari to Kuhle Wampe (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1990): 222. 
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the judgment complicit in his suicide. Again we are confronted with an interesting connection of 
individual and the social here, as without recourse to the social we cannot interrupt the real life 
decisions of the individual.122 
In both the depiction of anguish in the present world and hope for the new, the individual 
and individuality are crushed. Indeed, it is this leading marker of bourgeois morality that marks 
out Brecht’s early work that continues in Kuhle Wampe. The notion of the lone individual 
protagonist battling for his family is defeated before we are introduced to young Boehnike. We 
see only him and others gathering around together waiting in the very early morning, as the mass 
of unemployed that they are, clamouring for newspaper listings of what work is to be had for that 
day. The pursuit of those jobs with the “suicidal panic”123 of the spinning of bicycle wheels will 
come to fruition with the actual suicide of the young man. The depiction of the suicide, and the 
reporting officer’s response to it, are yet another entrenchment of the failings of the notion of the 
bourgeois individual in both a formal and then political sense. The integration of the social and 
the individual here marks a deep connection in the specific moment of the now – we are now in 
the moment of the crisis of the dissolution of the individual – and this is, as mentioned above, a 
tactic devised with maintaining this recognition by the viewer in mind. 
Before he jumps out of his parent’s window, he is careful and considerate in his actions. 
He slowly considers his actions, and he even takes off his watch so that its value will not be lost 
to his family. Pace the central metaphor of Kassovitz’s powerful La Haine, wherein a man also 
jumps off of a tall building, young Boehnike does not delude himself that “so far so good.” And 
                                                        
122 The suicide itself, coming as it does in the first third of the film, “practically defies all German screen traditions,” 
states Siegfried Kracauer. Despite being asked repeatedly to shift this scene towards the end “so as to re-establish the 
natural order of things.” and disavows psychological retrogression” (that is, making a social act into an individual 
one). Siegfried Kracauer, From Caligari to Hitler: A Psychological History of the German Film (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1966): 246. This shift would have also “prevented spectators from interacting with it as 
they had grown accustomed to interacting with mainstream films.” Murray, Film and the German Left, 224. 
123 Jameson, Brecht and Method, 150. 
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as in the French film, we are witness to both an individual and social moment bound up together. 
For him, the matter is tragically announced in the spinning away of his time. Before he jumps, 
however, he pauses to gaze into the camera. As Franz Birgel notes:  
 
The suicide is presented as purely mechanical rather than an impulsive act, which, as the 
censor in “Kleiner Beitrag zum Realismus” asserts, the viewer does not even want to 
prevent in the absence of “artistic, human, warm-hearted representation.124 
 
This “purely mechanical” act marks a significant challenge to traditional aesthetics. Theodore 
Rippey notes that this is the film’s 
 
…first breach of the cinematic fourth wall. The turn is virtually his only action in the 
entire apartment sequence; his expression conveys his powerlessness and visually poses 
the question: “What other options do I have?” He now views suicide as the only viable 
release from oppression. In a bow to the family’s economic plight, young Bönike leaves 
his watch on the windowsill before leaping to his death. Dudov[sic] (the film’s director) 
adds emphasis with an extreme close-up of the watch two shots after the jump.125 
 
The depiction of the state of things having been met, the question will eventually become that of 
the response to such horrific predictability.  
Often lost in analysis of the film is probably its most deliberate statement about (or 
delivering of) politics and aesthetics.126 It is the play within a play that is meant here, put on by 
                                                        
124 Frantz A. Brigel, “Kuhle Wampe, Leftist Cinema, and the Politics of Film Censorship in Weimar Germany,” 
Historical Reflections 35 (2009): 51. 
125 Theodore Rippey, “Kuhle Wampe and the Problem of Corporal Culture,” Cinema Journal 47 (2007): 7. 
126 While they may too easily accept the transition from a “pre-Marxist” to a Marxist Brecht, Jeff Kinkle and Alberto 
Toscano note how the historical fact of the destruction of perfectly good coffee to raise the price of it, a fact that is 
mentioned in Die Heilige Johanna, “…led Brecht to Marx, and to the dramatization of the link between class 
position, social knowledge, and aesthetic form evident in the coffee scene from Kuhle Wampe.” See Jeff Kinkle and 
Alberto Toscano, “Filming the Crisis: A Survey,” Film Quarterly 65 (2011): 48. Also useful in this regard is Nenad 
Jovanovic’s discussion of James Pettifer’s “Against the Stream – Kuhle Wampe,” Screen 15.2 (1977): 49 – 63. This 
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the Rote Sprachchor, and the particular role of art in changing social scenarios. Throughout the 
film we are witness to tales of homelessness not as an abstract category or ontology but as a 
process, or social event. A person or group is not simply homeless as a state of being through 
some fault of their own; rather the process by which this has come about consistently acts as a 
frame for the film. Its offshoots, such as suicide, expressing the right to choice,127 not to mention 
the broader role of sexism in the society, a punishing judicial system, and a raft of destructive 
emotions are not backdrops but the thing itself. The role of art is necessarily to assess these and 
then respond. This is the distinctly social nature of Brecht’s formal practice.  
 In this regard, returning to Franz’s unstated question as to “what other options do I have” 
is an important one as it also poses the political aspect of the cultural producer’s position through 
a formal method. On formal invention in the film Katie Trumpener notes that: “Brecht's writings 
around his 1932 film script for Kuhle Wampe suggest how non-traditional and dialectical uses of 
film syntax (the establishment of a counterpointal relationship between image and music, for 
instance) can be used to unsettle the spectator and to create a critical space for (political) 
reflection…”128 That is, the political aspect is not, and in this moment cannot be, separate from 
the formal strategy. The moment is one of a social-political aesthetics which seeks to liberate 
                                                        
article occludes the relation of political aesthetics that Brecht et al. advance in the film. See Nenad Jovanovic, 
Brechtian Cinemas: Montage and Theatricality in Jean-Marie Straub and Daniéle Huillet, Peter Watkins, and Lars 
von Trier (Albany: SUNY Press, 2017): 53 – 54.     
127 While often overlooked, female sexuality and a woman’s right to choose are important aspects of the film, and, as 
Kerstin Barndt notes, it is the character Anni’s “sexual independence, though, that ultimately determines the 
heroine’s fate and brings the drama of abortion into play”. It is Brecht’s task in the film to show how Anni’s 
positionality is defined by her social setting. This politics of situatedness is show to be in contrast to the ephemeral 
notion of young lovers. See Kerstin Barndt, “Aesthetics of Crisis: Motherhood, Abortion, and Melodrama in Irmgard 
Keun and Friedrich Wolf,” Women in German Yearbook: Feminist Studies in German Literature & Culture 24 
(2008): 82. 
128 The formulation “unsettle the spectator” needs further thought: this quote is useful as it clearly articulates that 
Brecht began to articulate a formal strategy aligned with his political purpose. This key point often gets lost in 
discussions of Brecht’s political aesthetics. See Katie Trumpener, “Theory, History and German Film,” Monatshefte 
82 (1990): 300.  
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both in a propagandistic sense – that is to challenge the dominant views – as well as challenging 
the dominant modes of viewing.  
 The response to real, concrete concerns as opposed to abstract categories and goals 
(which is how Brecht’s work is sometimes characterised) is the basis of the play within the play. 
Jameson may be correct in stating that it is in Brecht’s oeuvre “not the worker’s work that is 
representable but their poverty,”129 but this is hardly a shortcoming. The oppression of rent and 
how to respond to that oppression are equally valid “representables” in understanding the 
complex of pressures brought to bear on the working class. Therefore, this raw material of lived 
relations is taken up in the play within the play. The latter section of the play which offers the 
expression of organised opposition frames the play as the socialist artistic or cultural response to 
the capitalist crisis. Whereas in Die Mutter a worker responds to the owner’s demands for firings 
and reduced wages due to financial crisis as “Capitalism is sick and you’re the doctor,” there is 
little effective organised response as Die Mutter (as are Die Heilige Johanna and arguably Mann 
ist Mann) is a learning play based on defeat.130 The offering here is much more overtly combative 
and positive. If we learn through sport to win (especially as the unsuccessful jobseekers bicycle 
through the city, to scrape by is compared to the motorcycle racers driving forward to win, not so 
much in competition with others but pushing each other on), we also learn through protest 
aesthetics to aim to win, and respond to the concerns of people immediately. This is not, one 
should clarify, a template for oppositional aesthetics. Rather, this is how a particular form of 
aesthetics responds in this situation (particularly one that is protest oriented). What is important 
and worthy of generalisation is the emphasis on beginning from the concerns of the contemporary 
                                                        
129 Jameson, Brecht and Method, 150. 
130 Die Mutter was also produced prior to Kuhle Wampe and was, like Die Heilige Johanna before it, perhaps less 
concerned with producing an directly oppositional project given the further proximity to the strongest showings of 
the NSDAP electorally, and more generally on the ground as 1933 approached. 
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problem and then finding ways of addressing this problem through encouraging collective 
activity. In this instance the film’s depiction of the Boenikes’ eviction is mirrored in the depiction 
of the content of the Agit-Prop group. Brecht’s aesthetics are responsive. They must be focussed 
on addressing and shaping actual lived social situations and the importance that Brecht gives to 
the troupe “Das Rote Sprachrohr” (“The Red Megaphone”) in the film suggests a larger proposal 
for action and strategy.  Here is one “critic’s” take on the film:  
 
Yes, you will be astonished that I reproach your depiction for not being sufficiently 
human. You have not depicted a person but, well, let’s admit it, a type. Your unemployed 
worker is not a real individual, not a real flesh-and-blood person, distinct from every other 
person, with his particular worries, particular joys and finally his particular fate. He is 
drawn very superficially. As artists you must forgive me for the strong expression that we 
learn too little about him, but the consequences are of a political nature and force me to 
object to the film’s release.131  
 
The “critic,” as one may deduce from this last sentence, was the censor who blocked earlier 
releases of the film.132 Yet this is only relevant given that Brecht, upon hearing this appraisal, had 
the “unpleasant impression of being caught red-handed” and went further to commend the censor 
by stating that “he had penetrated far deeper into the essence of our artistic intentions than our 
most supportive critics.”133 What this censor had understood was the attempts at redefinition of 
the individual in capitalist society, although clearly the censor objects to this for the reasons 
                                                        
131 Bertolt Brecht, Brecht on Film and Radio (Methuen, London, 2000): 208. 
132 One should note that besides getting the film through the censors, the film was affected by the very depression it 
sought to examine on film, with Brecht and Dudow having to find another film company to finance the completion 
of the project, as the Prometheus Company dealt with liquidation proceedings.  
Kuhle Wampe was, despite the best efforts of the authorities to keep the film from being seen, relatively successful. 
After a successful first week, the film was prolonged and opened in 15 separate cinemas. This was followed by 
showings in London, Amsterdam and Paris. Jan Knopf, Brecht Handbuch 2, 443. 
See Vance Kepley Jr., “The Workers’ International Relief and the Cinema of the Left 1921-1935,” Cinema Journal 
23 (1983): 19. 
133 Brecht, Brecht on Film and Radio, 208-9.  
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stated above. What Brecht constructs is, in a way, a cinematic form of repetition whereby the 
individual is, as evidenced in Mann ist Mann, capable of reconstruction. The reconstruction is the 
gap filled by the narrative arc created by the suicide at the beginning of the play. Whereas the 
speeding of the wheels locates workers in a race against each other (and at the expense of each 
other), the collective marching through the streets on the way to the festivities presents the 
opportunity to highlight what Eugene Lunn terms the “positive potentials of the depersonalised, 
urban, machine age.”134 That is, by working through the constructs that capitalism provides, one 
is able to produce something that is able to liberate itself. 
 In his excellent essay “A Brechtian Aesthetics,” Dana Polan argues that the production of 
an over-formalised Brecht has lost sight, or even obscured the importance of Brecht’s political 
aesthetics. Brecht himself, notes Polan, insisted that all art contained a distancing or alienating 
feature to it. Yet there is in this nothing “socially distancing” about this.135 Whereas audiences 
may have become used to these alienating forms of making strange, many artists themselves have 
shied away from the conscious distancing towards intuitive abstraction. In order to meet the 
historical moment, Polan notes, we must replace the process which “keeps literary production in 
the realm of accident and signals a refusal to situate such production within the actual workings 
of history.” For this we must adopt a “scientific attitude.”136 The emphasis on the “actual 
workings of history” cannot be underestimated in Brecht as it implies a supple ability to address 
and act as redress in the now. It is important to note however that the “scientific attitude” need 
not privilege an anti-communal or anti-social experience. In fact, the living out of this attitude is 
                                                        
134 Lunn, Marxism and Modernism, 103. As Katherine Roper notes, Kuhle Wampe was unique (alongside Piel Jutzi's 
Mutter Krausens Fahrt ins Glück) in that it was the only film to “refer to revolutionary transformation of institutions 
and the Communist movement that would carry it out.” See Katherine Roper, “Looking for the German Revolution 
in Weimar Films,” Central European History 31 (1998): 90.  
135 Dana Polan, The Political Language of Film and the Avant-Garde (Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press, 1985): 92. 
136 Polan, The Political Language of Film, 93. 
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made clear only in the moment where a plurality is involved. Unfortunately, very little has been 
written on the play within a play chapter of Kuhle Wampe as the political aesthetics of the now 
are perhaps nowhere clearer than in any other part of the film.  
Just preceding the play there is a round of socialist games that highlight the ideals of 
comradeship, learning through sport to win, and the larger metaphor that to “win” socialism is 
key. It is not enough to respond to injustice, however; one must create an oppositional project 
aimed at overthrowing the world which makes injustice possible. At this point the purpose of the 
play seems to operate as a lesson in responding to the social problems repeatedly addressed 
throughout the film, but only partially. The actors make clear the particularities of their position 
in the play (for instance, that they are active in the working-class district of Wedding, Berlin) and 
make clear their role in the daily activities of the lives of those facing eviction. The purpose of 
their action is to support those being made homeless by late-Weimar capitalism. In this way their 
practice is necessarily defined by the positions of their allies in the particular historical moment 
and location. This adeptness requires a collective experience and one which liberates the 
construct of the singular bourgeois artist from his (sic) individuality to the position of collective 
cultural producer. As noted by Birgel below, such a political aesthetic project was itself 
attempted in Kuhle Wampe. 
 
Working with over 4,000 participants, including the members of the leftist Fichte Sports 
Club, the agit-prop group Das Rote Sprachrohr (The Red Megaphone), and several 
choruses, Brecht wanted the production to be a learning experience for all involved. As in 
his Lehrstücke from this period, the collaborative process was just as important, if not 
more so, than the final product. In addition, the audience was to be a co-producer of the 
film. By disrupting the illusion of reality through his well-known alienation technique, 
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Brecht wanted the viewers to become active participants who reflect on what was 
happening on the screen and relate it to their own lives.137 
 
The collective nature of the production and its nimble nature, able to respond in a meaningful 
way to the lives of workers in a moment of great need (eviction), necessitates a move away from 
a firm formal structure (so often the cause of misunderstandings of Brecht) and the understanding 
of Brecht’s political aesthetics as a process which requires a move towards experimentation that, 
for instance, one can witness so dramatically in the many productions and re-productions of 
Mann ist Mann.138 As Dana Polan explains, “Brecht’s interest in experimentation, his strictures 
against any too rigidly constructed theory of political art, are so many attempts to minimize 
predictability and keep art open to the changing demands of history.”139 
 
Concluding Brecht to 1933  
 
While I discuss Brecht’s conceptions and constructions of history in the next chapters, for 
Brecht’s time and for the works covered in this chapter the outstanding interpreter is Walter 
Benjamin. In Benjamin, Brecht finds not only a collaborator on many texts, including Die Heilige 
                                                        
137 Franz A. Birgel, “Kuhle Wampe, Leftist Cinema, and the Politics of Film Censorship in Weimar Germany,” 
Historical Reflections 35 (2009): 49. Brecht’s admiration for groups such as Das Rote Sprachchor was in part due to 
their ability to put forward arguments to workers directly. Yet Brecht also was keen to show, as in the tram scene at 
the end of the film, “the value of proletarian common sense, in which young workers successfully debated older 
bourgeois passengers about the need to change the world.” See Richard Bodek, Proletarian Performance in Weimar 
Berlin: Agitprop, Chorus, and Brecht (Columbia: Camden House, 1997): 146. 
138 On the concept of change in Brecht, the important Brechtian scholar Marc Silberman notes that “Brecht's entire 
oeuvre, his very mode of thought, derives from the conviction that society can and must be changed.” This article 
provides a very useful riposte to “post-modern” appropriations of Brecht while also noting the current power of 
Brecht’s work where this work has not been as of yet been institutionalized. See Marc Silberman, “A 
Postmodernized Brecht?,” Theatre Journal 45 (1993): 8.  
139 Polan, The Political Language of Film, 95. 
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Johanna (although of these Brecht had more than most),140 but rather someone – at least from the 
period – whose understanding and perceptions of Brecht’s work, even if they did not always 
agree, was unrivalled for his (and maybe any) age. While Brecht notes in 1927 his first spectator 
was Karl Marx, the argument could be made that in Walter Benjamin he had found his second.141 
In fact, Brecht himself would admit to as much. Wizisla notes: 
 
Benjamin was Brecht’s first systematic critic with a claim to theory, and he was the first 
to identify Brecht’s originality and his role in contemporary writing. According to 
Hannah Arendt, Brecht knew that in Benjamin he had encountered “the most important 
critic of the time”. This was confirmed by a note by Adorno, certainly in this case an 
incorruptible source, and certainly free from suspicion of having represented the 
relationship between Benjamin and Brecht as closer than it was: “Story that BB, when I 
saw him again for the first time since 1932, in exile in the autumn of 1941, spoke of WB 
as his best critic.”142 
 
What concerned both was an attempt to rethink a means and a form of active political aesthetics 
that was uniquely and deeply attuned to its age, an “expression of its closeness to real life.” 
                                                        
140 That said, it would be hard to overestimate Benjamin’s contribution to Brecht’s work during their friendship. One 
example of this deep connection is the fact that the two had been involved in an open journal project, the purpose of 
which was to “account for itself in regard to positions and challenges which uniquely – in current circumstances – 
permit it an active, interventionist role, with tangible consequences, as opposed to its usual ineffectual arbitrariness.” 
Wizisla, Benjamin and Brecht, 66. For more on this exciting project, which unfortunately never saw publication, and 
the way in which this was key in the development of aesthetics and politics of the day, see Wizisla, Benjamin and 
Brecht, 66-97. Of course, this was not a one-way street, and Brecht’s influence can be seen clearly in key Benjamin 
works such as the Arcades Projects, “The Author as Producer,” “The Work of Art” and “Theses on History.” 
Brecht’s work, as Guenter Hartung has observed, was for Benjamin the unexpected phenomenon of a great modern 
non-auratic art, and in the German language to boot – to the extent that even the powerful effect on Benjamin of 
surrealist texts paled by comparison. (Guenter Hartung in Wizisla, Benjamin and Brecht, 103). 
141 Fascinatingly, Benjamin had intended to send a copy of the essay to Brecht before he committed suicide, 
envisaging Brecht as “one of the first readers of the theses” as Wizisla notes. Wizisla, Walter Benjamin and Bertolt 
Brecht, 173. In this he was correct. As Brecht wrote in his journal of the essay: “In short, the little treatise is clear 
and presents complex issues simply (despite its metaphors and its Judaisms), and it is frightening to think how few 
people there are who are prepared even at least to misunderstand such a piece.” Brecht, quoted in Wizisla, Walter 
Benjamin and Bertolt Brecht, 173. 
142 Wizisla, Walter Benjamin and Bertolt Brecht, 151. 
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 What Benjamin recognizes as powerful in Brecht, and what I have attempted to articulate 
about Brecht in this chapter, is that there is a necessity to work through the logic of the system, 
that is, to understand and experiment in order to understand it at a moment, let those 
contradictions lose and play out on stage, and situate the audience so that they will be able to 
critically engage in the piece with which they are presented. A chief part of this project is not to 
abstract the key tensions and struggles but rather to embody them as much as possible. Thus the 
problem is not, as Jameson may argue, that Brecht is unable to represent capitalism in its totality. 
This, I have tried to argue here, is not Brecht’s chief pursuit, although it is one that has been 
attributed to him. Rather, Brecht is focussed on depicting how capitalism figures in remaking 
itself and a working class (as in Mann ist Mann), on the necessity of learning how the capitalist 
system manipulates and produces a system of complex ideological obfuscations (on things that 
need not be obfuscated, as seen as Die Heilige Johanna) and ultimately on the way in which art 
and culture can respond to the perpetual crises and daily horrors that are part and parcel of 
capitalism (Kuhle Wampe). In Chapter 4 I will continue to show this influence at work, yet with a 
focus on retrieving history as a means to illuminate the importance of making an argument for the 
present. 
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Chapter 3: Blake, Opposition, and the Now 
 
 In the following two Blake chapters I hope to argue, following the previous example of 
Brecht in the preceding chapters, that there are two distinct moments in Blake’s work. While the 
circumstances for their interventions are somewhat comparable in that they are marked by major 
historical defeats (the cause behind the shift for Brecht occurs with the rise of Nazi power which 
necessitates an exile away from his political and artistic connections, whereas for Blake (et al.) 
we see the hopes and desires of a generation expressed by the French Revolution destroyed by its 
failures),143 there is a similarity in that the earlier periods of each writer are structured by 
exploring their own moment of capitalism and working through its specific contradictions. This 
exploration involves examining the way they can be as close to that moment as possible – a 
process dedicated to understanding that historical moment’s impulses most deeply – while 
producing an oppositional aesthetic that speaks of and to that moment. Yet just as we see the 
connections in producing this aesthetic, what I have termed, following Benjamin, a political 
aesthetics of the now, so too do we see, as presented in the last chapter and as I will present in the 
next, a moment of historical reexamination as a means to think through an otherwise historically 
relatively inopportune time for progressives more generally and progressive cultural producers as 
a result.  
                                                        
143 Erdman notes that Blake’s work at the time and in response is “alive with the sense of a new and revolutionary 
break with the past and a great hopeful movement of the people.” Erdman, Blake, Prophet Against Empire: A Poets 
Interpretation of the History of His Own Time (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969): 130 whereas later, once 
the Revolution had collapsed, the figure of Orc, a harbinger of rebellious spirit, is described by Erdman as “the 
Napoleonic serpent”. Erdman, Blake, Prophet Against Empire, 375. See also Jerome Christensen, Romanticism at the 
End of History  (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000); and for a more nuanced approach, 
considering Blake’s hesitation to violence, see Robert Manquis, “Holy Savagery and Wild Justice: English 
Romanticism and the Terror,” Studies in Romanticism 28 (1989): 365 – 95.  
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Just as Mann ist Mann’s Galy Gay is a character who begins his quest in response to a 
need (the purchase of food) so too in the Introduction to the Songs of Innocence do we meet the 
poet responding to a need. A religious vision (a child upon a cloud) entreats Blake to pipe and 
sing and ultimately to write down his lyrics “that all may read.”144 This poem, like many of the 
poems in Innocence, is a thoughtful moment of introspection, seemingly very personal in nature, 
so that the desire to spread the word, as it were, is especially notable. The poem bears many of 
the common marks of a perceived simplicity in Blake. The intended audience for the poetry, 
which is meant to be written so that “Every child may joy to hear,” hints further at the “innocent” 
purpose of the poem. But the question which should be posed is: what comprises this innocence, 
and perhaps more relevant, from what and where does it originate? What in the make-up of this 
cycle defines innocence, and likewise, is there something, sine qua non, that comprises this 
definition by its absence?  
What I would like to argue is that the poems offer a conception of innocence that is 
constituted by an absence from (or retreat from and rejection of) the dominance of exploitation 
and oppression, very broadly, and that this innocence embodies a conscious rejection of this 
dominance, and by doing so erects a space of innocence separate from this dominance. 
Innocence, it cannot be stressed enough, is not indicative of, or a signal of, ignorance.145 Indeed, 
innocence stands specifically against ignorance and obfuscation, especially in regards to those 
dominant attempts to make of that which is radical and (radically) pleasurable about life a cover 
                                                        
144 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 7. 
145 Robert Rix, in contrast to my argument, states that in the poem “Chimney Sweeper” Innocence “becomes 
ignorance blinding [children] to the way they are socially exploited.” I take issue with this argument below using 
Thompson and Makdisi, although Löwy and Sayre’s point also suggests concurrence with my position. See Robert 
Rix, William Blake and the Cultures of Radical Christianity (London: Routledge, 2007): 111. 
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for their own misery-making domination. That is, innocence is a block or a refusal against its 
own possible inversion and perversion.  
Innocence is a conscious space of rejection against the dominating oppressive and 
exploitative world of capitalism. Innocence involves carving out a space where the rules of 
oppression and exploitation do not, and cannot, apply. In part, innocence in Blake relies on a 
retrieval of the past, whereas for Brecht the move into history is a form of accessing the 
disastrousness of the present. The shift away, for Brecht, brings us closer to home. In contrast, the 
past exists for Blake not merely in the sense of a particular historical conjuncture, but rather, a 
state of being that is at once seemingly originary and historically determined. The absence (or 
negation) of an exploitative worldview in Songs of Innocence does narrow the options available 
as to what can comprise innocence. That is, innocence is not simply a universal, always existing 
category reliant on an essentialist notion of itself.146 Innocence is both responsive to and 
determined by its own structures. That is, in Blake’s cosmology there is a conceit in which he 
combines the absolute and the contemporary and presents it merely as the absolute. Yet in 
Blake’s formulation innocence is determined by this other of exploitation and oppression, while 
maintaining a clear position that determination does not equal being comprised of it as well. 
Determination here is perhaps, following Raymond Williams’ intervention in Marxism and 
Literature, better translated as limitation, a closer translation of Marx’s concept of bestimmen.147  
In this sense, what is defined as innocence is limited to what can be rejected from the dominant 
society. Innocence involves a (concealed) knowing rejection of the world of experience. 
                                                        
146 See Saree Makdisi, Romantic Imperialism: Universal Empire and the Culture of Modernity (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998). Important in this regard is also Clifford Siskin, The Historicity of Romantic 
Discourse (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1988): 3 – 13; Dennis M. Welch, “Essence, Gender, Race: William Blake’s “Visions 
of the Daughters of Albion,” Studies in Romanticism 49 (2010). 
147 Williams, Marxism and Literature, 84. 
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Yet innocence is only half of the equation. The other half exists in the realm of 
experience, and what experience connotes for Blake. I wish to argue that experience is that 
moment of proof or recognition in Blake that the realm of the actually existing world is one that 
must be acknowledged and reckoned with. That is, innocence is not possible of creating 
everything in its image, or even indeed of opting out of the world of experience. The process of 
innocence is necessary for maintaining an allegiance to something that is good in an abstract but 
also very much lived, and deeply practical sense. Experience is equally necessary for the 
development of understanding of the ways in which the type of innocence that Blake constructs is 
turned over and used by the dominant classes and oppressive actors and institutions. The 
processes of innocence are always in danger of being co-opted and used in ways in which the 
ruling ideologies benefit as “organized Innocence springs out of Experience.”148 Blake is aware 
of this and seeks to carve out a space of freedom, the freedom(s) that the society attempts to 
distinguish and constantly reframe for its own purposes. This is the central dilemma of the Songs 
of Innocence and Experience, and shows how deeply Blake’s poetry is concerned with 
understanding and operating in his moment.  
This may sound perhaps like an unfaithful reading of Blake. It may appear to be an 
attempt, as it were, to smuggle Blake’s complex world into one that neatly corresponds with that 
of an almost explicit, dialectical, Marxist one. This suspicion is perhaps understandable, albeit 
misguided. Nor is this the first time that such a misunderstanding has occurred, as I will show 
later.  I am not stating that all in Blake is “proto-typical” of Marxism (as if such a thing were 
possible). What I am arguing is that Blake’s process is nevertheless something that is ultimately 
liberatory and specifically driven through its own moment. 
                                                        
148 Erdman, Blake: Prophet Against Empire, 118. 
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Blake and Romanticism  
 
A large part of the central thesis I am proposing here borrows from the work of Michael 
Löwy and Robert Sayre and their analysis of the central tenets of Romanticism. Löwy formulates 
his central arguments in two pieces, his 1987 essay “The Romantic and the Marxist Critique of 
Modern Civilization” and then later again in his book-length text with Robert Sayre. The key 
failing in critical writings on the Romantics, argue the two in the latter work, is that most 
appreciations and examinations have sought to justify a particular theory of Romanticism with 
only examples from a select group of writers, painters, poets etc. at the expense/omission of other 
figures who do not fit in a particular schema. As a result such attempts, they argue, “no doubt 
designate significant features that are present in the work of many Romantic writers, but they fail 
to deliver the essence of the phenomenon.”149 Löwy argues that it is thus necessary to examine 
Romanticism as a way of seeing the world that stretched beyond a particular group or subset of 
cultural producers and encompasses the movement as a whole. While my focus on Blake is 
informed mainly by the experience of English Romantics, and many of the commentators I use 
will be likewise focused on this region, it is important to highlight that, as Löwy argues, that the 
Romantics across Europe were united in their vision against what they term the “Quantification 
of Life.” As Löwy argued in his 1987 essay,  
 
The central feature of industrial (bourgeois) civilization that Romanticism criticizes is not 
the exploitation of the workers or social inequality – although these may also be 
                                                        
149 Michael L. Löwy and Robert Sayre, Romanticism Against the Tide of Modernity (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2001): 4. 
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denounced, particularly by leftist Romantics – it is the quantification of life, i.e. the total 
domination of (quantitative) exchange-value, of the cold calculation of price and profit, 
and of the laws of the market, over the whole social fabric.150 
 
What Löwy’s framework makes clear is that the Romantics were met with a rapidly advancing 
capitalist system which sought to lay waste to all it encountered, letting nothing slip either out of 
its sphere of domination or its systemic logic. While it is true that there were a myriad of political 
and aesthetic responses to the problems that capitalism forced onto them, the Romantics, across 
the diverse collection that they were, and for a longer period than the 1850s, were fundamentally 
concerned with the quantification of all aspects of the social, cultural and political economic 
realities of their age.  
 Even among more general appreciations of Romanticism, contemporary scholarship has 
been fully willing to accept that the Romantics were sharply political and often politically active. 
Aidan Day’s Romanticism leaves us in no doubt of the connections between politics and literary 
production of the time, as does Carmen Casaliggi and Porscha Fermanis Romanticism: A literary 
and Cultiural History and the connection to the rise of human rights discourse. Even a 
mainstream author such as William Vaughan has argued as much in the admittedly clichéd notion 
that they were “courageously facing the realities of their age.”151 Despite the melodramatic word 
choice, the basic idea itself is sound. Often described as hopelessly lost in an age that was most 
                                                        
150  Michael Löwy, “The Romantic and the Marxist Critique of Modern Civilization,” Theory and Society 16 (1987): 
892. 
151 William Vaughan, Romanticism and Art (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978): p. 9. A less bombastic offering 
by Raymond Williams achieves the same goal: “Than the poets from Blake and Wordsworth to Shelley and Keats 
there have been few generations of creative writers more deeply interested and more involved in study and criticism 
of the society of their day.” Raymond Williams, Culture and Society: 1780 – 1950 (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1983): 30. The chapter “The Romantic Artist”, 30 – 48, remains a useful analysis and has a refreshing 
boldness of language. See also Aidan Day’s Romanticism (New York: Routledge, 2012) and Carmen Casaliggi and 
Porscha Fermanis Romanticism: A literary and Cultural History (New York: Routledge, 2016). 
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definitely no longer theirs (a description with some validity), the Romantics sought to engage 
with their society by way of a significant rejection of “modernity,” yet this opposition was the 
basis for reenergizing their own times. This rejection of capitalist modernity is highly important 
for Romanticism in general,152 but also for Blake in particular.  
Part and parcel of the quantification of the world was a disenchantment of ideas that 
capital deemed antithetical to its own purposes, a point that Marx and Engels also advanced. 
Löwy and Sayre quote a particularly telling passage from The Communist Manifesto in which the 
two argued that the effect (if not the stated intent) of the rise of capitalist modernity involved the 
extinguishing of the non-quantifiable energies of previous systems. They note, “Marx observed 
that ‘the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervor, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine 
sentimentalism’ of the past had been submerged by the bourgeoisie, ‘drowned…in the icy water 
of egotistical calculation.’”153 The reaction of the Romantic project, largely defined, was the 
activation of a resistance meant to reverse this process. As Löwy and Sayre note, 
 
Romanticism may be viewed as being to a large extent a reaction on the part of 
“chivalrous enthusiasm” against the “icy water” of rational calculation and against the 
Entzauberung der Welt – leading to an often desperate attempt to reenchant the world.154 
 
                                                        
152 A general but worthy study in this regard is Mark Lussier and Bruce Matsunaga eds., Engaged Romanticism: 
Romanticism as Praxis (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2008). 
153 Löwy and Sayre, Romanticism, 29.  
154 Löwy and Sayre, Romanticism, 30.  
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The idea that Blake’s work represents a reaction to the “icy water of rational calculation” should 
incite little argument. However, to describe this rejection of the “Entzauberung der Welt” 
(disenchantment of the world) as a “desperate attempt to reenchant the world” cannot be said as 
easily of Blake. Blake surely expresses desperation when one considers the fervency with which 
he rejects his own society. Yet the desperation can often result in a desire merely to reconstruct 
the past in largely uncritical ways. That is, rather than a thinking through of the issue at hand, one 
lurches back in search of a form of society which is deeply implicated in the same power 
relations that one finds so abhorrent in the current society. In such a regression, reconstruction of 
the almost always idealized older order frequently leads to a glorification of and desire for a re-
imposition of facets of feudalism, without critically acknowledging the real oppressive and 
exploitative nature of that system, merely in an attempt to rid oneself of the present’s undesirable 
circumstances.155 Blake stands contrary to this desperation in that his rejection of life’s 
quantification is of a more thoroughgoing and comprehensive sort than was the case with most of 
his fellow Romantics, as he seeks to reenergize his society by working through the logic of 
capitalist modernity and by arguing for justice for those who are oppressed and expropriated. 
Thus, while I agree with Löwy’s statement that “The essential characteristic of Romantic anti-
capitalism is a thorough critique of modern industrial (bourgeois) civilization (including the 
process of production and work) in the name of certain pre-capitalist social and cultural 
values,”156 at the same time I take the position that the political impulses of Blake were to re-
energise the present and also to occupy it, thereby saving the present from those who sought to 
                                                        
155 What is particularly important here is the work of Raymond Williams in his major work The Country and the 
City. In that work Williams investigates the way in which the glory days of so-called “organic” communities are 
often an attempt to re-impose paternalist forms of oppression onto the present. In this regard, the emphasis of the 
country manor poems is a background glance at the supposed halcyon days of a peaceable community which was in 
fact built on the foundations of one of the largest scales examples of expropriation in Europe, the enclosures act. See 
Raymond Williams, The Country and the City (London: The Hogarth Press, 1985).  
156 Löwy, “The Romantic and the Marxist Critique,” 891. 
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monopolise it. This does not involve opting out fully (but definitely partially), but rather working 
through the system’s logics and monopolising discourse. Blake takes the contemporary at its face 
value and makes known that which it occludes or leaves aside (leaving it on the “ecchoing 
green”). Blake’s particular form of oppositional aesthetics necessarily revolves around a 
dialectical analysis of his modernity, an analysis which requires an understanding of its key 
impulses and drives while simultaneously examining how these require the extinguishing of 
liberatory spirits on the one hand and the disempowering of those liberatory spirits for large 
sections of society on the other. This is very far from a naïve re-enchanting of the world. Blake’s 
Songs of Innocence and Experience represent an attempt to dialectically dissect society from a 
dissenting position. These poems argue against the nascent and established ideologies and 
experienced worlds of modernity by working through its contradictions and omissions.  
 I should note, before I turn to a closer consideration of Blake and anti-capitalism that 
while, unlike Brecht, he did not have the concept of capitalism available to him, and nor did he 
have any systematic or likewise formulated critique of the system upon which he could draw, this 
should not preclude the descriptor being applied to his work. Charges of anachronism miss the 
point that Blake’s work is not closed to the future, as I have tried to argue passim. To not have 
the ability to understand the system in its totality (in as much as we are able to, or as Brecht was 
able to) should not invalidate his anti-capitalism, especially when one considers the extent to 
which his work foresaw areas of capitalist domination that would only be the focus of 
contemporary scholarship almost two centuries after his death (one case of note, as Joel Kovel 
argues, is surveillance studies).157 
                                                        
157 As Joel Kovel argues in his analysis of Blake’s Milton, “As Joel Kovel argues, “There is an entire economy of 
accusation in the regime of Satanic Mills, watching, nagging, hemming in the mass, extracting power for the 
aggrandizement of the state. War is its matrix. And the system prepares for war in all its Mills, bringing the Satanic 
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Expect Poison, Demand Movement 
 
 Nothing more kills the revolutionary, redemptive, inspiration of God for Blake than the 
destruction of his (sic) power in the name of those who purport to carry it forward. Conversely, 
nothing is more prized in Blake than the achievement of that inspiration through the mediation of 
the mind and enjoyment of the body.158 In this mediation of the living, working human the 
revolutionary impact of Blake’s work is most pronounced. In this relationship, the stress on 
movement in partial dialectical opposition to stillness is vital.159 Being inside the flow of 
creativity and experiment as the fulfillment of human activity very much defines Blake’s 
approach, and its opposite is the product of Blake’s greatest fears. This fundamental duality is 
expressed in the following passage from the “Excerpt to the Marriage of Heaven and Hell.” Blake 
writes: 
                                                        
arts of surveillance to bear on the workers in advanced, monopoly capital, where productivity is the mode, and a 
century-old process of controlling and invading the bodies of workers are the norm: “quality control” is the fine 
structure of domination, the quiet, everyday humiliation of the worker, the control that does not speak its own name.” 
See Joel Kovel, “Dark Satanic Mills: William Blake and the Critique of War,” Capitalism, Nature, Socialism 21 
(2010): 14. 
158 One post-modern interpretation of the body in Blake seems to argue that it is impossible for such a connection 
that I suggested above to exist. Erin M. Gross notes that “The body in Blake’s work points to the inability of 
comprehension to catch up to the lived experience that the body makes possible.” I don’t see there a necessary 
disjunction between the thought and action of the body. In fact, in Blake’s cosmology, the two can never fully be 
disassociated from the other. Erin M. Gross, “What is Called Corporeal: William Blake and the Question of the 
Body,” The Eighteenth Century 51 (2010): 414. This is not to deny Nicholas Williams’ claim that “If Blake is a poet 
willing to acknowledge the difficulty of being born, then he is also one who seems to acknowledge the difficulty of 
seeing and knowing oneself in motion.” Difficulty is one matter, inability is another. The latter invites a discussion of 
the problems of materiality and becoming, the former invites none.  See Nicholas M. Williams, “Blake Dead or 
Alive,” Nineteenth-Century Literature 63 (2009): 491. 
159 In Innocence even Blake’s own work is implicated in the aversion to permanence. As Edward Said has noted, 
“…the opening poem of Blake’s Songs of Innocence represents the poet as using a reed – “a rural pen” – to write his 
happy songs for the joy of every child. His paper is the water which is stained as he “writes”: but one’s inclination is 
to associate innocence in the poem with impossibility of a permanent inscription in the water. The one line of the 
poem that suggests a troubling of innocence is “And I stain’d the water clear.” Nevertheless, the ambiguously placed 
adjective “clear” offsets the threat in “stain’d”, so that one can read the line to mean either “I stained the water until 
it became clear” or “my pen stained the clear water”: in both cases the conclusion is that because he writes on water, 
which even if momentarily stained would not retain the imprint, the poet composes happy (and clear) songs.” See 
Edward Said, Beginnings: Intention and Method (New York: Basic Books, 1975): 203-4. 
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The fox provides for himself, but God provides for the lion. 
Think in the morning. Act in the noon. Eat in the evening. Sleep in the night.  
He who has suffer'd you to impose on him, knows you.  
As the plow follows words, so God rewards prayers.  
The tygers of wrath are wiser than the horses of instruction.  
Expect poison from the standing water.  
You never know what is enough unless you know what is more than enough.160 
 
There is a deeply connected sentiment expressed in these last two lines and one that offers help in 
finding an origin to the stream of his thought. While Blake will rely at times on a circular logic, 
wherein the end goal is merely a beginning again of the same process, he does not see all 
attempts at making or producing as equal. Indeed, what terrifies Blake, and this is the poisonous 
source of the standing water, is those attempts to rule out the conditions of productive activity. 
The poison exists when production cannot. It is better thus to go too far than to not go far 
enough.161 That is, there are forces (authoritarian religious, commodifying, sexist) which excel in 
producing standing waters of thought. Blake is deeply distrustful of these. He is always wary of 
                                                        
160 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 37. There is a tendency to read the lines above as the culmination of a particular line of 
abstracting thought. That is, as I showed in the criticism of the early Brecht, to abstract the poetry here as a mere 
philosophy on the role of reading and interpretation, emphasizing the importance of doing rather than thinking. Yet 
such an approach neglects the important line “As the plow follows words, so God rewards prayers”.  What Blake 
seems to be hinting at here is not a choice of words over actions, but rather words that are inspired by actions. This 
requires a deeper understanding of the moment of action, of labour in its own instance and its movement that will 
invoke inspiration.  This version of Blake requires a more complex analysis than the clichéd version of the poet with 
his head trained only towards the sky (particularly of a Blake only obsessed with angels and spirits in the trees). Yet 
works which have attempted to stress the importance of this relation of the material and the philosophical in Brecht 
have often left out the role of the structured society that Blake was interested in countering. 
161 Blake’s notion of radicalism thus finds comfort in excess, which would have distanced him further from other 
forms of radicalism of his time. As Saree Makdisi notes; “Radicalism in the 1790s, at least in its hegemonic 
formulation, must be understood as a project to locate and articulate a middle-class sensibility as against the unruly 
excesses of both higher and lower orders”. Saree Makdisi, “Immortal Joy: William Blake and the Cultural Politics of 
Empire,” in Blake, Nation and Empire, Steve Clark and David Worrall eds., (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006): 
22. 
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the colonization of the one extreme (of innocence, of potential, of pleasurable lived experiences) 
by the other (of those elements in experience, which seek to make of innocence a commodifiable, 
useable entity to reinforce their own power and necessarily clamp down on innocent desire and 
need). 
The fear of such extreme caution is borne out of an intense trepidation of the destructive 
powers of the dominant system. The lack of movement is a symbol of organized inertia causing a 
virtual death as one is not aware of one’s life’s potential. The constriction of movement both 
destroys life-making potential while benefitting those who profit from such a constriction. In a 
metaphor that would be to Blake’s liking, paraphrasing Rosa Luxembourg, one cannot notice 
one’s chains if one doesn’t move. These energies, while constricted, are never fully distinguished 
and their potential sets up a moment of tension between the state of things, understood in a broad 
fashion as the totality of human experience and action and the possibility of what could be 
different. Saree Makdisi has nicely articulated this point in his William Blake and the Impossible 
History of the 1790’s. He writes, 
 
The question, in other words, is whether life is to be the instrumental and reified life of 
the organized organism…or, on the contrary, the joyous life of the “prolific”, indefinite 
open, reaching out toward an infinitely prolific number of re-makings, re-connections, re-
imaginations – life as pure potential, life as constituent, rather than constituted power.162  
 
                                                        
162 Makdisi, William Blake, 266.  
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For Blake this constituted power makes itself known in all aspects of life; in work, in freedom to 
and from work, in all of life’s spoken, and importantly, unspoken activities. In this way, Blake’s 
poetics have also led to attempts to break down the totality of his “‘prolific’, indefinite open, 
reaching out” thought into a reified space which imposes “an interpretive frame” which limits the 
reader’s creative appreciation of his work.163 This process abstracts away, as we saw with 
Brecht’s Mann ist Mann, the complexity and openness of Blakean materiality. In Blake’s 
construction, often his concept of the imagination (as mentioned more generally within the 
Romantic tradition) is offered as one which would lead us away from the material and into the 
realm of pure ideas. Yet there exists another option that seeks to reject the dualism and put forth 
another possibility: 
 
For Blake’s concept of the imagination unifies body and mind, thought and action, 
material and immaterial, not in the sense that it mediates between them, but in the sense 
that it marks the deployment of pure creative ontological power on both a mental and 
material plane. It is, in other words, the experience of a materialist ontology.164  
 
This experience of a materialist ontology attempts to be all encompassing. Not in the teleological 
or predictive sense, or even inclusive of all that it produces, but rather in the way in which 
Innocence implicitly and explicitly celebrates a non-repressive, creative world which is 
necessarily open ended. In contrast very much to our own times, the notion of imagination is part 
of our lived reality. Innocence, its production in the everyday, and specifically Blake’s 
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production of it, are at one and the same time unique instances of productive life. Not all lived 
reality is bent towards productivity, and some forms of lived reality target production itself. 
Imagination is almost co-terminous with productivity in this regard. As Makdisi notes, 
“Imagination here is the process by which such images of truth are produced: it is the process by 
which lived, experienced reality is brought into being. The freedom to imagine is the power to 
create the world…”165 Blake’s emphasis on productivity, his ability to make of imagination a 
lived way of being, acts as a reminder also of his connection to God – not as a God of rules and 
prescriptions – but of good, nurturing life that reproduces itself through the good nature of God in 
our lives. Here, “power is human rather than divine” in that “such divine power is here 
recognized as inherently human.”166 And yet, as Axel Staehler notes: “Divine revelation is not a 
singular occurrence in the past but happens time and again anew, and occurs individually for 
every human being.”167 This unique process of reproduction of innocent life through the 
imagination is put forward in the poems “Laughing Song,” “A Cradle Song,” and “The Divine 
Image.” What we see in these is a progression of nature’s connections in (pro-) creation, creation, 
and maintenance, and a philosophical examination of the natural inclination that is reflected 
ultimately in God’s own vision of the innocent life.  
 The first six lines of the “Laughing Song”, much as the title would have us believe, centre 
on the how everything in innocent life seems bent on pleasure. They read as follows: 
 
When the green woods laugh, with the voice of joy 
                                                        
165 Makdisi, William Blake, 267. 
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167 See Axel Staehler, “Writ(h)ing Images. Imagination, the Human Form, and the Divine in William Blake, Salman 
Rushdie, and Simon Louvish,” English Studies 89 (2008): 105. 
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And the dimpling stream runs laughing by, 
When the air does laugh with our merry wit, 
And the green hill laughs with the noise of it 
When the meadows laugh with lively green 
And the grasshopper laughs in the merry scene168 
 
 “The green woods,” “the dimpling stream,” “the air,” “the green hill,” “the meadows,” and “the 
grasshopper” all laugh, either of their own accord or through interaction with the human “merry 
wit.”169 Here, nature is, like imagination in the discussion above, brought to life. The natural 
world in this regard seemingly follows our human lead, reciprocated in the poem as the last six 
lines are human-centric. Nature is not merely given over to us, but conjoins with our conception 
of judgment of the pleasure-making of life. This is not to anthropomorphize the woods, stream, 
air, or hill but to make them a part of the same process. Humanity’s life-giving force is mirrored 
as nature offers up delights, so too are we then delighted by it. The similarities do not stop here. 
Nature comes alive with its connection to humanity, and reaches a fuller fruition by its extension 
through the prism of human imagination, often as a metaphor for both human production and 
reproduction. The poem offers “a profound unity, a sense of commonality and unruptured 
mutuality linking us all joyously together.”170 In order to extend this unruptured mutuality, Blake 
employs somewhat subtle sexual imagery to further bind the two.  
The “sweet round mouths” of “Mary and Susan and Emily” is a physically pleasurable 
utterance, as is the fact that they sing “Ha, ha he!” There is at the very least a sense of double 
entendre here. This reading is given more credibility when we read that “our table with cherries 
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and nuts is spread.” The final entreaty to “Come live, and be merry, and join with me, To sing the 
sweet chorus of “Ha, ha, he!”171 is an equation of sexual pleasure and the pleasure of the natural 
world more generally. They are, if not inseparable, at the very least complementary to each other. 
The introduction of the pleasure of the natural world, and the joys of the natural world with their 
connection to humanity and humanity’s role in their existence (for instance, “the painted birds 
laugh in the shade”), lends a certain degree of conjoined frivolity, and sexual frivolity, herewith.  
 Although it would be wrong to equate the physical enjoyment of sex, and in particular the 
playfulness of this portrayal of sexuality, with procreation (designed with a purpose wherein 
pleasure is a mere inducement to the larger act – indeed we are provided little evidence here that 
Blake is referring to hetero-normative sex, given that the three names mentioned are women’s), 
the poem which follows is about the raising of a young child. Love is in this sense, especially as 
regards a unity of multiples (albeit with a maintenance of difference), extended towards another 
who cannot, at least in the moment, appreciate it. This involves loving more purely in the sense 
of a gift. Whereas the joy of nature and sex in “The Laughing Song” took place during the day, in 
the evening we find an ode to care and protection of a sleeping child, or perhaps a child 
struggling to find sleep.172 
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172 While not the focus of this text, it should be noted that although Blake is seen as almost synonymous with 
progressive sexual politics, so much so that that Susan Matthews has stated that “Blake has stood for a prophet of 
sexual freedom in popular culture in the latter part of the twentieth century,” his later writings (not including the 
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(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011): 1. Likewise, as Jon Mee notes, Blake will “return again and again 
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Sleep should offer a moment without hardship, though Blake suggests that all may be not 
well with the warning that the child should “Sleep, sleep, happy child, / While o’er thee doth 
mother weep.”173 In the midst of this sadness, the child’s peace and the parent’s care signify the 
promise of redemption that we find in the reliance on others, but also in the innocent world’s 
offering of unity in compassion and love. Humanity is not alone in this as, like innocence, it is 
cast in a cosmological frame. In the mother’s weeping, for instance, we find the sympathetic 
nature of God. “Sweet babe, once like thee / Thy Maker lay, and wept for me:”174 And nor is the 
connection between the mother and child, and mother and God, the end of it. There is a third 
connector. “Infant smiles are his own smiles; Heaven and earth to peace beguiles.”175 The 
correlation of the infant to the heavenly is a further instantiation of the deeper sense of unity that 
exists in innocence. At every level of compassion we see how another becomes represented. 
“Sweet babe, in thy face / Holy image I can trace.”176 
Being free of an oppression that exists everywhere in the tragedy of experience is at once 
seemingly an impossibility yet paradoxically also the only present antidote for an exploitative 
world, a world which seeks to colonise all in and out of its path. Yet innocence should not be 
read merely as an exasperated critique of the current order. Blake was mindful of the ways in 
which there were only a few moments that opened up a possibility against the tyranny of a 
totalizing capitalist world. All language and activity (not just biblical) is not merely fused with 
meaning, but rather is immersed in the struggle over meaning. If exploitation acts in such a way 
as to almost bar opposition to it, then an aspect of resistance to this involves maintaining 
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something that is universally good, and to a very large extent, “pure.” In Blakean terms, this 
purity is not uniform but rooted in difference and acceptance.  
In the poem “The Little Black Boy” there is seemingly a clear demonstration of the 
pitfalls associated with the notion of purity as referenced above. The poem, prima facie, suggests 
offensive racial over/undertones. The opening lines, in particular, stand out as problematic; “My 
mother bore me in the southern wild, And I am black, but oh my soul is white!”177 seems to 
confirm the racial hierarchies of the time. Whiteness bears the marks of superiority, and likewise 
there is an equation of whiteness and “civilized” Englishness. Whiteness bears the marks of 
blessings, while blackness stands as a marker for deprivation and lack, as the last line of the first 
stanza notes, “But I am black, as if bereaved of light.”178 Read in relation to the rest of the poem, 
the meanings here shift considerably. At this stage of the poem we are hearing from the black boy 
himself, but he is in conversation with his mother, a teacher, who challenges this thought. As 
Elizabeth A. Bohls notes, “The child’s African mother teaches him a lesson about God, nature 
and human bodies, a lesson that questions in significant ways what we come to recognize as the 
imposed colonial mentality of the first stanza.”179  The lesson involves equating racial attitudes to 
“a cloud, and like a shady grove” which obscure from the light of God. This importantly involves 
our collective “learn [ing] to bear the beams of love.”180 The lesson is to jettison the binds of 
racism and racial authority and, in the second last stanza, the child arrives at a state which 
contradicts the problematic formulation referenced abouve. As Blake states, “When I from black 
and he from white cloud free, / And round the tent of God like lambs we joy.”181 Whiteness and 
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Blackness as racial categories of superiority and inferiority obscure us from understanding our 
indivisible humanity. Interestingly, and in opposition to standard colonial narratives of the time 
of the learned white and instructed brown learner, in the final stanza it is the black child that takes 
on the role of his mother in teaching the young white boy how to bear the light of God’s love.182  
In this poem humanity is reflective of God’s most benevolent state. Despite Blake’s 
protestations against the standing water, there exists a form of stasis in God’s purity. Stasis, 
rather than a block on human creativity and the making possible, acts as a form of protection 
against the world of experience in which racial categories are necessary to maintain the system. 
Yet this version of stasis involves a state of being that is simultaneously a state of becoming. In 
order for this benevolence to become a reality, we must arrive at a time “…when our souls have 
learn’d the heat to bear.”183 That is, in order for God to have purpose, God must be made living in 
the everyday both in moments of innocence but also by maintaining moments of innocence in 
trying circumstances.  
What is striking in “The Divine Image” is that Blake suggests how God’s action in the 
world manifests itself, but also suggests that the gesture goes one better by portraying humanity 
as reflective of and constituting of the Divine. There is the clearest evidence presented in 
maintaining the natural goodness that Blake displays is in fact part of Innocence. Note here the 
duplication in the following,  
 
                                                        
182 It should be noted that in two persuasive readings of the poem, Makdisi’s William Blake and Bohls’ Romantic 
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For Mercy, Pity, Peace, and Love, 
Is God our father dear: 
And Mercy Pity Peace and Love, 
Is Man his child and care.184 
 
This is a poem not merely of relation but of equivalence. The mirroring of the two lines provides 
a clear sense of the reproduction of God in humanity. Yet while the first two lines lend 
themselves to a description of God’s nature, the following two are a description of action, 
especially when one considers the relational nature of humanity and the natural world in “A 
Laughing Song,” “A Cradle Song,” and as well “The Little Black Boy.” While God is, in the 
terms referred to earlier, a pure being of goodness in nature,185 the trinity of man (as humanity), 
child, and care are the products of nature in action and in this way inseparable. Christopher Z. 
Hobson argues similarly that: “Exactly the distinction between human and transcendent 
Jesus….is one that Blake has denied since his early works, such as “The Divine Image.””186 This 
connected existence, while connected to the Divine, is interdependent on its own reproduction. 
This reproduction necessitates the nature of God made alive, and this is “Mercy Pity Peace and 
Love.” The grammar here is particularly telling, as the use of semicolon is literally meant to join 
the independent clauses.187 Blake may at times be very creative with grammar, and often eschews 
its rules, but this particular instance seems, given the content here, to be a symbolic formal 
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strategy. This formal aspect is further found in the notion of, the poem’s title, “The Divine 
Image.” The poem continues, 
 
For Mercy has a human heart 
Pity, a human face: 
And Love, the human form divine, 
And Peace, the human dress.188 
 
Blake carefully devotes a line to each aspect of humanity’s reflection of God made real. In the 
image, in the moment before it can be spoiled, and perhaps even while being spoiled it maintains 
the belief in cleanliness, is innocence. What we see here is the beginning of the end of a trinity of 
sorts, a trinity of a composition of life that is founded on an alternative notion of humanity than 
that offered by the dominant forces and their structures of feeling.  
While admitting the advancement of a religious politics of innocence, it would be a 
mischaracterization of Blake to suggest that he looks merely to negate an oppressive politics by 
his oppositional way of viewing and being in the world. Blake does not offer a mere rejection of 
the corollary but offers what E. P. Thompson terms a “contrary state.” The distinction is relevant 
as it illustrates both the necessity of responding to the current moment in Blake, and a refusal to 
accept the dominant features of that current moment as the only way out. In an earlier model for 
the poem “Divine Image” we see an example of this mirroring:  
 
Cruelty has a Human Heart 
And Jealousy a Human Face 
Terror, the Human Form Divine 
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And Secrecy, the Human Dress 
The Human Dress, is forged Iron 
The Human Form, a Fiery Forge. 
The Human Face, a Furnace seal’d  
The Human Heart, its hungry Gorge.189 
 
Terror and Love equally stand on opposite poles of the Human Form in this framing. This is 
likewise the case with Pity and Jealousy, Cruelty and Mercy, etc. The fact that Blake rejected this 
mirror opposition is telling. The opposite of Innocence is not Experience. Experience, as I will 
argue, is a knowing of what is there in the world which attempts to deform and purposefully 
empty out the content of Blake’s living, productive, trinity.  What we should draw from this is 
that the straight negation of The Divine Image is rejected by Blake. The trinity is also a 
representation of unity, and one which attempts to shield us from the penetration of the world 
depicted in Experience. 
While the more common deployment of God, especially those depictions characterized in 
Songs of Experience, works towards an abstraction of human relations, the use of God here 
produces the opposite effect. The title, “Divine Image,” potentially reflects the source of the 
human malady, but again one must note that the source of the error is the image of God as a static 
entity which must be obeyed, and not God a process to be discussed, and struggled over. In 
Blake’s alternative reading, God here produces an ever-greater materiality, that is, becomes a 
practiced thing, even if the dominant practice’s object is to remove the idea that God is an 
arguable subject matter. This materiality is caught in an interesting circle, as the more it is 
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grounded in the totality of social relations, the more it attempts to make impossible its own 
undoing, and in that, change.190 Here we have again the principle which objects to “Standing 
Water.” Nature itself depends on movement, on the overcoming of itself and transference into 
something else. Thus, an attempt to fix any particular moment of the godly into a series of set 
rituals, is anathema to Blake.191  It is for this reason that Innocence has an impulse that is its own, 
devoid of Experience’s determining influence. Yet for this reason, Innocence involves the 
necessity of continual active creation in life as it is constantly lived, that Innocence must reckon 
with, and define itself in relation to, Experience.  
And here again is where the connection with Brecht, in the creation of an aesthetic 
politics of the now, is so vital. For Brecht, the contemporary moment defines the nature of a 
necessary aesthetic response. It defines what its categories of reference are, but also involves the 
duty to explore that moment. The general theory of opposition is a sine qua non of oppositional 
political aesthetics, but it must be continually lived and shaped to its own time. A significant part 
of Blake’s particular constellation is formed with another quite radical tradition.192 Blake was by 
no means alone in framing a way of seeing or imagining a world of thought that sought to 
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discharge itself from dominant ideologies. The tradition that he channels is Antinomianism, and 
its centrality to Blake’s work should not be underestimated.193 E.P. Thompson defines this 
tradition as follows: “Antinomianism, indeed, is not a place at all, but a way of breaking out from 
received wisdom and moralism, and entering upon new possibilities.”194 Blake’s own inheritance 
of the politics of antinomianism, if we follow Thompson,195 produces a specifically oppositional 
politics for his own time. While the colour and shape of antinomianism will change according to 
the mode of the specific historical time in which they are found,196 for Blake they are linked to 
issues of poverty and social justice. It is a feature of this tradition of radical religious thought,197 
as I have argued in Blake’s conception of innocence above, that God must be made real in lived 
relations. The greater belief in what God represents and entails is more important than a stricture 
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of observance. As Thompson notes, “Faith must always take priority to form.”198 God’s form is 
only a form, an image, or a semblance. It offers a hints towards a particular instantiation, but this 
is as much as the form can offer. As Makdisi notes,  
 
…the antinomian tradition with which Blake engaged locates in its faith in the eternal and 
the infinite – that is, in God – a concept of particularity that cannot be reduced to a single, 
definite, and reified – and hence quantifiable, measurable, and interchangeable – form, 
even though it is “infinitely various.”199 
 
The most explicit statement of this form is that innocence is a form of love that should be 
directed towards another as one would love God. Acceptance of everyone is necessary as God is 
in everyone. Life is always already a continuous radical gesture of becoming and developing a 
connection with one’s social world. Innocence thus involves an enacted purity of position. 
Innocence is an irreducible that negates any attempts to ascribe religious affiliation to an other. 
As final stanza of the “Divine Image” runs: 
 
And all must love the human form, 
In heathen, turk, or jew. 
Where Mercy, Love & Pity dwell, 
There God is dwelling too200 
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Innocence here implies an “immanent understanding of God [that] does not impose unity at the 
expense of difference.”201 This immanence of God, “A God constituted from below rather than 
existing independently of us from on high,”202 fills every aspect of life, and only when life is 
fulfilled in this way can we reach the stage of love. 
The form of this godly intervention is only possible through human interaction, yet its 
pulse can often seem faint. While Blake scholarship has at times supported an unhelpful 
dichotomy of city as place of dirt and decadence and country as place of refuge and hope, such a 
binary is consistently bucked by Blake himself. He makes clear that the countryside, or the 
natural world as such, is no simple refuge. There is hope there but the actual living situation is 
much different, especially as the dominant systems begin to dominate it. Indeed, as quoted in a 
famous essay by George Orwell203, there is posited the notion, a fairly conservative one which 
occludes the laborious reality of rural production, that seeks to mould the countryside as the other 
to the city. The offending passage goes as follows:  
 
 Such such were the joys.  
 When we all girls & boys, 
 In our youth-time were seen 
 On the Ecchoing Green.204 
 
As in Orwell’s essay, this lines are intended as a rebuke to those who would idealize nature. 
Indeed, one need only keep reading to see that this joyous scene is, crucially, no longer to be 
                                                        
201 Makdisi, Reading William Blake, 69.  
202 Makdisi, Reading William Blake, 52. 
203 See George Orwell, “Such, Such Were the Joys,” in George Orwell, The Penguin Essays of George Orwell 
(Penguin: London, 1994): 147. 
204 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 8. 
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found: 
 
 Like birds in their nest,  
 Are ready for rest,  
 And sport no more seen,  
 On the darkening Green.205 
 
While there is a strong argument to make that Blake is dismissive of an ideal past of pleasure in 
nature, it is another thing entirely to suggest that Blake is claiming that the joys of the natural 
world are gone.206 Blake is not advancing a nostalgic politics here, but rather attempting, as he is 
doing across the whole of the Songs of Innocence, to show how those who are different can still 
be or act in unison. The speaker of the “Such, such were the joys” is Old John, and through the 
aid of the children, “Does laugh away care.” And the poem suggests that the children are aware 
of this beneficence. Just as in nature “The birds of the bush, / Sing louder around”, so too do the 
youth offer themselves for a greater pleasure “While our sports shall be seen / On the echoing 
Green.”207 The notion of the “Ecchoing Green” suggests an action in the past, but given this 
reading’s propensity to productivity, it is more accurate that this marks “the convergence of being 
and becoming, of production and constitution.”208 In this sense “echoing” is both the noise being 
made, as well as its reference and typification of this process. The metaphor of an echo is useful, 
                                                        
205 Blake, Complete Poetry, 8. 
206 Orwell is not alone in this position. Steve Clark follows by arguing that the poem ends with the belief that: “An 
idealized past is evoked from which the present narrator is necessarily exiled: ‘Ecchoing’ signifies estrangement 
rather than proximity, the encroachment of mortality onto the ‘darkening Green.’” This too literal reading of the text 
projects a vision of mortality that a larger reading of Innocence tends to negate. There is not only no exile here, the 
notion of echo seems to, if anything, note maintenance and reverberation as opposed to a definitive stoppage. See 
Steve Clark, “‘There is no Competition’: Eliot on Blake, Blake in Eliot,” in Blake, Modernity and Popular Culture, 
edited by Steve Clark and Jason Whittaker (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007): 93. 
207 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 8. 
208 Makdisi, Impossible History, 265. 
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however, in that it locates the mark of potential – it has once existed – and will continue to 
reverberate in another form. The potential of child’s play – its inability to be harnessed by 
rationalist, utilitarian ends – points towards a life outside of experience.  
The “childlike” simplicity of the poem, and the position given to children as both 
responders to pain and agents of change should not be overlooked. While Nick Rawlinson argues 
that: “Indeed, it is the inherent vulnerability of child’s play that leads to the need for 
institutionalized religion, thus exposing the child to exploitation,”209 one might instead posit that 
in fact while the child’s inherent vulnerability makes possible the child’s exploitation, it does not 
produce the need for institutionalized religion. Rather, it is the absence of good care that, in 
effect, creates a vacuum which exploitation will seek to colonize. In reference to his illuminated 
works, Blake stated that “his own work has been particularly well elucidated by children, who 
‘have taken a greater delight in contemplating my Pictures than I have ever hoped.’”210 This is an 
example of how Blake’s conception of justice is coloured by his analysis of the potential for 
inspiration in the contemporary moment, and cannot disconnect from this change the role of 
human compassion as an engaged, thoughtful position. Blake dismisses the attitude that regards 
the emotional aspects of humanity body as an unthinking being, and locates in its opposite the 
power of its own liberation, specifically against those forms which would negate its potential. As 
Stephen Goldsmith argues: 
 
                                                        
209 See Nick Rawlinson, William Blake’s Comic Vision (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003): 168. Blake would 
maintain an interest in childhood vulnerability long throughout. Writing on Blake’s Urizen, George H. Gilpen makes 
a link between the contrast between Innocence and Experience in different stages of the Urizenic world. He notes 
that in later texts, and as I have tried to argue in the Songs and Löwy and Sayre do above, “What Blake does 
accomplish with fascinating artistry is a clear identification of the errors in the blinkered thinking of unholy priests of 
Enlightenment science – their stagnant pride, their meaningless abstraction, their spiritual vacuity, and their practical 
inhumanity.” See George H. Gilpen, “William Blake and World’s Body of Science,” Studies in Romanticism 43 
(2004): 56. 
210 Makdisi, “The Political Aesthetic of Blake’s Images,” in The Cambridge Companion to William Blake, edited by 
Morris Eaves (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006): 111. 
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Blake stands at the early stage of a modern critical legacy that posits the agency of 
emotion within and against a world that would subordinate the full capabilities of 
response and action to instrumental reason. Against the old enlightenment charge that 
enthusiasm overleaps the space of reflection and is therefore incompatible with the 
intellectual distance required by modern critical judgment, and against the charge that 
errant enthusiasm relies instead on experiential immediacy as evidence of its authenticity, 
this legacy integrates the immediacy of enthusiasm into critical practice, placing charged 
affect at the vanguard of critique, creativity, and change.211  
 
And thus Innocence, to extend our reading of Löwy and Sayre above, cannot be positioned from 
neglect, whether of neglect of compassion, human empathy or care, or even of intellect.212  
The only use of the word “innocent” in the cycle of poems is in “Holy Thursday,” a poem 
which more than most in the cycle makes clear the division of young and old, yet emphasizes the 
connection between the two. The last six lines of the poem are informative in this regard, as well 
as particularly instructive in establishing the state of the godly instantiation. They read as 
follows; 
 
The hum of multitudes was there but multitudes of lambs 
Thousands of little boys & girls raising their innocent hands 
Now like a mighty wild they raise to heaven the voice of song  
Or like harmonious thunderings the seats of heaven among  
Beneath them sit the aged man wise guardians of the poor  
Then cherish pity, lest you drive an angel from your door213  
 
                                                        
211 Steven Goldsmith, “William Blake and the Future of Enthusiasm,” Nineteenth-Century Literature 63 (2009): 446. 
212 Thus, the famous line from the Preface of Milton, “I will not cease from mental fight,” See Erdman, Complete 
Poetry, 95.  
213 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 13. 
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In their infancy, the “multitude of lambs,” innocent, make “harmonious thunderings” to the 
heavens. Here the collective is taken care of and the potential of the many (due to their harmony 
as the “mighty wild” who “raise to heaven” their song) is clear. These uproarious descriptions do 
not seem to harness their offerings, yet they point again to the connections between young and 
old, and the immanence of God is offered in the shepherding of the poor and inclusiveness that is 
a prerequisite of this immanence. The last lines prefigure the state of hardship that resonates 
through Blake’s society, and clearly we are not in a “pure” setting of the “Ecchoing Green.” In 
that scene there is reason to believe Blake is suggesting something that is not the actual order of 
things, but the order of things as they could and should be. The use of the term “lest” is a telling 
harbinger of the many abuses of power to come in the Songs of Experience. There is a balance, an 
edge, on which things stand. If anything, the deployment of the term “wise” – so categorically a 
term of derision in the Marriage of Heaven and Hell – instructs us to beware the potential of 
abuse or misdirection. Wisdom here is rhetorical – not a matter for question in that they are wise 
– and taken as given and positive. This deployment of rhetorical questions is employed in the 
same way as Blake’s question in “On Another’s Sorrow”;  
 
Can I see another's woe, 
And not be in sorrow too. 
Can I see another's grief, 
And not seek for kind relief?214 
 
                                                        
214 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 17. 
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At this stage, in the world of innocence and all that comprises it, the answer is no. Yet Innocence 
is also lived and is thus a direction, a way of acting, being and becoming in the world, and a 
response to a need, as we saw at the beginning of the Songs of Innocence cycle. As the poem 
concludes, the last in the cycle, the shift to a world of experience is prefigured; 
 
O! he gives to us his joy, 
That our grief he may destroy 
Till our grief is fled & gone 
He doth sit by us and moan.215 
 
As “He” sits so did the Mother prior in “A Cradle Song,” and they both moan in empathy with 
the sufferer. Comforting someone in grief is an end in itself. Compassion is pure and necessary. It 
evokes that moment of connection between those in need and those able to help. This simple, 
loving logic of Innocence, at home in all manner of peoples and protective of differences, is 
consistently undone and prohibited in the world of Experience. 
 
Innocence’s Opposition to Experience 
 
If in the Songs of Innocence we saw a vision or a worldview that attempted to offer a 
totalizing (read all-encompassing – cosmological) picture of Blake’s possibility-making, 
inspiring world, in the Songs of Experience we see that world toppled over and replaced by an 
equally totalizing worldview of modern capitalism and its commodifying, monopolizing, 
                                                        
215 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 17. 
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rationality. While Blake is not shy in using repetition of words, images or metaphors throughout 
his work as a formal strategy (which is sometimes problematic for critics as the same signifier 
denotes an entirely different meaning depending on a subtle shift of context), few are as 
pronounced as the repetition of the “every” in one of the most notable offerings, “London,” in the 
Songs of Experience. The word is repeated seven times216 and in each we are left with little 
ambiguity as to its intent.  
  
I wander thro’ each charter’d street,  
Near where the charter’d Thames does flow.  
And mark in every face I meet  
Marks of weakness, marks of woe. 
In every cry of every Man,  
In every Infants cry of fear,  
In every voice: in every ban,  
The mind-forg’d manacles I hear: 
How the Chimney-sweepers cry  
Every blackning Church appalls,  
And the hapless Soldiers sigh  
Runs in blood down Palace walls 
But most thro’ midnight streets I hear  
How the youthful Harlots curse  
Blasts the new-born Infants tear  
                                                        
216 While “charter’d” and “every” capture attention given the repetition another word dirt and dirty should also be 
noted. As Susan Matthews argues, “But the flatly unpoetic “dirty” was there for a reason. Dirt is not only a literal 
feature of Blake’s Lambeth but also an image of the corruption of childhood and marriage…” See Susan Matthews, 
“Impurity of Diction: The ‘Harlots Curse’ and Dirty Words,” Blake and Conflict, edited by Sarah Haggarty and Jon 
Mee (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009): 65. Note however the depiction of the process of consistent life-giving 
force in Innocence: “Significantly, Blake’s Sweep in Innocence is envisioned as a weaving Caterpillar, a creature 
regenerated from death.” Paul Milner, “Blake’s London: Time and Spaces,” Studies in Romanticism 41 (2002): 293. 
Pramod K. Nayar has provided a modern take on the poem, suggesting that one of the forms of authority depicted in 
the poem is the surveillance state. See Pramod K.Nayar, “William Blake’s ‘London’ as a Surveillance poem,” The 
Explicator 72 (2014): 328-332. 
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And blights with plagues the Marriage hearse.217 
 
What we have here is the closest vision of a system which leaves nothing outside of the wake of 
its destructive power. The overwhelming sense of despair in the poem is introduced not merely 
by the dirt and destruction of London218 but through its specifically commodified nature, most 
notably in the repeated use of “charter’d,” a reference to commercial organizations that existed in 
London connecting the political and economic systems that profited from its management.219 The 
system turned streets and rivers into profit making entities. Blake’s London builds “out of the 
indirect translation of radical oppositional politics and nonconformist discourse, while attempting 
to “unbuild” the mainstream manifestations of London’s political power.”220 Yet London reveals, 
in its supposed specificity, more than the city itself. As Raymond Williams notes, the “London” 
of the poem is more than a signifier for the metropolis:  
 
A dominant part of the life of the nation was reflected but also created within it [London]. 
As its population grew it went into deficit, not only in food but in the balance of material 
production; but this was much more than compensated by the fact of its social production: 
it was producing and reproducing, to a dominant degree, the social reality of the nation as a 
whole. It was in this still eighteenth-century sense that Blake, himself a craftsman and a 
                                                        
217 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 26-7. On the subject of marriage and submission, “What Blake has most in mind is the 
bringing of a thing into a state of acquiescence or submission to another, the establishment of an unequal relation 
between two things, indeed a kind of “marriage” in which one partner is, perhaps forcibly, reconciled to the 
domination of the other.” See Russell Prather, “William Blake and the Problem of Progression,” Studies in 
Romanticism 46 (2007): 509. 
218 It is interesting to note that the original poem had the word Chartered replaced by “dirty.” See Williams, Country 
and the City, 148.  
219 On this point we can further see the totalizing essence of capitalism is reflected in capital’s attempts to disrupt the 
connection between humans and the natural world. This runs counter to a Blakean stance which argues that in nature 
and ecology one finds that “all things are complexly interrelated.” Thus, to argue against this inter-relatedness is to 
be “anti-ecologic,” and there is little that is more anti-Blakean than being anti-ecological. See Kevin Hutchings, 
Imagining Nature: Blake’s Environmental Poetics (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002): 13. This 
argument is contended passim.  
220 Julian Wolfreys, Writing London: The Trace of the Urban Text from Blake to Dickens (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
1998): 37. 
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Londoner, saw the capital city.221  
 
The key problem for Blake is that his capitalist society, by then the dominant form of social 
relation, was doing all it could to make alternative ontologies risible and impossible. Indeed, this 
totalizing system produces itself a form of “educated” readers, trained carefully in rebutting 
criticisms of their own oppression, which hinders the possibilities for thinking outside of it. For 
this reason, Saree Makdisi questions how we begin to approach Blake in the first place, given that 
we have come through this process ourselves. “It may be, in other words, that the very way we 
have learned to read is precisely what prevents us from reading Blake properly.”222 This is not to 
suggest that no efforts have been put forward to unravel these strategies and dominant discourses. 
Yet these strategies are principally marginal. The problem for Blake’s society was its profound 
totalizing quantification. The “Charter’d streets” and “charter’d Thames,”223 the urban and 
natural in London’s duality, were imposing other forms of living and surviving, and Blake is at 
                                                        
221 Williams, Country and the City, 147-48. Jennifer Davis Michael argues that in regards to the poem “London” that 
“The potential danger of pastoral, illustrated in the deadly gardens above [The Garden of Love], is that while it 
enables us to envision an ideal world, it also enables us to ignore the elements in the world around us that fall short 
of the ideal.” I believe this argues misses the point of Blake’s criticism of the pastoral, as Blake’s philosophy seems 
to buck the ideal/real formulation, as in Blake everything is in a sense real, even, as Makdisi will argue, the 
imagination. Michael’s slight on materialist criticism, referring to “London” as “the poem most favored by Marxist 
interpreters of Blake, is hardly a realistic description,” perhaps is informative as to the inattention to materialism in 
that regard. Raymond Williams also dismisses the notion that Blake maintains a notion of the pastoral (especially as 
opposed to the city). See Jennifer Michael Davis, Blake and the City (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2006): 
67 & 26. In a similar vein, Christopher Tomlins writes: “The London of Blake’s poem was Patrick Colquhoun’s 
London—the London, that is, of the Police of the Metropolis (1796), the world’s greatest commercial city, the 
riverine heart of an imperial political economy, inhabited by a laboring population disciplined by the sciences of 
magistracy.” See Christopher Tomlins, “Revolutionary Justice in Brecht, Conrad and Blake,” Law and Literature 21 
(2009): 196. 
222 Saree Makdisi, “The Political Aesthetic of Blake’s Images,” 111. 
223 David Erdman usefully notes that in “London” Blake borrows Thomas Paine’s notion “that all charters are purely 
negative in effect and that city charters, by annulling the rights of the majority, cheat the inhabitants and destroy the 
town’s prosperity…” Erdman, Blake, 277. This further speaks to the universality that Blake aims to represent, a point 
that Raymond Williams also makes here: “It is worth stressing this in Blake, since although he inherits many 
eighteenth-century pastoral images, in his whole work he transforms them to elements of a general condition. The 
simplifying contrast between country and city is then decisively transcended.” Raymond Williams, Country and the 
City, 149. 
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odds with this process. The construction of Blake’s aesthetic politics of this time is grounded in 
this relation to (and ultimate rejection of) his society. What I argued in the earlier section of the 
Songs of Innocence, particularly around the question of care and its fundamental nature in 
Blake’s system of thought, is relevant in this regard.  
As argued earlier, the temporal and spatial co-ordinates of Innocence do not exclude 
moments of difficulty, moments of sadness, or even physical or emotional pain. That is, 
Innocence is not a pure space where certain realities of human hardship are magically whisked 
away. The relevance of Innocence is not the absence of human suffering, or depression, but the 
way in which that suffering is responded to, and how the others in the same space are implicated 
and responsible for the misery. In “A Cradle Song,” the moment of anguish (“While o’er thee 
doth mother weep”) is deemed part of life’s cycle on the one hand (parents worrying over their 
children), or a consequence of capitalism on the other (the poverty that one presumes exists so 
widely in Experience also exists in the realm of Innocence). The difference is that in the realm of 
Innocence there is an offer of assistance, or of guidance, and ultimately of sharing in that pain. In 
the realm of Experience, there is no aid to pain, but rather that pain is portrayed not as an 
unfortunate by-product of the system, an aberration, but an aspect of the system’s very core 
functioning. Thus in “Holy Thursday” Blake notes this bare contradiction in another rhetorical 
question: 
 
Is this a holy thing to see,  
In a rich and fruitful land,  
Babes reducd to misery, 
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Fed with cold and usurous hand?224 
 
The comment that these babes are “fed with cold and usurious hand” should prick our ears. There 
is a deep connection here between the depiction of money and its force in the world. It seems that 
they are two mains criticisms that Blake is laying out for us. There is corrupting power that 
money has in that it makes humanity move away from the notions of pity and mercy that were so 
prevalent in Innocence. Yet it goes one step further insofar as there is a long-term plan in place 
for these children as they spend their entire lives in the service of this misery. The usury to which 
they are subjected will dominate them, and make them beholden against their will to the 
propertied, or at least, moneyed classes.  
 There exists another form of criticism here, and it is specifically the notion of being 
chartered and its role in the production of “England.” The practice of being chartered – literally 
undergoing a formal training in (the most relevant application here) accountancy – is a formal 
written arrangement with the state. And here is the most delicate yet venomous entangling for 
Blake, as power is no longer merely moneyed and coercive, but outright controlling. The moment 
of freedom cannot exist in this realm (in both meanings of that term) but only in its abolition. 
Blake may dissect the current system’s urges, and how those urges distort humanity’s need for 
care, but the need for its abolition must be total.  
In the absence of the “wise guardians of the poor,” who were to nourish the poor?225 It is 
those whose specific responsibility is to guard against that mistreatment, or at the very least 
                                                        
224 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 19. 
225 Interestingly, David Fairer has argued that the presence of poor children, and specifically the visual act of giving 
charity to a handful of poor children, was in fact a more commonplace act, perpetrated by those who wished to 
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provide aid through that period. Yet from the top down, the means by which capitalism 
reproduces itself, capitalism’s innermost ideology, wishes to make care for another who is at risk 
seem an impossibility, despite the concessions it might find necessary to make at times when 
pushed to do so.226 Indeed, not only is care not offered, but the must vulnerable are asked to take 
part in their own subjugation. The last four lines of the “Chimney Sweeper” are particularly 
damning.  
 
And because I am happy, & dance & sing, 
They think they have done me no injury: 
And are gone to praise God & his Priest & King, 
Who make up a heaven of our misery.227 
 
                                                        
instrumentalise the poverty of children. Often the children’s presence was designed to stage a moment of “national 
unity”. This was a longer tradition present even before Blake’s time. Fairer writes that: “The awkward subsuming of 
the political into the national had characterized a comparable occasion earlier in the century, the day of Thanksgiving 
for the Peace of Utrecht on 7 July 1713, another gesture of Tory triumph marked by the presence of the massed 
London charity children. Fig. 4 shows the scene along the Strand when the procession made its way to the service in 
St Paul’s. 3,925 children, newly clothed for the occasion, were arranged in a specially erected stand 620 feet long, 
consisting of eight rows of seats, and they sang together two hymns, one for the Queen as she passed along to the 
church, and a second three hours later as she returned. At least that was the plan, but Anne herself was too ill to be 
present. Nevertheless, between a repeated chorus of nine Allelujahs, the first hymn greeted her as the nursing mother 
of the kingdom (“Long, long may she remain”), while the second jubilantly celebrated the Tory Peace (“Peace his 
best gift to Earth's returnd, Long may it here remain; As we too long its Absence mourn’d, Nor sigh’d to Heaven in 
vain”).” See David Fairer, “Experience Reading Innocence: Contextualizing Blake's ‘Holy Thursday,’” Eighteenth-
Century Studies 35 (2002): 541. In this regard it is best to apply David Erdman’s reading that the Chimney Sweep “is 
saying to the London citizen: you salve your conscience by handing out a few farthings on May Day, but if you 
really listened to this bitter cry among the snow you and your icy church would be appalled.” Erdman, Blake, p. 275. 
226 Indeed, even charity – the supposed bridge to care offered by the powerful – is deeply implicated in the current 
consensus. As Sarah Haggarty notes, “Charity, even the direct, voluntary charity so lauded in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, was in many respects designed to reconcile the “poor” to the inequality of their status – a 
reconciliation of especial importance during periods of special crisis. Charity might even create that inequality…”. 
Sarah Haggarty, “From Donation to Demand? Almsgiving and the Annotations to Thornton,” in Blake and Conflict, 
Haggarty and Mee eds., 108. 
227 Erdman, Complete Poetry p. 23. 
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Similar to Brecht’s own position, a rejection of the current society requires an understanding of 
its most intimate impulses. Without this acknowledgement of the way this dominant system 
perverts the possibility of ultimate redemption, reproduction of its abuses would proceed 
unhindered. The logic of capital necessitates the maintenance of an ideological worldview that 
takes in its very own worst excesses and results and sells them back at the price of honourable, 
quiet suffering. This does not mean, however, that the logic behind this twisted logic, nor the 
effects they produce themselves, are accepted by those who are harmed by capitalism. Quite the 
opposite, as Shirley Dent and Jason Whitaker note:  
 
…the total omission of quotation marks makes the closure of ‘The Chimney Sweeper’s’ 
narration highly ambiguous and highly charged…. This is not simply the subjective voice 
of the naïve sweep, who has internalized religious ideology and dutifully murmurs the 
dogmas of deferred reward. It is a direct plea from the poet for the audience to do their 
social duty so that they, the sweeps, need not fear their present life.228 
 
In this there is a toying “with the ideal of a childish Utopia, putting the onus on the reader to 
actively engage in an imaginative act of emancipation, of seeing grim social reality in order to 
change it, to envision an emancipated world.”229 It is no coincidence that Joan is asked to view 
the degradation of working by Mauler as not merely an unfortunate bi-product of the system, but 
as necessary to its proper functioning. And as we have seen, Die Heilige Johanna ends with a call 
to action.  
                                                        
228 See Shirley Dent and Jason Whittaker, Radical Blake (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002): 102. 
229 Dent and Whittaker, Radical Blake, 102. 
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Blake presents us here with a compelling analysis of oppression, and how it works and is 
reproduced. Far from dismissing those who are young and have potential, the “They” see the 
evidence of hope and potential and bury it with the weight of misery. Whether they even note 
their part in this process is an open question. The world of Experience provides the appearance of 
openness and care; it ventures on producing and reproducing misery, while using the gestures of 
caring as a means to disguise its actual misdeeds.  
 Education and the rearing of children are important instruments for Blake in depicting the 
manner of inversion of life’s pleasurable pursuits. This inversion required a move against 
humanity’s nature. This nature, in the Blakean sense, as is so frequently displayed throughout 
Innocence, does not merely secure a bridge between humanity and nature, as much as moulds 
them into the same entity. All aspects of humanity’s lived relations are a discovery (of life and its 
endless possibilities), and in every discovery we see a partial return of connected action of nature 
and humanity, so much so that their existence as experiencing beings becomes interchangeable. 
Their unity becomes a form of resisting the world of Experience in practice.  Note for instance 
the problem that is experienced in “The Schoolboy”: 
 
But to go to school in a summer morn, 
O! it drives all joy away; 
Under a cruel eye outworn, 
The little ones spend the day,  
In sighing and dismay.230  
 
                                                        
230 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 31. 
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The depiction here is of making education a source of misery rather than exploration, and the 
“cruel eye” denotes a lack of humanity. It is a partial entity in a world that, were it to focus on 
possibility making, needs to be made whole as in the description of the little ones. The question 
of how one subverts the process of manipulation and destruction of natural innocence by 
education is through Innocence’s own logic. To undercut Experience’s use – which has been 
“outworn” – human and nature, or human/nature, responds by reframing the issue. The child 
questions:  
 
How can the bird that is born for joy, 
Sit in a cage and sing. 
How can a child when fears annoy, 
But droop his tender wing, 
And forget his youthful spring.231 
 
The merging of entities, the boy and the bird in the description of the boy’s “tender wing”, 
returns us to our connection both to ourselves and to our nature and natural world. This simple 
discovery of the schoolboy, a discovery not because of his education but rather in response to it, 
will lead to greater realizations of the logic of both Innocence and Experience. If we have not 
cared for and gathered the “summer fruits” because the “buds are nip’d,” how “shall we gather 
what griefs destroy / Or bless the mellowing year, / When the blasts of winter appear.”232 If we 
do not have reserves of pleasure, if we have not taught ourselves how to experience life’s 
pleasures, how can we respond when in times of anguish. The logic here is that there is no other 
way if, shorn of life’s endless horizons, “the tender plants are stripped.” This is the monopolizing 
                                                        
231 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 31. 
232 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 31. 
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nature of capitalism. It creates despair, while also doing away with the means by which one 
might counter despair’s consequences. In contrast, Innocence offers a way of acting and living in 
the world. It is a means by which life-making thought, that specific brand of philosophy which is 
so integral to Blake, is the response to those efforts to make life impossible. The enacting of 
Innocence is the acknowledgement of Experience, and offers the hope for its potential undoing.  
If Innocence is the kernel of the greatest potential that we could possibility have, 
Experience as its most deceitful uses the shell of Innocence, which promises everything that 
Innocence hopes to deliver, and ultimately destroys that potential. This is the central tension 
between the two. There is an alternate version of agency here, an agency which feeds off of rather 
than feeds.233 The infrastructure of Experience, the “God and his priest and king” are the key 
drivers of this exploitative system. While for Blake everything in the constellation of Experience 
is challengeable (and he explicitly sees his project as that which “rouzes the faculties to act”234) 
Innocence reads Experience’s intent and function. In the opening stanza of “The Human 
Abstract” we see this dynamic at work, both elucidating the problem and suggesting a way out of 
it. It reads:  
 
Pity would be no more 
If we did not make somebody Poor: 
And Mercy no more could be, 
                                                        
233 On the loving connection between God and active love more generally in Blake, Matthew Green notes: “This 
accords well with the experience of the believer who discovers the love of Christ, who is let into or out of the secret 
that he or she has been loved since before time and is therefore enabled to experience love as an active participant, to 
have her or his love kindled, even if it must always fall short of the mark.” See Matthew Green, Visionary 
Materialism in the Early Works of William Blake: The Intersection of Enthusiasm and Empiricism (New York: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2005): 103-4. 
234 William Blake as quoted in Makdisi, “Political Aesthetic,” 111. 
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If all were happy as we;235 
 
The central contradiction of this society requires an intervention, and one that acknowledges that 
there a counter-balance to the attempted universalizing logic governing “Ev’ry chartered street.” 
The world of Experience, so attuned to paternalistic manipulation, was not only distrustful of a 
poetics of production as found in Blake, but sought to make us answerable to a capitalist logic. 
Esther Leslie provides a useful contrast of Blake and his age in this regard. She writes: 
 
Blake was born into the “Age of Johnson.” This was his misfortune. This was an age 
dominated by blank English instrumentalist empiricism, such as that promoted by the 
Royal Society which demanded clear language, mathematical plainness. Samuel Johnson 
(1709-1784) was a lexicographer. He was a waiter serving up words, fixing meanings 
rather than creating them. In addition, Johnson saw it as his lexicographer's duty to 
provide moral instruction for the semi-educated. So Johnson's business was weighty, but 
dull. It was a chore all round, and who would do it but for financial recompense?236 
 
Leslie’s presentation of Blake as misfortunate is useful in that it helps focus attention away from 
his supposed views on rationality and places him in relation to his age more broadly. In this 
reading of Blake, Leslie brushes the cold, moneyed calculation then dominanting the age, against 
a Romantic for whom the rescue of words and images for the imagination was paramount. As 
Löwy and Sayre would argue, while the leveling of the critique of “irrationality” is a serious 
charge, it is also seriously misleading. Such a characterization of one of Romanticism’s key 
                                                        
235 Erdman, Complete Poetry, p. 27. 
236 Esther Leslie, “Blake’s Lines: Seven Digressions Through Time and Space.” ImageTexT: Interdisciplinary 
Comics Studies 3.2 (2007). Dept of English, University of Florida. 22 Apr 2013. 
<http://www.english.ufl.edu/imagetext/archives/v3_2/leslie/>. 
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problematics lends only further obfuscation to what is central to Blake (and other Romantics 
besides). The criticisms of “rationality” that are present in Blake’s texts, and most other 
Romantic’s, are mobilized against a particular form of rationalism, notably a mechanical 
rationalism and rationalist abstraction, very much akin to the Johnsonian paradigm described 
above. Mechanical rationalism was associated with those institutions and forms of life which 
sought to make all life calculable and subject to mathematical or quantifiable logic.237  
 The necessary effect of this logic was that anything that was not deemed economic– for 
instance compassion and empathy – was discarded and dismissed from the liberatory potential 
that Blake locates in God. As a contrast, note the pains of the struggling mother to find a way for 
her child to sleep from “A Cradle Song” (“Sleep, sleep, happy sleep, / While o’er thee doth my 
mother weep”) to those spoken by the child from “Infant Sorrow”: 
 
My mother groand! my father wept. 
Into the dangerous world I leapt: 
Helpless, naked, piping loud; 
Like a fiend hid in a cloud. 
 
Struggling in my father’s hands: 
                                                        
237 Many of the same criticisms are leveled against rational abstraction. Here, there are two key points of discussion. 
Not simply are Löwy and Sayre referring to abstract rationalist philosophy, but rather to a totalizing system of 
thought and life which seeks to reproduce itself on every available level. Following three philosophers, Löwy and 
Sayre argue that this system works on the level of “abstract categories: abstract work, abstract exchange value, 
money” (Marx) the level on which “modern bourgeois civilization…organizes all economic, social and political life 
according to the requirements of rationality-with-respect-to-goals (Weber), and finally the level on which 
rationalization, disenchantment and quantification’ are embedded in a psychic attitude and form of experience with 
regard to things and the world which may itself be described as ‘abstract’” (Mannheim) Löwy and Sayre, 
Romanticism, 39 – 40. The effect of this rationalization led to two important consequences both evident in Blake 
simultaneously, a turn towards forms of “concrete thinking” on the one hand a “rehabilitation of nonrational and/or 
nonrationalizable behaviours” such as “love as a pure emotion, a spontaneous attraction that cannot be reduced to 
any calculation and that is in contradiction with all rationalist strategies of marriage, - marriage for money, marriage 
‘for good reasons.’” Löwy and Sayre, Romanticism, 41. 
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Striving against my swadling bands: 
Bound and weary I thought best 
To sulk upon my mother’s breast.238  
 
As Ian Balfour has noted in his analysis of the “Introduction” to the Songs of Innocence and 
Experience, in Blake’s works writing is an instrument of dissemination and democratization, 
producing books “that all may read.”239 Yet the object of this democratic dissemination240 is 
Divine and Human, and the ultimate gesture is to join oneself with this coupling, as the Divine 
and the Human joined together are the “closest to the moment of birth” in Blake, as Tristanne J. 
Connolly notes.241 This literally new moment must involve itself with Experience’s anguish and 
anxiety-making while also holding out the moment of Experience’s potential undoing. The 
entreaty to “Sleep, sleep, happy sleep” is at once a good on its own. The act of nourishment in 
seeking to turn towards its “mother’s breast” is a concluding act in and of itself as it is 
representative of a joining with others to deal with one’s predicament. This poem is not a 
representation of gladness and hope against the odds, or of quiet suffering. Rather, through such 
acts we “thought best” acts as a means that mirrors the method that “Our grief he may destroy” as 
Blake’s cites in “On Another’s Sorrow.” Faith here does not stand still, but is the immediate 
engine for rejecting the systematically imposed grief and “binding with briars my joys and 
desires” of Blake’s age. What Blake is demonstrating in this fissure between the worlds of 
                                                        
238 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 28. 
239 Ian Balfour, The Rhetoric of Romantic Prophecy (Stanford University Press: Stanford California, 2002): 144. 
240 Writing on the poem America, Peter Otto speaks to the emergence and resonance of the new world in Blake. Note 
here the emphasis on democracy. “I am of course not suggesting that this emergent world is incommensurate with 
the revolutionary rhetoric of modernity. One could argue that Blake here merely reworks the movement from the old 
to the new, troping it as the passage from a static world, anchored in a transcendental principle, to a democratic 
world where form is forged by interaction between its parts.” Peter Otto, “Politics, aesthetics, and Blake’s ‘boundling 
line,’” Word & Image 26 (2010): 179.  
241 Tristanne J. Connolly, William Blake and the Body (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002): 125. 
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Innocence and Experience is the necessity of a messianic power articulable in the moment of the 
now. As Benjamin would famously note, “Like every generation that preceded us, we have been 
endowed with a weak messianic power,”242 and Blake’s society was no different. Blake’s 
addendum to Benjamin might well be that not only does the past have a claim to this, but so too 
does the present. And yet Innocence represents more largely the moment of a godly intervention, 
a moment of action forever in the now, which the world of Experience attempts to forestall. Yet 
as Benjamin notes, “The present, which, as a model of Messianic time, comprises the entire 
history of making in an enormous abridgement, coincides exactly with the stature which the 
history of mankind has in the universe.”243 Experience attempts to starve the present of this 
conception of time, of intervention, and ultimately claim ownership to notions of compassion and 
empathy. Its role is to clamp down on the potential of the present, and make of the past a stick 
with which to beat the living out of the living.  
 
Conclusion: The Future in the Present 
 
On the 6th of June 1929, in a letter to Gershom Scholem, Benjamin writes that he has 
struck up a “close acquaintance with Brecht.” Erdmut Wizisla notes that “This was the first hint 
of a friendship which, in the years that followed, many of Benjamin’s friends and associates were 
to find disturbing.”244 It is surprising, given the extensive and profound intellectual friendship 
that the two would forge, how often this connection continues to get lost in a critical appraisal of 
their work. Indeed, as Wizisla’s research has demonstrated, even their more famous 
                                                        
242 Benjamin, Illuminations, 254. 
243 Benjamin, Illuminations, 263. 
244 Wizisla, Walter Benjamin and Bertolt Brecht, 1. 
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disagreements on Benjamin’s “Some Reflections on Kafka” and “The Author as Producer,” were 
less about the central arguments themselves and more about the specific application of them.245 In 
the same way here, I hope to show that while Brecht and Blake experience their worlds in 
different ways and express this difference asymmetrically, thee works covered in this and the 
preceding chapter advance a common oppositional political aesthetic that gestures towards 
responding to the time of their now.  
In part what ties Brecht and Blake together is not the specific form of opposition 
espoused, but rather the philosophical implications that their opposition, taken together, speaks 
to. For the two, the object was not merely to be opposed to a system or logic or ideology. What 
was fundamentally necessary was that each articulated a response to the specific predicaments of 
their society, predicated on a unique yet comprehensive understanding of this society and then 
offering, ultimately, a form of aesthetic articulation that responded to that society and offered 
ways by which one could undo its logic. But again, the form that this takes in the two differs in 
considerable and contradictory ways.  
Brecht seeks to work through its logic far more than Blake does. I would disagree that this 
is attributable to the “nascent” status that thinkers such as Makdisi suggest was characteristic of 
Blake’s capitalism during his time (the central forms of capitalist relations had long been 
dominant, a fact that Blake himself suggests in his use of “every” and “chartr’d” above) but 
rather Blake had not seen the coalescing of the response of class forces that Brecht had 
recognized and made himself an active part of. This is not to suggest that Blake can be slotted 
into the position of Marxist avant la lettre, as such a framework would do more to confuse our 
                                                        
245 See Wizisla, Walter Benjamin and Bertolt Brecht, 144-187.  
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sense of Blake’s position than edify us as to its coordinates, not least given the Marxist tradition 
aversion towards religion.   
Blake’s Songs of Innocence engages the present – knowingly – by rejecting it. Whereas 
Brecht’s engagement was to submerge himself as deeply as he could, Blake’s response is to 
acknowledge and refute. This means recognizing the moment of capital’s barbarity, while 
maintaining the need for a space outside of its dominance. In this way, the moment of Innocence 
is a celebration of the Brechtian possibilities of experimentation, wherein a space for 
productiveness and work outside capitalism is present. Yet this does not mean a withdrawal, but 
rather a complex coming together. Take, for instance, Brecht’s notes on the sporting public, and 
in particular the bold nature of his claims.  
 
Make no bones about it, we have our eye on those huge stadiums, filled with 15,000 men 
and women of every variety of class and physiognomy, the fairest and shrewdest audience 
in the world. There you will find 15,000 persons paying high prices, and working things 
out on the basis of a sensible weighing of supply and demand. You cannot expect to get 
fair conduct on a sinking ship. The demoralization of our theatre audiences springs from 
the fact that neither theatre nor audience has any idea what is supposed to go on there.246   
 
Yet the response that Brecht will offer is not a submission to the crowd, but an engagement with 
it. 
 
…no doubt an artist will fall far short of achieving his maximum effectiveness today if he 
sails with today’s wind. It would be quite wrong to judge a play’s relevance or lack of 
relevance by its current effectiveness. Theatres don’t work that way. A theatre which 
makes no contact with the public is a nonsense. Our theatre is accordingly a nonsense.247  
                                                        
246 Brecht, Brecht on Theatre, 6. 
247 Brecht, Brecht on Theatre, 7. 
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Brecht’s damning emphasis, his not mine, reiterates the need for connection to the lived 
experience of the audience, but that this did not mean succumbing to the ephemeral moods of an 
audience (an audience whose expectations were shaped by capitalist social relations). Likewise, 
Brecht’s rejection of the “enemies of production” is about maintaining the ability of the cultural 
producer to operate in a radically engaged way. Here, the individual artist’s relation to their 
society, while preserved, must not also reproduce the dominant forms of life which one is seeking 
to undercut.  
The Songs of Innocence are constructed in such a circular way to block out the work of 
totalizing capitalist existence. Innocence acts as a bulwark against the threat of this world. It is a 
preserve against the danger of the outside. Innocence is a refuge, but a knowing refuge. On the 
other hand, Experience is the warning of this world. Experience is not a harbinger of things to 
come – but an identity of a spirit of a real existing world that is sold off and purchased piece by 
piece.  Experience seeks to locate any activity, way of seeing the world or “spirit” – such as the 
one that resonates in Innocence – and either block it entirely or usher it out of any sphere of 
influence. But it is so knowing in that it sees the threat – and attempts to delegitimize and make 
impossible the threat. This dichotomy is the one in which Blake operates, and he does so 
consciously. His dilemma is then how to maintain the individual’s position while at the same 
time maintaining a connection to one’s audience? Saree Makdisi and Jon Mee note how central 
this question was to Blake’s overall aesthetic strategies: 
 
…Blake refused to endorse wholesale the Orientalist discourse distinguishing between a 
virtuous, disciplined, productive, sober, rational Western Self, and a delinquent, 
undisciplined, unproductive, unregulated, and irrational Eastern Other. Moreover, he 
refused to distinguish between Self and Other in the first place. Not only is such a rigid 
 118 
contrast not something that we can find anywhere in Blake’s work, early or late: it is the 
very antithesis of all his work, the concept that he most fundamentally struggled to resist 
and subvert.….This is why Blake refuses Orientalism: because he utterly refuses the logic 
of individualism predicated on an opposition to otherness – the logic that Orientalism 
fundamentally requires as its motives force.248  
 
Blake’s refusal is a step further away than Brecht’s strategies allow, and marks out a disjuncture 
between the two. In order to divine more closely those, we must first think in terms of what 
possibilities have been made open by the understanding of the contemporary moment, and what 
options there are in an alternative future. Nevertheless, it is for this reason that Brecht relies on a 
far more clearly co-ordinated response than Blake’s. For Blake, as E. P. Thompson points out, 
there is something far deeper required. He notes: “There must be some utopian leap, some human 
rebirth, from Mystery to renewed imaginative life. “London” must still be made anew as the New 
Jerusalem.”249 This leap though does not move us away from connection with the world, or put us 
in a holding pattern while the Utopian leap approaches. To the contrary, “Blake’s innocence is 
more than cultivated state of inner warmth, however, for the cultivation of innocence is itself a 
form of social criticism.”250 Critique exists so that we may make future possibilities possible. 
                                                        
248 Saree Makdisi and John Mee, “‘Mutual interchange’: Life, Liberty and Community,” in Re-Envisioning Blake, 
edited by Crosby, Patenaude and Whitehead, 16. Yet we should be clear that the rejection of the present did not 
result in a retreat into the past. Martin Bidney also uses Benjamin’s “Theses” in his essay on Blake, but contrary to 
the position I have sought to put forward, Bidney argues that to “counteract the seeming threat of a relentless 
speeding up of modern industrial time by nostalgically envisioning a dream-like slow-motion medieval world where 
time is comfortingly relaxed, or even brought to a halt. Both the historical, socioeconomic problem and its attempted 
poetic solution can be expressed in terms of ontological psychology as involving each poet’s attempt to protect 
himself against the overwhelming pressures of chaotic Becoming by imagining a more blissful alternative condition 
of purer, simpler Being. The paradoxical trap is that such an imagined freezing of life and action in static Being 
makes palpable the even graver menace of a deadening Nothingness.” While the notion of counteracting the time of 
capitalism is part of Blake’s oppositional aesthetics, to suggest that his poetics leads him to a position of stasis seems 
to be a rejection of the thesis of potentiality put forward by Makdisi, and against the spirit of referenced authors such 
as Erdman, Thompson, Mee, et al. See Martin Bidney, “Slowed-Down Time and the Fear of History: The 
Medievalist Visions of William Blake and William Morris,” Journal for Early Modern Cultural Studies 2 (2002): 
102. 
249 Thompson, Witness Against the Beast, 193.  
250 Erdman, Blake, 117. Likewise, as Frye noted of the Songs of Experience: “Contempt and horror have never 
spoken more clearly in English poetry.” Yet despite this, “The reason will not take us far. Only vision helps us here, 
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Critique exists so that good spaces can remain and be potentially harnessed for a redemption of 
the present for future purposes. Whereas Brecht seems to take in all he can in order to engage 
more fully within the frameworks available to him, Blake understands what is dominating his 
society in order to remove himself and his work, to maintain what is fundamentally good from 
the clutches of the totalizing system. In this sense, individuality (as understood in relation to 
Makdisi and Staehler above) and a rejection of alienation are fundamental. A central focus for 
Brecht, from Mann ist Mann forward, is to map out the seeming impossibility of individuality. 
This could, in part, be a difference of historical moment, but it also underlies the notion of 
reproducibility. For Blake, the artwork bore the necessity of individual input, whereas Brecht’s 
work – fully immersed in the moment of no return of technical reproducibility – locates the death 
of the individual and the need to embrace this and respond in collective fashion.  
Despite the ways in which they present their cases, both Blake and Brecht present us with 
a world that is always changing. In Blake we see more clearly how the fires of change are sought 
to be extinguished by those in power, and likewise in Brecht we see the ways in which change 
has been used by those in power for their own purposes. This posits a conception of change that 
is reliant on a notion of “messianic time” where other worlds are possible. As Peter Fenves 
argues: 
 
…messianic time is not another time; it is just time – time and nothing else but “plastic 
time”. The paradisal character of space, toward which the painterly plane tends, accords 
                                                        
and vision helps us here, and vision shows us the tree of mystery and morality growing inside the human skull; it 
shows us the prophet calling to the earth to herself and earth answering with a groan to be delivered; it shows us our 
accusing enemy who frightens us out of Paradise behind the menacing blaze of a tiger’s eyes.” “This is the only 
world the child can grow into, and yet the child must grow. The Songs of Experience are satires, but one of the things 
they satirize is the state of innocence. They show us the butcher’s knife which is waiting for the unconscious lamb. 
Consequently, the Songs of Innocence satirize the state of experience, as the contrast which they present to it makes 
its hypocrises more obviously shameful. Hence the two sets of lyrics show two contrary states of the soul, and in 
their opposition there is a double edged irony, cutting into both the tragedy and the reality of fallen existence.” 
Northrop Frye, Fearful Symmetry: A Study of William Blake (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969): 236-7. 
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with the messianic character of time, which is thus charged with tension and can be called 
“full” because every stretch of time contains all of time. In “World and Time” Benjamin 
says of first category” “there is nothing continuous”; the opposite condition characterizes 
the other concept under consideration, namely time, which, as Benjamin briefly suggests, 
should actually be called “the coming world.” By virtue of its nondirectional continuity, 
time – “turned” by “now” – is the “coming world.”251  
 
This coming world requires for Blake and Brecht opposition and experiment in the present for its 
eventual manifestation to be even remotely considerable, were a “Utopian leap” possible.252 If 
this is not deemed possible in the present, if the time of the now provides insufficient 
nourishment required for the rich veins of experiment, then the move towards the past and 
historical redemption, the focus of the next two chapters, becomes the hope for the future. 
                                                        
251 Peter Fenves, The Messianic Reduction: Walter Benjamin and the Shape of Time (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2011): 244.  
252 Benjamin himself expressed this relationship to the present himself. Michael Jennings states: “Life as an 
experiment: Benjamin’s restless travelling, his problematic friendships and alliances – all can be seen under the 
category of experiment. “When it comes to the most important things,” he wrote to Scholem in 1926, “I always 
proceed radically, never consistently; this would also be my attitude, were I one day to join the Communist 
Party….The possibility of my remaining in the party will have to be determined experimentally.” Michael W. 
Jennings, Dialectical Images: Walter Benjamin’s Theory of Literary Criticism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1987): 8.  
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Chapter 4: Brecht, History and the Productive Past 
 
 A Brechtian maxim: “Don’t start from the 
 good old things but the bad new ones.”253 
 
 Much has been made of the period of Brecht’s exile and the ways in which this move 
abroad, or more accurately moves (given the many countries he sought refuge in before arriving 
in the United States), shaped his politics and the nature of the work he produced.254 In what 
follows I hope to link this period of exile with the nascent relevance of history in his work. I am 
not, however, arguing, that the move towards history was in any way new for Brecht. His work in 
Weimar Berlin was marked by an interest in historical themes. For example, there was The Life of 
Edward II of England, and the celebrated reworking of Gay’s The Threepenny Opera (perhaps 
Brecht’s most well known work). There, historically reimagined works were the exception and 
not the rule for this time period. For if Brecht’s connections with the working-class movement in 
Germany did a great deal in shaping his response to the particular social and political situation in 
Germany (and to some extent abroad), as I have attempted to show in Chapter 2, and the 
imposition of successive exiles (“changing countries more often than shoes,”255 was his deft 
description) saw Brecht resort to using history and historical themes as a means of returning to 
the present conjuncture.256 This is not to suggest that Brecht eschewed political intervention. On 
                                                        
253 Benjamin, Understanding Brecht: 121. 
254 An important work on the successful work of Brecht’s present while in exile is examined comprehensively in 
John J. White and Ann White, Bertolt Brecht’s Furcht und Elend des Dritten Reiches: A German Exile Drama in the 
Struggle against Fascism (Rochester: Camden House, 2010).  
255 Bertolt Brecht, “To Those Born After Us” in Collected Poems, edited by Willett and Mannheim, XX. Galvano 
Della Volpe refers to this poem as “Marxist” as the “moral and ideological climate which constitutes the poetic 
“tone” is, unlike Rimbaud’s Ouvriers, revolutionary.” Galvano Della Volpe, Critique of Taste (London: Verso, 
1978): 147. 
256 Just as Brecht offered little fidelity to other texts, so too did he view history. As William Burling notes: “Brecht 
routinely thought of all history and all earlier cultural production as grist for his mill.” William J. Burling, “Brecht’s 
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the contrary, it is the purpose of this chapter to argue that the more considered and fully-formed 
turn towards history and historical themes was specifically an attempt to make a political impact 
in a different manner than was previously imaginable given that connections to developed social-
political movements were now thin on the ground, and the receptions of Brecht in the United 
States were mixed at best.257 Although more could be added to the list, John J. White notes that:  
 
Two factors weighed heavily with Brecht in the mid-1930s. The first was knowing that 
ideologically progressive theater-groups could also fail to grasp Epic Theater’s innovative 
approach, and the second, an awareness that the American stage was becoming dominated 
by Stanislavskians to a far greater extent than he could have suspected from his European 
vantage point.258 
 
Given this context it is telling that during his period of exile, a period which stretched from 1933 
– 1949, his most direct form of political writing, with few exceptions (direct meaning here simply 
not mediating his political interventions through history and historical themes), is located in his 
poetry.259 Yet his poetry notwithstanding, what I would like to argue in this chapter is that the 
historical focus in Brecht’s plays (which included other post-1939 texts and re-workings such as 
The Trial of Lucullus, The Judith of Shimoda, The Duchess of Malfi, Antigone, and Coriolanus, 
among other texts besides the three examined herein), both as a device and as a strategy, offered 
him a means to continue his political aesthetics productively in order to intervene in the 
                                                        
“U-effect”: Theorizing the Horizons of Revolutionary Theatre,” in Brecht, Broadway and United States Theatre, 
edited by J. Chris Westgate (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2007): 173. 
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258 John J. White, Bertolt Brecht’s Dramatic Theory (Rochester: Camden House, 2004): 84. 
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Ronald Spiers ed., Brecht’s Poetry of Political Exile (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).   
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contemporary moment. In this sense, the “time of the now” is still operating as a guiding 
principle for Brecht, but with historical settings and motifs being used as a vehicle to shed light 
on the present. This historical turn, although a continuation of the political trajectory of his earlier 
work,260 a process that Brecht himself termed Historisierung, marks Brecht’s “final – and most 
political – major new term in Brecht’s conceptual arsenal of the late 1930’s.”261  
In this regard I will argue that the plays Mutter Courage und ihre Kinder, Der 
Kaukasische Kreidekreis, and Leben des Galilei are constructed in such a way so as to continue 
the political uses of estrangement effects, but using the historical past as a means to stretch the 
political understandings of the audience. Yet history is not meant to act as a mirror of the present, 
but to skew it slightly, to give it distance or “perspective,” as a means of establishing a 
productive memory that continues to make itself useful in the present rather than repress the 
oppositional energies that could be unleashed by going against the grain, in the sense of 
Benjamin’s Brechtian maxim. Indeed, the new maxim, after Benjamin, is more akin to “start 
from the bad old times for the bad new times.” In order to show this the present chapter will 
focus on the aforementioned three post-1933 plays. First, I will show how the historical backdrop 
                                                        
260 There is a stream in Brechtian scholarship that has sought to divide Brecht into a younger and older version, with 
each temporal position defined by decidedly contradictory political positions. As Betty Nance Weber has argued, 
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that in fact calls into question the liberatory potential of historical understanding, even if that historical understanding 
leads to disheartening truths. White, Bertolt Brecht’s Dramatic Theory, 128. 
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found in Mutter Courage and the lead character’s inability to see the system which feeds on the 
destruction of her family propels the audience to learn from that bad history. I will illustrate how 
the “Little Monk” character in Leben des Galilei is emblematic of the importance of the larger 
struggle for justice of those who are deemed to have little power. In this regard, although key 
historical targets for Brecht’s play were both Stalinism and Capitalist war, the backdrop of 
Renaissance Italy provides the opportunity to explore the possibility of how we can learn from 
history. In the third section, the usefulness of historical learning for the present, especially as 
regards the ingenious strategies of productivity and historical planning, will be shown in the Die 
Kaukasische Kreidekreis. Perhaps fittingly, I will eschew chronological order and begin with the 
role of memory and forceful forgetting in Brecht’s Mutter Courage. 
 
And the Cart Rolls On…Mutter Courage and Learning from Those Who Don’t 
 
WHAT IS A PERFORMANCE OF MOTHER COURAGE AND  
HER CHILDREN PRIMARILY MEANT TO SHOW? 
That in wartime big business is not conducted by small people. 
 That war is a continuation of business by other means, making  
the human virtues fatal even to those who exercise them. That  
no sacrifice is too great for the struggle against war.262 
 
 Although others had long before discussed the long centuries of the wreckage of history 
before he arrived on the scene (not least Marx himself, whose famous encapsulation that “history 
of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle”263 involves an acknowledged 
reality of the grand scope of human oppression), few have exposed the liberating potentialities of 
the past as sharply as Benjamin. Rather than explore this potential for the contemporary 
                                                        
262 Brecht, Brecht on Theatre, 220. 
263 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (London: Penguin, 1985): 79. 
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conjuncture, however, Benjamin’s position is to no longer take the past for granted, and that the 
sufferings of the past will not, without a radical resurrection of them, positively condition a future 
left. This was significantly the case with the largest German left movement of Benjamin’s 
lifetime. As he writes in the “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” Social Democracy in 
Germany “made the working class forget both its hatred and its spirit of sacrifice, for both are 
nourished by the image of enslaved ancestors rather than that of liberated grandchildren.”264 By 
forgetting its hatred the working class has become unmoored from the struggles of its past. This 
has been key to the suppression of hatred of war, most notably in the infamous vote in August 
1914 by deputies of the German Social Democratic Party in support of “War Credits” for the 
First World War. The fight against war for Brecht, as the above quote from his notes on the play 
makes clear, involves a sacrifice (of one’s own life, or of restricting one’s choices) in the present 
against war. The historical background offered in Mutter Courage enables a way of learning from 
previous failures of others who have not acted against a similar threat.  
That much has been written on Brecht’s Mutter Courage is an understatement. For an 
author whose works have been subject to an industry of investigation, few works have been so 
delicately (and at times indelicately) chewed over as this piece. Yet despite the proliferation of 
scholarly work on and translations of the play,265 few have sought to seriously examine the role 
of loss in the work, and how that key theme of loss (and here one means more than the sum of the 
parts found throughout, such as family members, capital, self-respect, etc.) structures the work 
entirely.266  
                                                        
264 Benjamin, Illuminations, 253. 
265 See, for instance, Tony Kushner and Tom Kuhn’s recent bilingual edition of 2012, Mother Courage and Her 
Children / Mutter Courage und ihre Kinder (London: Bloomsbury Methuen Drama, 2012), and David Hare’s 
translation Mother Courage and Her Children (London: Methuen, 2010).  
266 It is important to note that the character of Mother Courage finds her roots not in Brecht, but rather in the work of 
the seventeenth-century German novelist Grimmelshausen in his Der Abenteuerliche Simplicissimus (translated as 
The Adventurous Simplicissimus). Grimmelshausen knew a lot about loss, being himself stolen away from his family 
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In Brecht’s careful production of the play, special attention was given to make clear to the 
audience the “bare facts” of the background of the work. For instance, maps of Europe detailing 
the progress and regress of various army movements were shown, placards stating the year were 
used between scenes to give a sense of temporal fixation, and other visual markings were 
deployed. Such efforts may seem especially counter-intuitive for a playwright who is known, 
perhaps more than any other, for his work on distancing techniques, the raison d’être of which is 
the meticulous alienation of the trappings of realism and facticity present in what he saw as 
Aristotelian theatre. Yet the techniques Brecht used in Mutter Courage are not an eschewal of his 
formal practice, but rather an attempt to make clearer the step backward in time for the purposes 
of historical reinvestigation in the present moment.  
Through the use of these techniques Brecht sought to set in place a situation where 
audience members would leave, in part, their assumptions of the current period and move to a 
time which is not explicitly capitalist but is assuredly pre-modern. That we will learn that Mother 
Courage herself is engaged in the buying and selling of commodities, and is a referent for the 
capitalist-parasitical position of living off of war, is in no doubt. Indeed, so blatantly obvious are 
the historical markers provided that they are merely enough to establish that we are not in the 
present epoch, despite the obvious correlations for the audience of the original productions. 
Openly we are invited to leave, at least partially, the moment of class conflict between proletariat 
and bourgeoisie and turn to that other struggle which, at least in terms of historical time, dwarfs 
the relative newness of the two chief struggling classes under capitalism. This is the time of 
feudalism in German-speaking lands (and elsewhere) and the almost incomparable exploitation of 
the peasantry. It is a moment in time that Brecht wishes to mobilise. Fredric Jameson, in his 1998 
                                                        
and rural life at the age of ten by the then Hessian army. A comparison highlighting religion as a survival strategy in 
each is provided in Cara M. Horwish, Survival in Simplicissimus and Mutter Courage (Bern: Peter Lang, 1997).  
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work Brecht and Method, has written of this process of drawing back into historical time (more 
than history as such) in Brecht’s work. He writes: 
 
This is the moment of freedom, the redemptive moment, in one of Brecht’s 
temporalities: the moment of provisional change, the moment which Advak [the corrupt 
judge in The Caucasian Chalk Circle] can appear, no matter how briefly, before 
vanishing again into the mists of time and the immemoriality of peasant labour and 
oppression. It is the Xairos of Brecht’s peasant history, and a temporality of pre-
capitalism that is most often associated with the “populist” features in Brecht, and 
determines the chronologies of the great plays: the Thirty Years War in Mother 
Courage; a peasant Middle Ages shaking off its timeless lethargy in Galileo...267  
 
That Mother Courage herself is not a peasant is not, strictly speaking, the point. It is rather the 
image and aura of the peasant, the larger “structure of feeling,” to abuse further an already abused 
term of Raymond Williams, that is meant here.268 Brecht reaches back into history and brings 
                                                        
267 Jameson, Brecht and Method, 139. While I am sympathetic to Douglas Kellner’s attempt to situate rather than 
abstract (a very Brechtian impulse) I think Jameson’s point here is at odds with Kellner’s when the latter points out 
that: “In his epic theatre built on the principles of historical specification and critique, Brecht sought to illuminate the 
historically specific features of an environment in order to show how that environment influenced, shaped, and often 
battered and destroyed the characters. Unlike dramatists who focused on the universal elements of the human 
situation and fate, Brecht was interested in the attitudes and behaviour people adopted toward each other in specific 
historical situations.” Douglas Kellner, “Brecht’s Marxist Aesthetic: The Korsch Connection,” in Bertolt Brecht: 
Political Theory and Literary Practice, edited by Weber and Heinen, p. 31. Oddly enough, the notion of specific 
conditions is far too limited in a discussion of Brecht. For Brecht, the specific condition is the now, and the historical 
condition is that which is far more malleable in Brecht. This leads us to the point of change and performance in 
Brechtian theatrical practice. As Marc Zimmerman had pointed out, “A Brechtian Theatre which represents a 
changing world implies that the theatre itself must change. A Brechtian production today which copies Brecht, or 
which adheres to his production models, is not Brechtian.” Marc Zimmerman, “Brecht and the Dynamics of 
Production,” Praxis 3 (1977): 125. In this regard the purpose is not to show historical truth or historical specificity 
for itself. Theatre does not seek to “evoke feelings of compassion an pity in the audience, as in Aristotelian theatre, 
nor do they leave the audience purged; [the] aim is to teach the audience so that each member leaves the theatre a 
changed person.” See Yasco Horsman, Theaters of Justice: Judging, Staging and Working Through in Arendt, Brecht 
and Delbo (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011): 92.  
268 See particularly Chapter 9 of Williams, Marxism and Literature. On the connections between this long standing 
feeling, and historical knowing, Douglas Robinson writes: “What for Brecht may in fact be allgemein menschlich is 
this hunger for progress, this instinct for the transitional moments in the dialectic, this shared kinaesthetic memory of 
our collective steps forward – this tendency, if I may generalize, to store in our collective regulatory knowing and 
deciding (our ideosomatics) the most important events in the long history of our learning.” Robinson, Estrangement 
and the Somatics of Literature, 227-28. This is a very fruitful thought, and one that connects our notions of learning 
and historical progress, and crashes them to the ground of historical tragedy. For Brecht, accessing these moments of 
 128 
with him, as Jameson writes, the “immemorality of peasant labour and oppression” as a means of 
emphasising the dire situation of again, almost incomparable expropriation and exploitation. Yet 
this critique does have limitations. Whereas a defining feature of peasant labour is its specific 
involuntary nature – the peasant is forcefully tied to the land – Mother Courage’s “enslavement” 
is neither enforced by, nor the fault of, others, at least not directly. Her relationship to her own 
exploitation is very much of her own making. While one should be cautious in terming her 
struggle over her own “freedom” – she is compelled to reproduce herself and her family under 
threat of starvation – she is given the possibility of not relying on war profiteering to do so. 
Ultimately, she embodies most importantly the contradictions of her own exploitation. The 
exploitation in her case is for the most part of her own devising, albeit in some sense 
unintentionally so, as it is not her surplus value (or all of her produced value) that is stolen from 
her. What Mother Courage is robbed of is her children (and thus her store of labour power), 
stolen away by the war upon which her material existence is based. Brecht here is mobilizing the 
World Wars, and the destruction that they brought upon Germany (and Europe) and the mindset 
of those who neither cannot face the truth about what they are involved in, nor about the 
conditions which make the horror (capitalist crises among them) possible. Further, this exposes 
the contradiction that Brecht presents between the Feudal relations of production (in various 
states of decline) that existed in Germany and Europe during the first half of the 17th century and 
the capitalism of his day. Germany at the time (or if we take the borders not of Germany and read 
                                                        
the grand sweeps of history was a playing ground of immense possibilities. And of course, the point was not merely 
to understand history, but rather to change it. As Robinson continues, “The desire to alter the world is specifically a 
dialectical desire (a) to recognize (through identificatory empathy) one’s membership and unconscious emotional 
and intellectual investment in that world, one’s circulatory ideosomatic regulation by and of that world, and (b) to 
feel (through estranging empathy) the discomfort of alienation from that world, the strangeness of alienness of that 
world from one’s own best interests, and yet at the same time the caused by any thought of separating once from it, 
precipitating (c) the discovery of another (Marxist) channel of ideosomatic regulation, which offers models for the 
Umfunktionierung of the world from a (de)alienated standpoint, a standpoint incorporating both the belonging of (a) 
and the alienation of (b).” Robinson, Estrangement and the Somatics of Literature, 228-29. 
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them to the 17th century) was not a capitalist society, and would not fully establish the capitalist 
market as such for some time.269   
Here I should pause for a moment and think back to the lines of Benjamin’s essay to 
capture the political reasoning of Brecht’s historical positioning of the play. Brecht’s gesture 
matches Benjamin’s urging to remember the hatred of exploitation that can be drawn from the 
image of the “enslaved ancestor.” In Benjamin’s Thesis XI he writes that “Nothing has corrupted 
the German working class so much as the notion that it was moving, with the current.”270 The 
idea then of a rupture in the notion of progress, a rupture which transforms the idea of a steady 
climb of prosperity to something akin to the longue durée that is represented by peasant suffering 
but is visible in this specific form of exploitative, commodified relationships raises the question 
of movement away from this “progression.” The gestus (and perhaps as well the habitus) of the 
peasant, coupled with the immense chronicle of loss that defines Mutter Courage’s personal 
narrative, sets clearly in motion a past wherein the oppressed protagonists have been unable to 
shake themselves out of their dire situations. Benjamin’s “Angel of History,” looking back on the 
destruction behind it, is mirrored in the moment of recognition of the part that Courage plays in 
the death of her son, Swiss Cheese, particularly as made famous by Brecht’s lead actress and 
long-term collaborator and partner, Helene Weigel, in her performance of Mother Courage. 
Weigel used a newspaper photo of an Asian mother “screaming over her son’s dead body”271 in 
                                                        
269 On this point I would follow the historiography of David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley in their classic text: The 
Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1984). While the authors famously reject the “Sonderweg” Thesis (wherein Germany’s capitalist 
ascent occurred only in the late 19th century due to a political push from the State), even they do not acknowledge a 
capitalist hegemony during the Thirty Years’ War. David Blackbourn will also argue that far from a direct transition 
from feudalism to capitalism, the transition was uneven, and there are several examples that during this time there 
was an expansion of nobles’ direction of the economy. See David Blackbourn, Fontana History of Germany 1780 – 
1918: The Long Nineteenth Century (London: Fontana, 1997): 19. 
270 Benjamin, Illuminations, 255. 
271 Gitta Honegger, “Gossip, Ghosts, and Memory Mother Courage and the Forging of the Berliner Ensemble,” The 
Drama Review 52 (2008): 100. 
 130 
her own performance. This usage reminds us to hold in contrast historical portrayal as a 
distancing device and the brutal reality of the continuing relations of war production and 
profiteering. When Courage is forced to deny knowing the identity of her dead son, a son who is 
dead because she haggled too long over his ransom, she lets out an inaudible scream. The scream 
punctures the air through silence. Even in the moment of tragedy her voice is not heard, just as 
the peasant and peasant history is largely unheard in the annals of official history, despite its 
ubiquitous historical presence throughout the centuries of feudalism. For Brecht, the silent 
scream of the past, that history of pent-up anger, must be made audible. 
The question, though, is why Mother Courage seems unable to recognize the rather 
simple logic that her parasitic existence on the war is slowly but surely killing off her children. If 
one is to resurrect the past, what is the value in her inability to change her circumstance? It is this 
problem that Brecht seeks to realize not in the play itself, but in the play’s reception. Dealing 
with this dynamic in correspondences with the playwright Friedrich Wolf, who asks if Mutter 
Courage would not have been more successful if there was some sense that Courage had learned 
from her behaviour, Brecht responds with the following: 
 
As you quite rightly say, the play in question shows that Courage has learnt nothing 
from the disasters that befall her. ...But even if Courage learns nothing else at least the 
audience can, in my view, learn something by observing her. I quite agree with you that 
the question of choice of artistic means can only be that of how we playwrights give a 
social stimulus to our audience (get them moving). To this end we should try out every 
conceivable artistic method which assists that end, whether it is old and new.272 
                                                        
272 Brecht, Brecht on Theatre, 229. In part this was a difficulty for Brecht as the actresses were successful in the 
Aristotelian tradition and audiences became too connected with them. This raises other issues of the type of theatre 
that Brecht put forward in an institutionalized GDR theatre, although as David Barnett notes, a technique used in 
another production with Therese Giehse as Mother Courage, produced the effect that despite her hope, “the audience 
knows it is mistaken.” See David Barnett, Brecht in Practice: Theatre, Theory and Performance (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2015): 177. 
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The link between historical time and the trajectory of her downfall, the loss of all but her own life 
and her wagon, are presented not just in the content but also in the formal strategies that Brecht 
employs. They shape the way in which the audience learns, in the particularly Brechtian 
constellation of didacticism,273 i.e. through learning from others’ mistakes. The key idea of 
learning, and its absence, is crucial here. In this regard Jameson writes, 
 
But in Brecht what is fatal is always the failure to learn: as witness the alleged tragedy of 
Mother Courage, for Brecht a fundamental illustration of the deadliness of the idea you 
can’t give up (the little nest-egg, the capital of the wagon that cannot be lost, hanging on 
to your investment no matter what happens).274 
 
Despite the feeling of historical accuracy – the firm dates listed throughout the text, the map that 
was originally used to show Courage’s movements across northern Europe, the backdrop of an 
historical war, etc., the play uses these to register the uses of the most pitied of all – the person 
who cannot learn from their own exploitation despite massive personal loss. This trope is useful 
for Brecht because this figure in the popular imagination (especially as an historical figure in the 
guise of the peasant) is signified with decidedly clear forms of exploitation and oppression, the 
object of historical suffering, while also being the terrified subject of war and famine. Despite the 
                                                        
273 While Brecht’s didacticism clearly does not sit entirely well with Raymond Williams, as has been noted often, 
Williams felt most drawn towards how Brecht constructed a way of so-called “complex seeing.” This form of seeing 
develops the mediation of the complex actions that are present on stage. As Alan O’Connor writes, “This separation 
between action and consciousness is the actual history that Brecht’s plays live out.” See O’Connor, Raymond 
Williams: Writing, Culture, Politics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989): 89. 
274 Jameson, Brecht and Method, 91. Mother Courage’s problem is that she tries to sneak through the gaps, to be that 
lucky one who escapes war’s total destruction while profiting from it. In contrast to this, “Brecht contends that 
survival tactics, if practiced collectively, can undermine oppressive strategies. The details of material, tactical 
existence have revolutionary potential, which is why epic theatre tries to single them out”. While I am sympathetic to 
aspects of this work, especially as it locates how very often female characters in Brecht are depicted as marginalized 
and left to manage the “tactical” issues of everyday (eternal) survival, one should not confuse all “strategies” as 
oppressive ones. See Bryant-Bertail, Space and Time in Epic Theatre: The Brechtian Legacy (Rochester, NY: 
Camden House, 2000): 70. 
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fact that Courage is not herself a peasant – her particular lesson is that of the historically 
represented peasant turned small businessperson – the play relies heavily on the forms (or 
depictions of historical forms) of this oppression and exploitation. Brecht’s historical work then 
demands what Sarah Bryant Bertail has discussed as the dialogical model wherein a particular 
theatrical piece is “multitemporal and multispatial in itself, able to stand independently” from its 
direct content while also making productive use of a recognized history.275  
In Brecht’s moment (the first version of the play was written in 1939, at the dawn of the 
World War II) the allegory276 of historical loss would have been all the more prescient as the 
plague of Nazism was to wreak its havoc outward after years of doing so within its own national 
borders, even though the most famous productions of the play, save a 1941 Zurich version, came 
after the war. Most notable here was the international production in Paris in 1954. This 
production was witnessed by, among others, the French theorist Roland Barthes.277 What 
influenced Barthes so immensely was the practice of gestus, fundamental in Brechtian theatre. 
While gestus is notoriously hard to define, Bryant-Bertail has usefully contributed to the 
discussion by noting that “Gestus may also be a nexus where contradictory spatio-temporal 
dimensions and their ideological valuations cross paths at one material object.”278 One example 
of these “contradictory spatio-temporal” moments which impressed Barthes was the moment in 
Mutter Courage where Courage bites down on a coin to test its authenticity. The dual moment of 
                                                        
275 Bryant-Bertail, Space and Time in Epic Theatre, 22. 
276 Examining the formal role of allegory, Alan Ackerman notes that: “Allegories collapse aspects of the present and 
the past, as Miller did in The Crucible or Brecht did in Leben des Galilei, redeeming the past for the purposes of the 
present.” While Ackerman doesn’t delve further in this in regards to Leben des Galilei, his comment is useful in 
diagnosing the purpose of the Allegory for Brecht’s play. This basic point is often lost of critics of the play. See Alan 
L. Ackerman, “The Prompter’s Box: Modern Drama’s Allegories of Allegory,” Modern Drama 49 (2006): 151. This 
could be equally applied to the other texts dealt with in this chapter. 
277 A useful analysis of the history of the play and its popular productions is found in Peter Thompson, Brecht: 
Mother Courage and her Children (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
278 Bryant-Bertail, Space and Time in Epic Theatre, 22. 
 133 
the hardness or materiality of money, in contrast to its abstract quality in capitalism, is a useful 
and informative contradiction. There is a dual moment involved here which involves a recasting 
of the moment of historical reality in Brecht. On this formation in the gestus, as regards the 
particular and the general, Jameson notes: 
 
What has not yet been added is that gestus clearly involves a whole process, in which a 
 specific act – indeed, a particular event, situated in time and space, and affiliated with 
 specific concrete individuals – is then somehow identified and renamed, associated with 
 a larger and more abstract type of action in general, and transformed into something 
 exemplary (even if archetypal is no longer the word we want to use about it). The 
 theoretical viewpoint required by gestus is therefore one in which several “levels” are 
 distinguished and then reassociated with each other…279 
 
What is refreshing here is Jameson’s emphasis on specific concrete individuals and instances, as 
this is something which he is at times not as willing to address, in part as his immensely valuable 
text does not take seriously Brecht’s engagement with Benjamin.280 Yet what is interesting is that 
both Jameson and Bryant-Bertail used similar words – “concrete” and “material” respectively – 
in relation to Gestus. What should be taken from this is that those who attempt to place Brecht as 
a formal practitioner above all else miss the point. Brecht’s formal practice is realized only with 
reference to concrete and/or material practice and situations.  
                                                        
279 Jameson, Brecht and Method, 103 
280 Indeed, the sparse references to Benjamin contained in Jameson’s text speak solely to Brecht’s work before the 
historical works under investigation in this chapter were written. In part, this seems to reproduce the notion that is 
much harder to hold after Wizisla’s text that any influence between the two was unidirectional (from Brecht to 
Benjamin). This may in part be in relation to Jameson’s presentation of Benjamin’s aesthetics as too influenced by 
“mysticism” unlike Brecht’s supposed hard-nosed, almost vulgar, materialism. Jameson would not be alone in this 
reading (with which it should be noted I disagree). For instance, Stanley Mitchell in his introduction to 
Understanding Brecht notes: “In one respect, by eliding the politicization of art with the use of artistic “means of 
production” or apparatus, Benjamin and Brecht at times constricted the relationship between politics and art. Brecht, 
in his later theory and practice, was able to clarify this confusion. Benjamin died before he could completely think 
through a new materialist aesthetics.” Mitchell in Understanding Brecht, xv. 
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 It is for this reason that gesture/g in Brechtian theatrical practice is such a vital entity. 
Gestus is so fundamental in his work as it is, in effect, a means of locating in the body a specific 
point which is the irreducible locus of human life. Despite capital’s wish/tendency to attempt to 
abstract away from the body, gestus brings the materiality of the body back into play. As 
McNally argues, “The drama of gesture is an historical one – an index of what has been lost with 
the decorporealization of language and culture.”281 What capital attempts to be rid of – the body 
as a site where its effects cannot be gotten rid of – is the place where Brecht attempts to dwell. As 
much as capital seeks to exist in a world divorced from material labour and in a “monetary 
universe that knows no social fixities or stable identities”282 it cannot occupy that space without 
exploiting human, corporeal labour. Brecht realizes that this tendency is unsustainable (one can 
only attempt to abstract away from the body) and brings us back to the ground zero of the body 
found in each moment of time, making them dialectical. McNally explains: 
 
 Such gestures are dialectical because, by disrupting the flow of scenes and actions which 
 recreate the time of everyday history, they cast light on the space of the body and its 
 desires. In so doing, they give rise “to the dialectical at a standstill,” the dramatic entry of 
 that which has been repressed – body, Eros, mimesis – onto the stage. Gesture is the 
 language of the body and things.283 
 
Gestus is an oppositional practice. And what one learns from this material practice is the 
importance of giving up on things which bring nothing with them but misery. This is specifically 
a rejection of the notion of progress that Benjamin finds so central to German social democracy 
and detrimental to working-class activity. He writes: “Progress, for Brecht, has a negative 
                                                        
281 McNally, Bodies of Meaning, 190. 
282 Perry Anderson, The Origins of Postmodernity (London: Verso, 1998): 85. 
283 McNally, Bodies of Meaning, 190. 
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connotation as the fortschreiten (to strive forward; to advance; to progress; to pass; to proceed) 
from others; it implies moving ahead and thus destroying unity even when it is well 
intentioned.”284 The lesson from this is clear. “Theatre, then, can provide a site for tracing ideas 
back to their progenitors and to those affected by them. Tracing ideas back and forth forms the 
basic structure of Brecht’s theatre…”285 
 The depiction of historical loss can be a useful force for opposition to contemporary 
forms of exploitation, oppression and war. In Brecht’s Mutter Courage, tragic history is (and 
was) therefore not that which has happened but that which will continue to happen unless 
something breaks its rhythm. In part the tragic form lends itself to a form of teleology of the pre-
ordained, of a kind of fate and fateful outcomes. For this reason Brecht was suspicious about the 
formal nature of tragedy. As Terry Eagleton notes, “Tragedy is about inevitability, and thus a 
politically noxious form.”286 Brecht addresses these traits by making it possible for the audience 
member to be a producer of alternate meanings and history (for the present). In this sense 
Brecht’s play is “anti-tragic” as it argues that “tragedy can be avoided.”287 Yet for this to be 
avoided someone must act, and be heard.288 In this regard the moment of Courage’s pain over the 
death of her son is obviously insufficient, but this insufficiency is a design of Brecht’s and is 
enacted as a means to encourage agency in the audience. As Elinor Fuchs notes:  
 
                                                        
284 Oesmann, Staging History, 201. 
285 Oesmann, Staging History, 201. 
286 Terry Eagleton, Sweet Violence: The Idea of the Tragic (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003): 127. 
287 Eagleton, Sweet Violence, 127. 
288 This also involves a realization of one’s position in a politics of learning, and acting on that learning. On this 
question Julian H. Wulbern notes that there is a similarity in Mutter Courage and Leben des Galelei when each turns 
from the truth and reason: “… there has been a dialectical transformation quite akin to that which occurs in Mother 
Courage, when Courage curses the army for having killed her child at the end of Scene Six, only to proclaim in her 
next words at the start of Scene Seven that she won’t have her war spoiled for her. Here Galileo has acceded to the 
demands of the Inquisition that he abjure his astronomical and has turned to a considerably safer field of 
investigation, the study of floating bodies.” Julian H. Wulbern, Brecht and Ionesco: Commitment in Context 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971): 163.  
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If Mother Courage achieves the political aim of Brecht’s Epic Theatre, it is because the 
reverses of Courage’s children’s deaths do not function as reversals in the plot. The 
recognition scene that should classically follow on these losses is glaringly absent. In 
effect, that scene is transferred from the protagonist to the audience. If, as Brecht hopes, 
the spectator leaves the audience motivated to change the world, it is because Courage 
cannot see what needs to change.289  
 
Courage, famous for her ability to talk around and fool others with linguistic trickery, is notably 
(and perhaps necessarily) silent in her scream. Yet silence, while the dominant response to a 
recognition of the barbarity of war, is not the only response the play offers. 
 By the end of the play Courage is alone, having witnessed the death of all her children. 
Yet only one of her children, her daughter who was deemed not to have been militarily useful due 
to her gender, has died in anything resembling noble circumstances. Courage’s daughter Kattrin 
sounds an alarm in the early hours of the morning and wakes a town that will otherwise be 
sacked. She nevertheless does so in the full knowledge that she will be killed for her actions. In 
this way, “Kattrin’s death alone is also portrayed as an act of vital revolutionary resistance, and in 
this form it is positioned in the penultimate scene of the play as its climactic, defining event.”290 
                                                        
289 Elinor Fuchs, “Waiting for Recognition: An Aristotle for “Non-Aristotelean” Drama,” Modern Drama 50 (2007): 
540. A similar point is offered by Susan Cannon Harris. She writes: “Courage knows, as the audience knows, that if 
she betrays her relationship to him by expressing emotion, she will be killed. Brecht would also seem to have known, 
by now, that forcing Courage not to express grief was the surest way of inducing spectators to feel it. Brecht enforces 
another such divergence by informing the audience of Eilif’s death while Courage is offstage. Since Courage never 
learns of Eilif’s death, she cannot grieve for him; the spectators have to do it for her. Courage hooks spectators as 
hard as any melodramatic mother ever did; but she is structurally prevented from making them her mirror.” Susan 
Cannon Harris, “Mobilizing Maurya: J. M. Synge, Bertolt Brecht, and the Revolutionary Mother,” Modern Drama 
56 (2013): 54. 
290 Vork, “Silencing Violence,” 33. While Vork’s above point is valid, his work does betray a reductive notion that 
Marxism’s radical notion can only lie within a narrow definition of class struggle, and this often leaves the complex 
relation to historical transposition buried under the presuppositions of what a Marxist playwright should be 
concerned with. “At the same time I will argue that this revolutionary power does not stem from the inherent 
inequity of class struggle.” Robert Vork, “Silencing Violence,” 35. Yet Vork is not alone here as the most prominent 
postmodern appreciation of Brecht, provided by Elizabeth Wright, suggests that Brecht’s plays “cannot be reduced to 
any particular ideology, including those of Marxism or existentialism, because this would amount to an attempt to 
join up a deliberatively decentred view of reality.” Instead, Wright argues instead that: “Their Politico-aesthetic 
function resides rather in the way Brecht manages to make the spasmodic, discontinuous perceptions of a reality-in-
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Here, for once in the play, is an example of someone who does not try to feed on the pain and 
misery of war. In her death there is the ultimate irony that the one person who was deemed to be 
without voice (Kattrin is speech impaired), makes herself heard. The metaphor of those who are 
not heard and yet have agency has obvious parallels with the function of the audience, but also 
with Brecht’s faith in the working class’s ability to change the historical tides. It is they who have 
been hidden from and unheard throughout history and occluded in historiography. As the narrator 
asks in Brecht’s poem “Questions from a Worker who Reads,” “Great Rome/ Is full of triumphal 
arches. Who erected them? Over whom/ Did the Caesars triumph?”291  
 This reconsideration of those occluded or suppressed (or both) questions plays an 
important part not only in Brecht’s concept of the gestus but elsewhere as well. While most of the 
earliest receptions of Brecht in English made much of his “Alienation Effect,” for some time 
Brechtian scholarship has opted for a more accurate translation of the Verfremdungseffekt, which 
is actually much closer to “Distancing Effect.” Alienation should not be completely dismissed, 
however, as there is some sense that Brecht wishes his audience to take on a new role inside the 
theatre, alien in relation to their traditional role as passive consumer. This marks a new 
positionality for the Brechtian spectator. Often Brecht has been depicted as encouraging an anti-
emotional attitude in his work, in part due to this misleading translation. Brecht sought the 
opposite, as Anthony Squiers notes in the following: 
                                                        
process into a theatrical object, thus challenging our automatic interpretations of the concrete and our assumptions 
that words are able to match that which we sensually perceive. Most of all, the plays are an attack on our 
assumptions of stable identity, our own and that of others, for in these plays no one has a fixed identity, least of all 
the “hero,” who tries to wrest it from others in a ceaseless round of aggressiveness and exploitation.” Elizabeth 
Wright, Postmodern Brecht: A Re-Presentation (London: Routledge, 1989): 98-9. This position is counter-balanced 
by Dougal McNeill who states that “We need to accept that Marxism, unlike measles or malaria, is not something 
one can isolate and cure a playwright from suffering under. There is no easy dissection possible to offer up Brecht 
the man and Brecht the Marxist militant.” See Dougal McNeill, The Many Lives of Galileo: Brecht, Theatre and 
Translation’s Political Unconscious (Bern: Peter Lang, 2005): 37. Another piece which dissects Wright’s position is 
found in the aforementioned Marc Silberman, “A Postmodernized Brecht?”. 
291 Willett and Mannheim eds., Bertolt Brecht: Poems, 252. 
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In fact, Brecht wanted the audience to be engaged with the performance. He required 
attentiveness and personal, intellectual commitment to it. The estrangement Brecht 
desired was an internal estrangement from one’s current Weltanschauung or   
worldview.292  
 
The shift in emphasis is vital here as we move away from the caricatures of Brechtian theatre as 
austere and anti-emotive to a space wherein complexity of positionality and emotion are central 
to any production of his work. As Angela Curran notes in her useful “Brecht’s Criticisms of 
Aristotle’s Aesthetics of Tragedy,” 
 
 The play does represent the individual suffering and loss Mother Courage experiences 
 from the death of her children in the war. But this loss is presented so that the relation- 
 ship between Mother Courage's individual loss and her occupation as a businesswoman 
 whose livelihood depends on the war is made clear.293 
 
This loss conflicts though with Kattrin’s outburst. The loss is accepted and predictable. In order 
to fully understand it we must have a critical attitude to this historical loss. Brecht had three 
strategies of distancing which he lists clearly in his instructions to the play. They read as follows: 
 
 Three aids which may help estrange the actions and remarks of the characters being 
 portrayed: 
1. Transposition into the third person. 
2. Transposition into the past. 
3. Speaking the stage directions out loud.294 
                                                        
292 Anthony Squiers, “A Critical Response to Heidi M. Silcox’s ‘What’s Wrong with Alienation,’” Philosophy and 
Literature 39 (2015): 244. 
293 Angela Curran, “Brecht’s Criticisms of Aristotle’s Aesthetics of Tragedy,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism 59 (2001): 172.  
294 Brecht, Brecht on Theatre, 138. 
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While the first and third aids give the impression of specific tactical use, the second aid bursts 
beyond the realm of a single production. Together they go a long way in determining the content 
of the play itself. Indeed, while aspects of the production were changed given the location of 
production (important here are the productions in Berlin, Munich, Paris, and London), the field of 
historical transposition marks the sine qua non of the work. The shifting to another historical time 
allows for the further distanciation of action and thought in the play.295 As noted previously in 
Fredric Jameson’s comment that the learning from errors is vital, the inability of Courage to learn 
from her actions is a further sign that such benefitting from war is a dish served only to those 
who can afford it. As with the case of Mauler in Die Heilige Johanna, it is clear that through 
crisis there are those that win and there are those who will (continue to) lose. The point of 
Courage’s lesson is that it should have been learned as a specifically historical lesson. This is not 
an abstracted lesson, an Aesop’s Fable of instruction, but a lesson which involves an emotional 
and critical tie to historical learning and transformation. By seeing what has failed before, and by 
understanding the reasons for this, we also understand what was, is and forever will be a dead 
end. The resonance for a German audience of the time, their memories fresh with the barbarity of 
                                                        
295 Part of the role of distanciation and history must be understood in relation to the intellectual environment within 
which Brecht was working, or at least that to which he needed to respond. It is safe to say that although after the fact 
Brecht’s works and aesthetics came to be seen evermore both in the North and than later in the Global South as the 
committed response to the arts, this is not to suggest that such a state of affairs was present at both the time of 
Mother Courage’s writing nor at the first production. What’s more, the opposite was in fact the case. By far the 
dominant literary position of the left at the time had been expressed via Zhdanov and Lukacs which stated that art 
must eschew “subjectivist tendencies” and aim to present a clear wholeness of the contemporary situation. Writing 
on the Lukacsian phenomena that “It just is the case that art which gives us the “real” is superior art”, Eagleton 
shows how the emphasis on displaying history as real is problematic for Brecht. He writes: “Now there is a sense in 
which Brecht would agree; but his sense of “rationality” surely differs in important respects from Lukacs’s. For 
Brecht, it is not quite that art can “give us the real” only by a ceaseless activity of dislocating and demystifying; it is 
rather that this is, precisely, its yielding of the real, not a mere prelude to the dramatic moment when the 
transcendental signified will emerge in all its glory.” See, Eagleton, Walter Benjamin, 85. This should not lead into 
the position that Brecht saw no hope in Lukacs. Rather than a rejection they are more properly seen as an 
encouragement, even if one with “misplaced” hope they “could be corrected.” See Cliff Slaughter, Marxism, 
Ideology and Literature (London: The Macmillan Press, 1980): 129. 
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Prussian militarism, the for it’s time incomparable carnage of the First World War, and Nazi rule 
(and perhaps their role in it), would have been stark.296  
 What is interesting in this regard is that Brecht’s understanding is that Courage’s downfall 
is not due to the individual choices only of her’s alone. Courage follows the logic of capitalism 
(transposed onto a peasant past) and thus what is often framed as an “opportunity” to make 
money in capitalism is understood here rather as an imperative. This imperative involves no 
longer a choice (does one choose to win?) and thus defines who one can be or become. Darko 
Suvin articulates this dyanic in the following;  
 
 Mother Courage is a union of opposites; even her nickname (or man-made name) testifies 
 to it. It was earned when she saved her little wagon business by running a corridor of 
 gunfire. Ironically, the “courage” came from her being more afraid to lose her profits than 
 to face the shells. (It is, of course, a “courage” which will lead both her financially 
 virtuous and her ruthlessly warlike sons to face the firing squads.)297 
 
The imperatives (as opposed to opportunities) imposed upon Courage’s family necessitate the 
risk taking that will eventually lead to her inevitable downfall.  
 This is a thoroughgoing radical critique of the present.298 The excursion into history 
which marks Brecht’s period of exile is specifically about a fundamental understanding of the 
present condition, one that knows that a simple reproduction of the past (were that even possible) 
                                                        
296 As Michael Richardson notes, “Brecht’s ending, however, derives its potential prophylactic power from a 
different sort of identification with Courage, one in which the audience is forced to come to terms with its own 
possible guilt with respect to its actions (or inactions) during the war years. In implicating the audience in this way, 
Brecht is able to activate the audience to ground their conclusions about the future in a specific moment in the past.” 
Michael D. Richardson, Revolutionary Theatre and the Classical Heritage: Inheritance and Appropriation from 
Weimar to the GDR (Bern: Peter Lang, 2007):168. 
297 Suvin, Brecht and Beyond, 65.  
298 As David McNally has noted, contra Adorno “…Benjamin’s dialectics at a standstill, like Brecht’s epic theatre, 
was not about an adequate depiction of an historical totality, but about puncturing the flow of everyday experience.” 
See McNally, Bodies of Meaning, 219. 
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is not what is required or desired.299 Brecht’s formal strategies discussed herein are not peripheral 
to his political strategies, but rather are part and parcel of the same process. They are devised in 
tandem and work to make the links between forms of oppression and exploitation and material 
and/or concrete consequences as clear as possible. The “spirit of sacrifice” of Kattrin’s actions 
ultimately upsets the prevailing historical narrative, and is a key feature in rejecting this 
seemingly continual process of the business of war, of which there are few winners but many 
losers. The question of the losers in history, and the extent to which they have been let down in 
moments of (perpetual) crisis will continue to be the focus in the following section when I 
examine the problem of faith and its rupture in Brecht’s Leben des Galilei.  
 
The Religion of the Now: Galileo and the Knowing Science 
 
 It may well be heretical to speak of the religiosity of Brecht’s commitment to the now, 
especially as regards a play which provides such a resounding critique of the Catholic Church. 
What exactly the “now” here is depends on the different versions of the play that one refers to, 
but that is, as I have tried to argue, as essential a Brechtian problematic as it gets.300 As in Mutter 
Courage, Brecht uses an historical backdrop, in this case a retelling of Galileo Galilei’s well 
                                                        
299 Pace the above footnote, a similar point was expressed by Theodore Adorno as well. Writing on Mutter Courage 
Adorno states: “Because the society of the Thirty Years War was not the functional capitalist society of modern 
times, we cannot even poetically stipulate a closed functional system in which the lives and deaths of private 
individuals directly reveal economic laws. But Brecht needed the old lawless days as an image of his own, precisely 
because he saw his own could no longer be directly comprehended in terms of people and things.” See Adorno, 
“Commitment,” in Aesthetics and Politics, ed. Jameson, 186-87. 
300 The play has been recognized for its radical nature, and Benjamin Bennett goes as far as to state that it: “is as 
close to a demonstrable instance of revolutionary theatre as we are likely to find.” Benjamin Bennett, All Theatre is 
Revolutionary Theatre (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005): 73.  
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documented battle with the Catholic Church, as a means to arrive at the centre of political 
questions of his time.301 
I wish to focus not only on Galileo’s relation with the Church and the importance that 
struggle had for his society, but also with the consequences of the hopes and disillusionments that 
Galileo’s work and renunciation force onto the stage and into Brecht’s time.302 To this end I will 
not investigate the importance of Brecht’s work for his time as manifested in the play, but rather 
examine what Galileo’s crucial failure, his backing-down in the face of pressure from above, 
means in relation to the peasant “Little Monk,” a character who well understands the politics of 
history and the politics of the now, (perhaps given his class position) more innately than any in 
                                                        
301 It is interesting to note that in a somewhat recent production of the play in Toronto, the director of the production 
finds it necessary to claim that “As a piece of history, it’s [Galileo] horribly inaccurate.” This is stated even though 
the one-off production was itself utilizing Brecht’s work to make a comment about the present, in this case the 
infiltration and commercialisation of private-sector led University-based scientific research. See Jacob Zimmer 
quoted in Jon Kaplan, “Preview: The Life of Galileo,” NOW Magazine, (May 27-June 3, 2010): 39. Much more 
productively, Betty Nance Weber argues that “Brecht’s strategy of composition in the play is to interlace moments of 
authentic seventeenth-century history with anachronisms and invented history to create a consistent set of parallel 
between two epochs.” Nance Weber, “The Life of Galileo and the Theory of Revolution in Performance,” 62. In 
Weber’s essays she analyses the parallels with Galileo and Trotskyists in the Soviet Union. While I would disagree 
with this formulation it is interesting further to consider that Weber sees a connection between many of Brecht’s 
history plays and the “need to counter the falsification of history,” particularly as there was a progressively greater 
“distortion in official Soviet record.” Nance Weber, “The Life of Galileo and the Theory of Revolution in 
Performance,” 62. 
302 For a more general philosophical examination of the reasons as to why it is important to underline the specific 
historical contradictions that Brecht sought to highlight, see Gene Ray, “Dialectical Realism and Radical 
Commitments: Brecht and Adorno on Representing Capitalism,” Historical Materialism18 (2010): 3–24. It is 
important in this process not to fall into the “argument” that Brecht saw the chance in using history as an attempt to 
sway his dim-witted audience, a position advanced here: “The problem is, of course, as Brecht’s own Marxist 
analysis shows very clearly, that appetite for illusion and fetish flourish under the conditions of capitalism, creating a 
gullible mindset that makes room for the uncritical acceptance of representation. The capitalist spectator-consumer is 
not simply stupid, but in need of magic and illusion.” Phoebe von Held, Alienation and Theatricality: Diderot after 
Brecht (Oxford: Legenda, 2011): 59. In fact, as Laura Bradley notes, Brecht’s project moved in the opposite 
direction. Writing on the context of Brecht’s Die Mutter, Laura Bradley writes: “Brecht’s emphasis on the historical 
context of the stage action must not be confused with his own use of theater, Historisierung (Historicization). In a 
postscript to the Messingkauf Brecht explained that Historisierung destroys the illusion that familiar phenomena are 
eternal: ‘was ist, war nicht immer und wird nicht immer sein.’ [What is, was not always so, and will not remain so 
forever].” Laura Bradley, Brecht and Political Theatre: The Mother on Stage (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006): 71. 
This point has been misunderstood, I think by Keith A. Dickson, who mistakes the clash of two historical moments 
as one being held up over another. He writes that “The present is weighed and found wanting by a pointed 
comparison with the past…”. Rather, it is not only that the present has been found wanting, it is that both the past and 
the present have been found wanting. Historical transposition brings this contradiction out. Keith A. Dickson, 
Towards Utopia: A Study of Brecht (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978): 61.  
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the play. Indeed, the Little Monk represents the vital intelligence and, perhaps problematically, 
the repeated Brechtian trope of the simplicity of working-class intellectuals, that are key in 
radically altering and fulfilling a project that shuns the pacific notions of official historiography 
and works for a politics of the now which sets to make of history something burning in the 
present. The term working-class intellectuals should be read in connection with the theorist 
Antonio Gramsci’s description of “organic intellectuals,” a group that, unlike traditional 
intellectuals who can be won over to a cause, arise from within and are, as it were, born with a 
movement.303   
However, I must add that my concern here is not to rehash the surplus of academic work 
which makes the connections with the actual historical reference points with which the play is, 
loosely put, “in conversation.” Rather, my focus is to broaden the discussion so as to take into 
consideration the larger implications of these reference points for an often-overlooked character 
in the play. In this sense, I wish to argue that by using the Little Monk as an example of that 
comprehension of history (he, of course, is not named, but is defined by his social category), in 
contrast to the definitive dates that are offered throughout the play chronologising Galileo’s life, 
Brecht simultaneously counteracts the many necessary omissions that comprise the “great man” 
theory of history, while also bringing in the important question of social transformation and 
class.304   
                                                        
303 Gramsci notes that “One of the most important characteristics of any group that is developing towards dominance 
is its struggle to assimilate and to conquer “ideologically” the traditional intellectuals, but this assimilation is made 
quicker and made more efficacious the more the group in question succeeds in simultaneously elaborating its own 
organic intellectuals.” Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci (New York: 
International Publishers, 1999): 10. The organic intellectual reflects in part the newness of the class formations from 
which they originate. As Peter Thomas notes, “It is for this reason that the specificity of the organic intellectual is 
integrally linked to the specificity of the class project from which they emerge.” Peter Thomas, The Gramscian 
Moment: Philosophy, Hegemony and Marxism (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2010): 416.  
304 On the importance of the Little Monk, Terry Holmes argues that “In his argument with the little monk he even 
asserts that the problem of social justice is the real point at issue behind the cosmological disputes…Galileo’s 
retraction of this insight, a retraction in effect of his own commitment to the cause of humanity, is a much more 
serious and fundamental betrayal than his later repudiation of the scientific facts.” See Terry Holmes, “The 
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There are two historical events which are normally brought up when one thinks of the 
contemporary inspirations for the writing two of the several versions of the play. The more 
popular interpretation sees in the play a condemnation of Oppenheimer and the Manhattan 
project, which involved the discovery of the technology behind the atom bombs that were 
horrifically put into practice on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The lesser-known 
interpretive example and also “the least mentioned” argues Jameson, “no doubt for all kinds of 
reasons, although Brecht himself mentions it, is the submission of Bukharin in Stalin’s show 
trials.”305 It stands as a testament to the strength of the play that its function could be switched 
from a critique of the nuclear politics of the post-war era and, a few years earlier, to the punishing 
of oppositional theories and practices in the Soviet Union.306 There is something which binds the 
two, and it is this common thread which seems to be of importance here. At the centre of both is 
the shirking of the responsibility of naming the truth that has proven, of science, in Galileo’s case 
astronomy and in Bukharin’s case the “science” of Marxism. Here, following Jameson,  
 
                                                        
Suppressed Science of Society in Leben des Galilei,” in Bertolt Brecht: Centenary Essays, edited by Steve Giles and 
Rodney Livingstone (Amsterdam: Rodopi Press, 1998): 154. This is a useful analysis and similar to my position, but 
is unfortunately not taken up further by Holmes. Rather, Holmes relies too often on preserving a sense of “orthodox 
Marxism” in Brecht’s work, even when that may not be the purpose in Brecht’s text. Note for instance Holmes 
argument that Brecht had wished to have Galileo ally himself with the bourgeoisie, thus hastening the bourgeois 
revolution, thus hastening communism. This stagist approach often found in Marxism has been powerfully criticized 
throughout the work of Ellen Meiksins Wood. See for instance her Democracy Against Capitalism: Renewing 
Historical Materialism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) and The Origins of Capitalism: A Longer 
View (London: Verso, 2002). 
305 Jameson, Brecht and Method, 123. 
306 While I would not take the position that Bukharin represented a fundamental change of direction for the Soviet 
Union, it is enough for our present purposes that Brecht himself thought so. On Brecht’s attitude to the Soviet Union, 
Peter Brooker accurately refers to Brecht’s anti-Stalinism as “indirect, cautious and delayed.” Brooker also refers to 
the Soviet Union a “type of socialist society,” a point with which I would also take issue, arguing instead that that 
society was a State Capitalist society. Peter Brooker, Bertolt Brecht: Dialectics, Poetry, Politics (London: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, 1988): 6. Brooker’s texts is also very useful in pointing out how critics have often sought to divide 
Brecht between a young period (sometimes “anarchistic,” less rational more overtly political Brecht) to an older 
(often rational, “humanist”) version. These latter interpretations often picture Brecht as being at odds with his own 
work, bursting through the confinements of his “unsustainable Marxist” politics. See Brooker, Bertolt Brecht, 182-
185. A remarkable study that depicts that the downfall of the hopes and utopic inspiration of the Russian Revolution 
is Susan Buck-Morss’s Dreamworld and Catastrophe: The Passing of Mass Utopia in East and West (Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press, 2000). 
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…the notion of Marxism as a science, and, indeed, as the well-known “science of society” 
 is a secondary signifying move which also corrects and limits itself: it says, yes, Marxism 
 really is a science in that sense, but only in that figurative sense of what accompanies and 
 theorizes the New.307 
 
I have already argued that for Brecht a “transposition into the past”308 was a key strategy 
in establishing a critical distance in his history plays. In a similar way religion stands in for other, 
established forms of dominance, and is, simultaneously, a prism through which to understand the 
new. Yet despite his significantly over-stated “hyper-rationalist” politics, the question of religion 
is not dismissed as false consciousness or as a way to cast a shadow over the people’s logic. 
Rather, understanding that the new is driven with contradictions, Brecht is clear that even within 
the church there are instances of struggle (for good and ill), not least represented during the time 
of Galileo’s birth in the Peace of Augsburg of 1555 (Augsburg is also Brecht’s birthplace and this 
history would have been known). The Little Monk is the prime example of this as he, coming 
from the peasantry, believes in the power of the Church to relieve suffering. In this instance the 
winning-over of a position of science must deal with the consequences of its success, and 
ultimately the circumstances upon which the success is founded.309 
                                                        
307 Jameson, Brecht and Method, 126. Brecht’s theoretical work is often underestimated. Wolfgang Haug argues that: 
“behind Brecht’s world fame as a playwright and poet it is still a widely kept secret that he was one of the most 
outstanding Marxist philosophers.” Wolfgang Fritz Haug, “Rethinking Gramsci’s Philosophy of Praxis from One 
Century to the Next,” boundary 2 26 (1999): 113. Anthony Squiers partially addresses this considerable gap in his 
An Introduction to the Social and Political Philosophy of Bertolt Brecht.   
308 Brecht, Brecht on Theatre, 138. 
309 As Peter Smith notes, “Leben des Galilei suggests that scientists should not view themselves as operating within a 
metadiscourse isolated from external influences.” This is no doubt a complex problem, and a general one in the play. 
Smith interest is in the history of science, and continues “Galilei warns that a pure science risks becoming an 
exploited science, as happened in Germany under the National Socialists.” See  Peter D. Smith, “German Literature 
and the Scientific World-View in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries,” The Journal of European Studies 27 
(1997): 406. 
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The Church of the Little Monk is not the Vatican and its institutional force, but rather a 
“little church and Bible texts” of Sunday’s devotion.310 In the Monk’s presentation, the Church’s 
standing is that of ordering life, in making sense of the poverty and degradation that are part and 
parcel of peasant labour. In this sense religion’s usefulness is to rationalize forms of life. Thus, 
the Church here represents a very real, material operation in the lives of peasants while also 
providing a way of viewing the world historically. A mere dismissal, at least in Brecht’s portrayal 
of the Little Monk, is for this reason not possible. As Wolfgang Sohlich notes in his analysis of 
the play, “Faith, at least, gives meaning to suffering and redeems death.”311 Galileo himself has a 
coterie of true “believers,” but these are educated men312 whose links to the poor are non-existent. 
This separation is notable, and Brecht is clear as to what transpires on the ground - the torture of 
the people by the Church and the ways in which the Church is an expression of dominance - but 
is also aware that a simple dismissal of God is dangerous for a counter-hegemonic politics. It 
will, for instance, not win over those who, like the Little Monk and his kind, are necessary if 
Galileo’s larger struggle against the Church is to be won.  
The Little Monk position sits on a knife’s edge, balanced between the reproduction of the 
“orderly” society and the potential of the peasants who, for the moment, believe in the rightness 
of the established church. God has potential as a means for structuring the lives of peasants, and 
this cannot be forgotten. Yet this must be balanced by the Little Monk’s response to Galileo’s 
assistant Federzoni’s cry that the established families “who ordered the earth stand still because 
their castles might be shaken loose if it resolves…” by finishing with “…and who only kiss the 
                                                        
310 Bertolt Brecht, Galileo (New York: Grove Press, 1966): 83. 
311 Wolfgang Sohlich, “The Dialectic of Mimesis and Representation in Brecht’s “Life of Galileo,” Theatre Journal 
45 (1993): 57. 
312 There is a serious gender problem herein as the few women portrayed in the play lack the ability to think outside 
of their perceived lowly positions and gendered stereotypes. 
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Pope’s feet as long as he uses them to trample on the people. God made the physical world, God 
made the human brain. God will allow physics.”313 God may be something different from the 
Church, yet God’s institutional presence is felt in ways that must be taken into account. Indeed, 
the philosophy of meeting people where there are in the moment, and acknowledging these 
contradictions, seems to be the point that we (and Galileo) are to take from this interaction. 
As so often in Brecht’s work, and as shown in the above section on Mutter Courage, we 
learn from those who do not. Galileo is a complex figure in this regard as he is one of the most 
knowing characters in Brecht’s oeuvre. Yet he’s equally as vulnerable as others in not learning, 
noteworthy given his high standing. At the beginning of Scene Seven of the play, when his 
findings have been ratified by the Papal Observatory and things seem to be turning in Galileo’s 
favour, he engages in a conversation with the Little Monk. The Little Monk, troubled by 
Galileo’s material facts which conflict with his theological texts, resolves to resign from his 
pursuit of astronomical truth. Galileo’s response, perhaps emboldened by this official validation, 
is arrogant towards the Little Monk, suggesting that Galileo can only see the Little Monk as an 
officer of the Church being loyal to its hierarchy. Galileo states “Your motives are familiar to 
me.”314 The Little Monk engages in a full-blown response, which links Galileo’s facts with the 
world with which he is most familiar: peasant life in the Campagna. Galileo, after having listened 
to the complexity of the Little Monk’s honest statement, and the genuine experience from which 
the Little Monk is being framed, realizes he has overreached in his assault against the Little 
Monk, the effect of which is to leave Galileo embarrassed.  
 Viewed without the Little Monk’s intervention, Leben des Galileo can very easily be read 
as a struggle of one man’s ideals against the powers that be. With the Little Monk’s intervention 
                                                        
313 Brecht, Galileo, 96. 
314 Brecht, Galileo, 82. 
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this reading is severely challenged, and the central problem becomes the scientist’s (broadly 
defined) arguments against the powers that be, balanced against the concrete situation of working 
people. Witness for instance the Monk’s statement that “Too often these days when I am trying to 
concentrate on tracking down the moons of Jupiter, I see my parents. I see them sitting by the fire 
with my sister, eating their curded cheese.”315 The distinction here between heaven and earth, 
between abstract struggle and the lived lives of peasants in the Campagna is not nearly as severe 
as has been presented thus far. Indeed, they are here presented as if an understanding of one is 
necessary to understanding the other. The “curded cheese” also stands in contrast to the 
wonderful meals and wine to which Galileo is accustomed, a pleasure he rates as highly as his 
research.  
In the discourse between Galileo and the peasant, the former is delivered another lesson 
by the latter. After Galileo has heard of the penury of the Little Monk’s devout parents, Galileo 
asks “where is their divine fury?”316 The Little Monk’s response that “They are old” leaves 
Galileo “beaten”, and unable to “meet the Little Monk’s eyes.”317 While the multiple forms of 
abuse that Galileo will take from those in positions of power has been the focus of almost all of 
the criticism of the play, the intellectual defeat and shame that Galileo experiences from below 
with this statement has been pointedly absent in English.318  
 The embarrassment that Galileo feels points to a key problem in Brecht, namely self-
criticism on the level of the individual, but also how intellectuals operate within Stalinist 
societies (a key problem for Azdak in particular), given the increased level of responsibility they 
                                                        
315 Brecht, Galileo, 83. 
316 Brecht, Galileo, 85. 
317 Brecht, Galileo, 85. 
318 Thus, the problem is not one simply to be placed on his shoulders. Brecht does not wish to isolate the problem but 
rather, as Darko Suvin explains, “Brecht's Life of Galileo melds in the protagonist both individualist and societal 
failure.” See Darko Suvin, “Revelation vs. Conflict: A Lesson from Nô Plays for a Comparative Dramaturgy,” 
Theatre Journal 46 (1994): 530-531. 
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carry. There is ample evidence that Galileo prides himself most on his own materiality (the 
emphasis placed on the heightened pleasure of eating chief among them). Yet wherever 
materiality runs its course it is joined by history. Two points in particular stand out here. The 
Little Monk notes on the one hand that this materiality is expressed in specifically historical 
terms. The depiction of the ceiling beams “which the smoke of centuries has blackened,” evokes 
Jameson’s clever depiction of the “Xairos of Brecht’s peasant history.”319 Also, the Little Monk’s 
father who “did not get his poor bent back all at once, but little by little, year by year, with 
unfailing regularity…” illustrates again the longue durée of the peasant. Yet the example of the 
peasant is also more largely an opportunity for learning. This is expressed especially in the case 
of Galileo’s own learning but also in terms of his teaching.  
 Despite being twice humbled by the Little Monk, Galileo ridicules him again for taking 
an interest in his new manuscript, despite the Monk’s misgivings about Galileo’s relation to the 
Church. The Little Monk pays no attention to Galileo, but coming across a difficult passage, 
states: “I don’t understand this sentence.” Galileo’s response is a practical one. “I’ll explain it to 
you, I’ll explain it to you,” he responds as they are both sitting on the floor. The symbolism of the 
basic question, the simple repeated answer and the fact that they are working together on the floor 
is telling. The problematic idea of high-mindedness that is present before, of a battle between the 
noble, great, individual and the political machine, is deconstructed and ridiculed here.320 In this 
scene the Little Monk has established the inefficacy, or even the uselessness, of knowledge that is 
                                                        
319 Jameson, Brecht and Method, 139. 
320 An attempt to examine this relation between individual and the social has been presented in Jacqueline Merriam-
Paskow’s “Brecht’s Leben des Galilei: The Modern Scientist as Voyeur,” Modern Language Studies 22 (1992): 42 – 
56. Merriam-Paskow’s contention is that rather than the historical figure of Galileo being a divided subject, 
straddling the lines between the truthfulness of his political position and the social implications of that position, the 
play is in fact a deconstruction of the idea of the rational scientist in the Western tradition. My use of the term 
deconstructed is much different than the meaning provided by Merriam-Paskow and the postmodern trajectory to 
which it is arguably indebted. 
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out of reach to those who most need it. Again, he brings Galileo back to earth. It is highly 
significant that Galileo’s single moment of non-coerced submission, that is submission free of 
physical or economic compunction, comes in the moment where is he forced to acknowledge the 
larger social importance of his actions. Sat on the floor, closest to the base elements with which 
Galileo’s study has been able to come to terms only in abstract theory, we see an inventive 
contrast between idealism and materialism. In Jameson’s discussion of Galileo he examines the 
complex materialist/idealist contradictions in the play using Hegel’s Master/Slave dialectic. He 
writes: 
 
The Master is willing to sacrifice his life for Honour (for a Recognition that will later 
include power and material privilege as a bonus and a supplement). It is this willingness 
to sacrifice his own life and living body that distinguishes him from the Slave, who is 
supremely unwilling to lose the one good he already has. The Slave is the materialist; the 
Master the idealist: materialism, then, is the ultimate unwillingness to let go of the body 
as such, no matter what the promises of reward (and those are, in any case, generally paid 
out in idealistic rhetoric and in a hollow language of honour a good deal less “materialist” 
in the long run than the Master’s feudal privileges).321 
 
This only partly fits (at least for my purposes), as it is clear from the play that the mark of 
Galileo’s famous submission is in fact that he wishes not to give up his life for his cause. Yet the 
conversation with the Monk nevertheless illustrates the central omission of the play thus far in 
that the waging of Galileo’s war is not at all sympathetic to the actual real concerns of the peasant 
class; his war is merely abstract, utopian in the sense of “no place” (note again the embarrassment 
and submission of Galileo when the Little Monk raises basic question of material circumstances). 
In this respect, the “good that the Little Monk already has” may not in fact be all that productive 
                                                        
321 Jameson, Brecht and Method, 124. 
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(the Little Monk is himself deeply conflicted, and despite his concerns about the repercussions of 
Galileo’s new book, he nevertheless “wolfs down” the text)322 but it does have an understandable 
purpose. How one learns, and how one is taught to learn will shift just as the terrain on which one 
stands moves. In this regard, as Freddie Rokem notes:  
 
Learning and pedagogy are for Brecht also a form of interaction with the world that is 
revolutionary, both in the sense of contemplating a particular phenomenon from 
constantly changing perspectives moving “around” it, but also by changing the world 
itself through revolutionary social change, which as Brecht’s Galileo also argues, is based 
on the new forms of knowledge he propagates for.323 
 
Learning must respond to the world it finds itself in. Learning conditions new thought, but it is 
limited in that it is itself shaped and determined. As Galileo notes in his mea culpa to his lifelong 
assistant Andrea in the penultimate scene, “Even a man who sells wool, however good he is at 
buying wool cheap and selling it dear, must be concerned with the standing of the wool trade.”324 
To bring a world asunder one must understand and have connections to the lived realities of the 
material world.  
 After Galileo’s recantation his many followers flee from him.325 Of the Little Monk, 
Andrea notes: “Fulganzio, our Little Monk, has abandoned research for the peace of the 
                                                        
322 Brecht, Galileo, 85.  
323 Rokem continues: In order to achieve this dual goal, not only the world as we know it, but also the activity of 
learning itself—in this case, from and through the theatre, as well as the pedagogies of studying theatre—must also 
be constantly investigated and radically critiqued and restructured.” Freddie Rokem, “The Aesthetics of Learning: 
Bertolt Brecht’s Die Ausnamhe und die Regel (The Exception and the Rule),” Theatre Topics 25 (2015): 57. This 
text also is useful in articulating novel ways in which the Brecht and Benjamin collective path began before the two 
began their friendship. 
324 Brecht, Galileo, 123. 
325 While her article is useful in examining the interrelation between ideology and scientific reason in Brecht’s play, 
Anne Moss’ analysis seems to overstate the reliance on the reasoning in Brecht, stemming from what she sees as 
Brecht’s “predilection for a utopian vision of reason as man’s unique capacity for practical intelligence, cognitive 
acuity and ideological thinking – none of which may necessarily be informed by sound judgment.” Anne Moss, 
“Limits of reason: An Exploration of Brecht’s Concept of Vernunft and the Discourse of Science in Leben des 
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Church.”326 In this sense the centrality of the Little Monk for the majority of the play, and the 
centrality of his sudden and distinct withdrawal from political life, recalls the idea of something 
missing, “etwas faellt” of Brecht’s earlier piece Der Aufstieg und Fall der Stadt Mahogonny.  The 
meaning of this loss, and the potential that it could have unlocked, is made clearer in the final 
scenes of the play. Galileo is visited by Andrea who is on his way to Holland to spread the word 
of Galileo’s works. Galileo, attempting to reflect on his part in the larger attack on science, states: 
 
As a scientist I had an almost unique opportunity. In my day astronomy emerged into the 
market place. At that particular time, had one man put up a fight, it could have had wide 
repercussions. I have come to believe that I was never in real danger; for some years I was 
as strong as the authorities, and I surrendered my knowledge to the powers that be, to use 
it, no, not use it, abuse it, as it suits their ends. I have betrayed my profession. Any man 
who does what I have done must not be tolerated in the ranks of science.327 
 
This may sound like an extreme burden to be placed on one’s shoulders, yet such a concern is not 
a new one for Brecht. And Brecht is clear on the subject. For Brecht, as I have already 
established, the idea of suffering – especially for the cause – is omnipresent. This is not always 
unproblematically formulated, for instance as in his infamous Die Massnahme. Nevertheless, 
what’s “missing” in this regard is not merely the Little Monk but the unrest which is belied by his 
return to the Church and its “peace.” Here we have a rejection of peace as an abstract category. A 
peace in the material sense does much to produce and reproduce the material destruction of the 
                                                        
Galilei” in Bertolt Brecht: Centenary Essays, Giles and Livingstone eds., 141. Such a viewpoint seems to abstract 
away from the principle of applied reason in Brecht’s work, and the usefulness Brecht locates in, as with Mutter 
Courage, learning from those who don’t learn. This also draws the line around the meanings of truth is differing 
social settings. “Truth must never be regarded as an absolute content of writing but must always be treated as a 
function of the responsible social action of individuals here and now.” Bennett, All Theatre is Revolutionary Theatre, 
62.  
326 Brecht, Galileo, 120.  
327 Brecht, Galileo, 124. 
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timeless peasant, a peasant who with Galileo has the possibility of being blown out of History’s 
continuum. The coupling of the fact that Galileo’s work “could have had wide repercussions” and 
the fact that the renunciation of politics of the Little Monk, the figure for whom these 
repercussions would be most keenly felt, are clear for Brecht.    
Yet history here is also the potential liberation of that weight of history in the sense that 
perhaps only Benjamin has been close enough to touch, a history which is truly dangerous. And 
the Little Monk is clear on this when he asks the question,  
 
 How could they take it, were I to tell them that they are on a lump of stone ceaselessly 
 spinning in empty space, circling around a second-rate star? What, then, would be the use 
 of their patience, their acceptance of misery? What comfort, then, the Holy Scriptures, 
 which have mercifully explained their crucifixion?328  
 
Something must stand in for this “missing” piece, something that will offer a way out of the 
“happy peace” of the Church’s chronology. As stated earlier, the Little Monk sits on a knife’s 
edge. The religion of “our Little Monk,” a name intended to be worthy of great compassion rather 
than condescension, is one of feeling towards working people. Working people are knowing 
subjects who are experts in their own struggle, even if they don’t always arrive at the right 
answer, just as Galileo may be the knowing subject who has the right answer, but is not an expert 
in the struggle which surrounds and consumes him. And thus falls the great man theory of 
history, and a renewed interplay of agency and structure. The emphasis on agency and division is 
central to the play, as Michael Bennett notes: 
 
                                                        
328 Brecht, Galileo, 83-4. 
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Thus, Galileo examines the point in human history where narrative and the idea of motion 
intersect: forcing the audience to be aware of conflicting narratives; forcing the audience 
to realize that their own narratives about the world are just socially and culturally 
constructed (i.e., artificial, in the broad sense, and human-made, in the more general 
sense); and forcing the audience to accept that both narratives and society is not a given 
and is not unchangeable.329  
 
For Galileo, the knowledge of science is knowledge, yes, but only of a kind. Crucially it is not 
the only form of knowledge that counts; there is also a knowledge joined to practice. Practice, its 
implications, and what confines it, will be the focus of the next section on Der Kaukasische 
Kreidekreis. 
 
 The Chalk Lines of History: Der Kaukasische Kreidekreis, Productivity and the Past  
 
 I move now from the historical investigation of Galileo to Der Kaukasische Kreidekreis 
where the transposition into the past has a more open, directly strategic, use. In some ways the 
movement here is very similar to that which came in the previous chapter on Brecht. As in Kuhle 
Wampe and Mann ist Mann, Brecht uses the trope of a play within a play. Here though there are 
two uses of this device, firstly with the story of the rescue of the child, and also in the story of the 
Judge, Azdak.330 Indeed, the principle of moving and shifting terrain structures the play, not only 
                                                        
329 Michael Y. Bennett, Narrating the Past through Theatre: Four Crucial Texts (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2013): 61. Also useful in this regard is Bennett’s argument regarding the link between the moment of the now and 
historical consciousness. He notes: “Confronting these memories not only takes us “back” into our individual and 
collective consciousness but also, importantly, simultaneously makes it “anew,” so as to alienate (to use Brecht’s 
idea that will be articulated near the end of “modern drama”) the familiar, making the “past and the strange” come 
into contact with the “near and the present”: making us encounter and question our deep-seeded individual and 
collective assumptions and memories.” Bennett, Narrating the Past through Theatre, 15. 
330 The origin of Azdak, argue Neil Brough and R. J. Kavanagh, is possibly found in a Persian religious figure called 
“Madzak”. See Neil Brough and R. J. Kavanagh, “But Who is Azdak? The Main Source of Brecht’s Der 
Kaukasische Kreidekreis,” Neophilologus 75 (1991): 573-580. This adds to the complex make-up of the play’s 
origins, and points towards Brecht’s use of various historical trajectories in the play. 
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formally (in the use of a play within a play, among others) but also with regard to content. 
Important in this sense is the connection between Grusha’s development from obliging servant to 
self-conscious actor,331 a dynamic which mirrors that of Joan in Die Heilige Johanna. Continuing 
in this vein we have similar trajectories in both Mann ist Mann and Die Kaukasische Kreidekreis, 
wherein the lead characters set out on a journey not of their choosing, forced to carry a burden 
(another identity and social role for both Galy Gay and Grusha, with the latter taking on the 
responsibility of a child to boot) before ultimately accepting and making that burden their own. 
The point here is that there are major structural links to be made between the works written 
before Brecht flees Germany and those which are written while in exile. The major distinction 
here is the specific use of history as it occurs in the later work (as opposed to the scant use of 
history in his Weimar days, as mentioned before) through which Brecht articulates his politics of 
productivity in the now. History here, both in the sense of the repressed peasant expressed above 
as well as a false/failed utopian past, is productively employed. As a correlative, in Der 
Kaukasische Kreidekreis, the possibility of building socialism is seen simultaneously as 
                                                        
331 Given the potential misunderstanding that are possible in Grusha taking the child, Brecht sought to formally 
divide the moment (and any flippant connection) involving “innate” behaviour. In this regard, a deep problem for 
Brecht was to prefigure Grusha as a product of a class divided society with its own inherent determinants. As Meg 
Mumford notes: “Not only did Brecht present Grusha’s behaviour as socially derived, but he repeatedly sought to 
avoid the presentation of her character as a fixed entity. For example, by foregrounding Grusha’s long hesitation 
before taking the abandoned child he interrupted the idea that her decision was a spontaneous impulse born of an 
eternally honourable character.” Meg Mumford, Bertolt Brecht (London: Routledge, 2009): 119. With this stated, 
however, in an important essay Iris Smith pays attention to the role of women’s sexuality in Brecht’s later works. 
She writes: “The crux of the problem is the representation of the mother's desire. In Mother Courage (1939), 
Caucasian Chalk Circle (1944-45), Good Person of Szechwan (1939-41) and The Mother (1930-31), the female 
subject is identified as an asexual mother, or as a sexual being that willingly abandons her sexuality and self-
definition for the sake of children. These characters’ social and economic positions are determined through their 
roles as mothers, and their sexual identities are correspondingly stunted. None of this can be explained by the 
flattening of dramatic character normally seen in Brecht’s epic theatre, for the sexual identities of male characters are 
not similarly foreshortened.” Iris Smith, “Brecht and the Mothers of Epic Theater,” Theatre Journal 43 (1991): 496. 
There is no doubt validity to this point, and it perhaps for this reason (and the stereotype of the “sexless” mother) that 
audiences identified so strongly with the principal characters (to Brecht’s bemusement). This said, it does need 
pointing out that Brecht’s focuses more on the social effects and problems that women (as mothers particularly) have 
to deal with as primary caregivers and providers for children and the elderly, and that their involvement in this “day-
to-day” struggle often means putting off meeting their own needs. 
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productive and utopian. Brecht’s use of peasant history makes this odd linking possible.332 The 
specific question of historical positionality in Der Kaukasische Kreidekreis is key to 
understanding the play’s political and aesthetic relevance.  
Brecht wrote the play when he felt himself very much politically irrelevant. His work in 
the United States with college and labour organizations’ productions was fraught with problems 
and often quickly abandoned, and his one other significant work during his time there – the film 
Hangmen Also Die – was both a limited and limiting production given the restrictions of working 
within the Hollywood system, even though the film itself bears many marks that make it stand 
out as something distinguishably Brechtian.333 Nevertheless, devoid of a political-aesthetic 
organization with which to work, not to mention a large group of committed cultural producers 
like himself (Eisler and Weigel being the major exceptions here), Brecht turns to the parable as a 
means of providing a productive distance to his work.334 As with his other historical works, this 
                                                        
332 While the pretext of the play is the decision making process of collectivization in the Soviet Union, there is a real 
question as to whether Brecht felt such freedom in deciding one’s future was in fact possible in Stalinist Georgia. 
While Brecht may have held a sincere hope that the economic successes of socialism would destroy the necessity or 
possibility for Stalinist type rule, he himself expressed sincere misgivings about the rule of Stalin (he referred to him 
as the “great murderer of the people” and expressed as early as 1936 the point that Leon Trotsky’s devastating 
criticisms of the Soviet Union may very well be valid). Nevertheless, it is worthy of note that the expert in the 
Prologue – the Delegate – is from Tiflis and his role is that of a Bureaucrat. Stalin was himself from Tiflis and in the 
Prologue there is a sly criticism given towards the Delegate. When, for instance, he asks for the play to be shortened 
to fit his schedule the Singer responds bluntly with “No”. For more on the critique of Stalin see T. M. Holmes, 
“Descrying the Dialectic: A Heterodox Line on the Prologue to Brecht’s Der Kaukasische Kreidekreis,” Journal of 
European Studies 7 (1977): 95-106. 
333 Among other examples, the character Professor Stephen Novotny states the Brechtian formulation “Don’t start 
from the good old times, but from the bad new ones.” Hangmen Also Die, Dir. Fritz Lang, Arnold Pressburger Films, 
1943. On the subject of the United States, J. Chris Westgate humorously notes: “If Brecht had lived long to consider 
the history of his plays on Broadway, he would have known that he made the right decision in settling in the GDR.” 
J. Chris Westgate, “Brecht on Broadway: A Dialectical History,” in Brecht, Broadway and United States Theatre, 
Westgate ed., xii.  
334 Long-time Berliner Ensemble member, Manfred Wekwerth, constructively delineates the parable as form and 
ideological content. He writes: “If the history play contributes to the construction of ideologies by encouraging 
activity on the part of the spectator, the parable makes ideology itself into its subject. It critiques ideology. It is not 
primarily concerned with discovering people or processes, but rather discovering discovery itself.” Manfred 
Wekwerth, Daring to Play: A Brecht Companion (London: Routledge, 2011): 157. Wekwerth qualifies his notion of 
Brecht’s work thus: This does not refer to the history play as a literary type, but to a mediating form in theatre.” p. 
156. “The history play is a suitable way of confronting the individual in the audience with the individual on stage. Its 
technique resides in highlighting the individual.” Wekwerth, Daring to Play, 157. And here: “Likewise, if you want 
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parable relies, however, on a distinctly different use of time than the frantic, ear-to-the-ground 
movement, of his earlier works.   
The play begins with a discussion of the future of a Georgian field that was – before the 
Nazis had taken over and subsequently expelled the local inhabitants – operated by the “Galinsk 
goat-farming commune.” The question presented to the nascent “Rosa Luxemburg fruit-growing 
commune” is how to convince those who wish to return to the pre-Nazi goat farming days that 
the land should be collectivized. The strategy that the commune devises is to invite a group of 
actors to produce a play which will make clear the notion of productive “ownership,” in the sense 
of showing how those who work together productively in common deserve their rightful ends. 
Clearly, the specific deployment of art here as a mechanism of actively engaging with material 
questions (something which was seen most directly before in Kuhle Wampe) should be 
highlighted. Yet, lacking a situation that made an organization devoted to such a politics a 
possibility (an organization like the Red Megaphone, for instance), Brecht uses history as a 
means to make an argument for the present. In order to provide an answer to the problem, 
historical representation, both via “transposition into the past” and by resurrecting the content of 
a biblical parable (although the reference given in the Prologue is that the legend “comes from 
the Chinese”335), is used to illuminate the present circumstance. As argued before, this history is 
specifically a peasant history in the general sense, a history not merely focused on exploitation of 
the land as such but of the entirety of social oppression of that time. Jameson has argued on this 
point that this vision of the peasantry represents almost an heuristic vision of historical 
                                                        
to question the present – with old or new plays – and “mercilessly” criticize it, dehistoricization in the end leads to 
the opposite – to adaptation. Because it deactivates the spectator.” Wekwerth, Daring to Play, 37-8. 
335 For an overview of the history of the Chinese versions of the Chalk Circle play see Weinwei Du’s “The Chalk 
Circle Comes Full Circle: From Yuan Drama Through the Western Stage to Peking,” Asian Theatre Journal 12 
(1995): 307-325. 
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exploitation before capitalism (and socialism). The peasantry epitomize exploitation taken to its 
most exaggerated state, without even the weak freedom of workers under capitalism. Likewise, 
the capitalist class (as opposed to the Feudal ruling elites, etc.) represent the clearest example of 
parasitic life. As Marx describes them in Volume 1 of Capital, “Capital is dead labour which, 
vampire-like, lives only by sucking living labour, and lives the more, the more labour it 
sucks.”336 This is the choice that Jameson sees Brecht making. How to represent the systems of 
exploitation most clearly involves a blending of historical periods and their particular forms of 
surplus extraction. He writes: 
 
For in the peasant works – and above all in the Chalk Circle… – peasant time is par 
excellence the time of oppression: in the great class struggle of human history as a whole, 
now defined not by the specific modes of production as such but, rather, as the 
immemorial relationship between exploiters and exploited – yet not a relationship of sheer 
power and domination only, as in the anarchist tradition, but as a very general economic 
relationship between those who produce and those who enjoy the products of that 
production – in this vision of human history, as Brecht sees it and is able to represent it, or 
perhaps as he sees himself able to represent it, peasant life is the great vehicle through 
which one is able to represent the experience of the exploited and the oppressed; while the 
life of the capitalists is the form through which one can best represent the exploiters…337 
 
What we have here is a compression of history into a compact form. By compression I mean a 
cursory summary of human history reduced to its basic (exploitative) impulses that is, once 
compressed, more easily explored (for its being therefore generalisable). And while Jameson may 
object to the Benjaminian possibilities that such a compression leaves open, there is nevertheless 
in this an historical politics which allows for a highly redemptive hermeneutic. This is not merely 
                                                        
336 Karl Marx, Capital: Volume 1 (London: Penguin, 1990): 342. 
337 Jameson, Brecht and Method, 138. 
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one of subject matter but also especially one of linguistic form and content.  Indeed, Brecht’s 
language choice in the text matches this turn towards a long view of history and the reduction of 
dialogue and emotion. Of special importance here is the reliance on the axiom in Die 
Kaukasische Kreidekreis.  
 There are numerous examples of the use of axioms throughout the text, but there is a 
particularly enlightening episode found in Scene 6 in the play, wherein the Judge Azdak and the 
Ironshirt Simon debate the fate of Grusha. In this debate (or perhaps “challenges” may be the 
more accurate term) the two exchange the following salvos: 
 
Simon loudly: “When the horse was shod, the horsefly stretched out its leg”, as the saying 
is. 
Azdak eagerly accepting the challenge: “Better a treasure in the sewer than a stone in the 
mountain stream.” 
Simon: “A fine day. Let’s go fishing,” said the angler to the worm. 
Azdak: “I’m my own master,” said the servant, and cut off his foot. 
Simon: “I love you like a father,” said the Czar to the peasant, and had the Czarevitch’s 
head chopped off.338 
 
The purpose of this exchange is to reproduce the play’s key notion of suffering – of having 
injustice from above meted out to those below, as well as emphasizing the parasitical nature of 
those who live off of those who labor – to the level of aesthetic representation.339 These 
                                                        
338 Bertolt Brecht, The Caucasian Chalk Circle (London: Methuen, 1988), 91. 
339 Yet this basic anti-oppression politics is at times lost on some important readers, including Jean Genet. A 
particularly shocking “understanding” of Brecht’s play is delivered in Carl Lavery’s essay on Jean Genet and 
commitment. In this piece, Lavery shows how Genet took Brecht’s argument about productivity (the land “belongs 
to those who are good for it”) and twisted it to produce its opposite intent and theory, while then suggesting that this 
is Brecht’s position. Lavery notes that Genet “…uses Brecht’s commitment to Marxist ideals of progress to justify 
colonial violence. This is an apt demonstration of Genet’s point about ideology, for it shows that Marxist ideology 
does not interrupt bourgeois oppression; rather, it repackages that suffering under a different name.” See Carl 
Lavery, “Between Negativity and Resistance: Jean Genet and Committed Theatre,” Contemporary Theatre Review 
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exchanges excel in their purpose of historical reduction, yet they are by no means the only such 
devices found in the play. Another missive in this vein is found in the following insertion from 
the “Singer”:  
 
When the houses of the great collapse 
Many little people are slain 
Those who had no share in the fortunes of the mighty 
Often have a share in their misfortunes. The plunging wain 
Drags the sweating beasts with it into the abyss.340 
 
These axioms, while not only summing up the key problems of the play, direct it irrevocably. The 
axiom as strategy in the play is symptomatic of a type of gestus which seeks to link historical 
forms of oppression and an impulse of reconstruction of the recognition of this former “attitude” 
for the present. Sean Carney has expanded on this double movement in the following passage 
from his Brecht and Critical Theory. He writes: 
 
The most important thing to draw from Brecht’s play, then, is the attitude that it displays, 
which Brecht also calls a kind of wisdom that is performed or staged for us. It seems 
important here to distinguish between the form of wisdom, and the content of wisdom. 
Brecht, for his part, is concerned only with the former, the posture of wisdom, wisdom as 
an action. The form of this wisdom is dialectical and historical. As the storyteller himself 
says, “It may be mistaken to mix different wines, but old and new wisdom mix very well” 
(148). The message of The Caucasian Chalk Circle is found in the “mixing” of old and 
new wisdom, and what matters is not the moral of Grusha’s tale, but that we perceive the 
                                                        
16 (2006): 226. To reiterate, Brechtian reception is at times subject to seemingly willful misrepresentation, and one 
must be clear in these examples of the limitations of it as such. 
340 Brecht, Caucasian Chalk Circle, 13. 
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dialectical relationship between past wisdom – the traditional Chinese tale and its biblical 
counterpart – and present wisdom, namely Marxist reconstruction and innovation.341 
 
Carney’s contribution here is valuable, not least for the emphasis on historical understanding and 
its implication in contemporary situations. What I find less convincing in Carney’s argument is 
the latter half of the formulation – “present wisdom” and “Marxist reconstruction and 
innovation.” I argue that history and its relations to the present cannot be read merely via a 
simple philosophical procedure, staging an ancient legend as a means to smuggle in Marx. In 
fact, this relation structures the text in a far more dramatic and immediate way than Carney 
allows. The fact that the most vicious group of the play – the “Panzerreiter” in Brecht’s original 
but often suggestively translated as the the “Ironshirts” (an obvious reference to the Brownshirts 
of Hitler’s Germany) are modelled on the Gestapo, thus making the link with historical forms of 
oppressive governments and those that were for Europe at the time a pressing concern – is one of 
many examples of the “directness” that is key to Brecht’s works. Yet perhaps the most important 
point here is that the introduction of the “mixing of old and new wisdom” is worth little if it is not 
ultimately joined with an attitude of action in the present, essentially a principle of judgment. 
 Grusha’s tale is, mirroring the reduced history of exploitation of which she is part, a harsh 
one. She is bullied and cajoled at almost every point in the play, the reason being that in a way 
like Galy Gay before her, she is a far too willing and perhaps naïve soul who often takes those 
she comes across as equally well-meaning, hard-working and altruistic, and thus is seemingly 
                                                        
341 Carney continues; “As a dialectical, eminently Benjaminian storyteller, the singer is the emblem of the play itself, 
for he produces something new through his transmission of the old. Past wisdom, decayed and historicized, is 
produced in the present in the form of a new historical attitude.” See Sean Carney, Brecht and Critical Theory: 
Dialectics and Contemporary Aesthetics (London: Routledge, 2005): 56. Yet this learning always takes place in a 
social setting. As Markus Wessendorf writes: ““Brecht the dramatist prefers to put his characters into social 
situations in which they are compelled to produce attitudes and gestures that reveal who they are as social beings, for 
example when standing trial, conducting a business transaction, reporting a traffic accident, going on strike, or 
teaching a lesson.”  Markus Wessendorf, “Brecht’s Materialist Ethics Between Confucianism and Mohism,” 
Philosophy East and West 66 (2016): 123.  
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unable to say no. While on her travels smuggling the child across borders, her situation is 
constantly compromised and she often is subjected to various forms of indignity. Despite all the 
personal sacrifices she has made, when Grusha is called to bring her rescued child forth to its 
biological mother, she bucks this demand, and with it her own history (and the compressed 
history of exploitation), and declares the child rightfully hers. At this impasse Brecht resolves this 
situation by opting for a trial to be led by the woefully corrupt and imperfect Azdak.342   
The move towards a moment of judgment is vital in this historical recovery if it is to be 
meaningful at all. Yet the material conditions of this judgment are highly questionable, as Grusha 
would normally simply be dismissed or killed for her “impudence.” What makes this moment of 
judgment possible is the fact that Advak believes History has been arrested, and that the peasants 
have taken over and restoratative judgment can be highly productive. We must remind ourselves 
that this is a parable, and we are liberated from sticking to the official line. For this brief utopian 
moment, a space has been carved out on stage (albeit in chalk, impermanent), and we are able to 
discern that by learning to judge historically, we can effectively judge in the now, albeit with 
different weapons. Good judgment relies on having good justices in positions of authority, aiding 
those who contribute.343 As Darko Suvin notes:  
 
In fact, this is an aesthetic correlative to a salvational perspective in which history has no 
 end, so that the kolkhoz story is simply a presently possible society in which Azdak’s 
                                                        
342 Marc Silberman has noted of Azdak that he is: “the judge despite himself who knows how to exploit the disorder 
of a revolution when it is opportune but never takes a risk otherwise. Such figures do not represent class positions but 
rather move between them, and hence they are able to undermine both class solidarity and social hierarchies.” 
Silberman, “Bertolt Brecht, Politics, and Comedy,” 178. 
343 This is also notable in “The Democratic Judge,” a poem that Brecht composes around the same time as The Chalk 
Circle. Brecht’s judge rewards the sincerity and hard work of an Italian innkeeper by manipulating immigration law 
in his favour. See Willett and Mannheim, Collected Poems, 385. 
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 exceptional drawing of a chalk circle has become the normative or dominant use of 
 pencils instead of pistols.344  
 
Yet in order for this to happen we must first have the example par excellence of Grusha and of 
the historical figuration of the time of the peasantry which she embodies as the framework or 
backdrop of historical, class, memory. This moment of “making succinct” that which seems 
endless is an attempt towards a productive use of history. As Brecht notes, “…the kolkhoz story 
assigns a historical localization.”345 This localization is that which Grusha and Azdak offer but 
should not be confused with the form of localization that takes place in a specific moment in the 
play, where a concrete historical situation is analysed. Because the play is in itself a mode for 
learning (it supposedly has a specific motive – to convince the peasants to collective the farm), 
the play necessitates a singular focal point in history (which is also able to articulate a moment 
outside of itself) and requires that history itself offer up an “exemplary ‘case’ calling for 
judgment.”346 This notion of judgment of the exemplary case (which Jameson notes follows from 
Andre Jolles’s notion of casus347) allows Brecht to make history more malleable and 
generalizable, a double yet linked procedure in which the past is made plastic and therefore 
accessible, so that which needs to be made strange – the present forms of exploitation and 
oppression – can be made that much more visible. 
Yet we must warn ourselves not to reduce the problematics laid out above to merely a 
formulaic games playing wherein the mystery to Brecht’s genius is, at once, revealed and easily 
duplicated or, on the flip side, tossed away as mechanistic (the latter of the two is much more 
common). Instead, the chief conjunctural tensions of the day need to be connected more fruitfully 
                                                        
344 Suvin, To Brecht and Beyond, 179 
345 Bertolt Brecht in Suvin, To Brecht and Beyond, 179. 
346 Jameson, Brecht and Method, 28. 
347 Jameson, Brecht and Method, 28. 
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with those which have historically determined the individual moment. This is a philosophical 
question for Brecht, which reasserts the principle of usefulness in the present moment. Jameson 
writes: 
 
Brechtian storytelling, looked at in this way, is indeed informed by something like a 
“method”, but one which is rigorously non-formulistic, and thereby evades the 
philosophical objection to sheer method as such which have been outlined above. Casus, 
in other words, must be shown to be a form with genuine content, not merely an abstract 
frame into which narrative content of all kinds can be neatly arranged and subsumed.348  
 
If we follow Jameson, this moment of judgment suggests a philosophical trajectory of judgment 
in Brecht, but the judgment tends towards never being fixed. This draws out the metaphor of the 
chalk circle as an heuristic tool that makes judgment possible. A chalk circle is easily rubbed 
away. It is not meant to be a permanent fixture but rather a sketch which will require rewriting as 
in a liberated classroom where teachers and students work together to produce knowledge for 
themselves, or as in the case of Brecht’s work, where the ensemble creates meaning firstly for 
itself, and then more broadly. The result is an internal education that is as important as that made 
for others. The chalk circle is that possibility, an outlining of something that may be theoretically 
possible, (theoretically possible and demonstrable in the confines of a play) but is as yet 
unattainable on the level of the social. In this sense Brecht leaves his most furtive and speculative 
moments for the future.349 The moment of judgment can, at least for now, be merely a suggestion 
                                                        
348 Jameson, Brecht and Method, 28. 
349 Further to this point, where we are left at the end of the play is not resolved, given the play within a play 
movements that come at the beginning. As Caroline Rupprecht points out, “…since the play does not return to the 
action of the prologue but rather ends with the play-within-the-play, we do not see their reaction. What we are left 
with is a happy ending, and at the same time, an open ending, since Brecht never closes the “frame” established in 
the prologue.” What this means is that “Brecht works with two competing versions of reality to show the discrepancy 
between what is and what might be.” See Caroline Rupprecht, “Post-war Iconographies: Wandering Women in 
Brecht, Duras, Kluge,” South Central Review 23 (2006): 39. 
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based on a type of guidance as laid out by Mayakovski: “The home of the soviet people shall also 
be the home of Reason.”350 
As decision making of the sort in the Prologue of the play did not take place in the Soviet 
Union,351 one may read this as an implicit critique of that Stalinist system, at least as referenced 
above. Nevertheless, what is clear is that Azdak’s final judgment of use over ownership is a 
utopian one, but one solely assigned not to this world but to the next, and hopefully to the next 
generation, as the child hints towards a future world and its potential for an alternate 
material/social existence. His request that the estates of the rich shall be made into a playground 
                                                        
350 Brecht, Caucasian Chalk Circle, 6. It may have hoped to be the home of reason, but also, in Brecht’s text, there’s 
an attempt to rescue this project. As R. Darren Gobert notes, “The framed story of the chalk circle test, [Brecht] 
claims, demonstrates for the kolkhozes not a just verdict but “a certain kind of wisdom” – “an attitude” that might 
help produce a verdict in the still-undecided argument over the valley’s ownership.” R. Darren Gobert, “Cognitive 
Catharsis in The Caucasian Chalk Circle,” Modern Drama 49 (2006): 21. This emphasis on a critical attitude, 
something that is just as fundamental to Brecht’s theatre as his later theatre, is fulfilled by an estrangement into (and 
by) history for Brecht. Yet while this “attitude” relies heavily on a reasoning subject (and not a “consuming object” 
of culture) this need not eschew the use of emotion.  
351 Part of the problem in this line of work is that Brecht, particularly Brecht after he departs the United States after 
1947, is caught very much caught between the two dominant spheres of his age. Despite this positioning remains the 
fundamental productive nature of Brecht’s works specifically as it relates to the activation of the audience in making 
sense and fulfilling his own Brechtian project. Often Brecht’s note that he simply “made suggestions” gets 
overlooked, or perhaps it is not given the importance that it requires. For Brecht, according to the logic of his own 
project, could only but make suggestions. Ultimately, that was the self-set limit of the project. Brecht’s project is one 
that must always be fulfilled in practice, and practice has no template. For this reason, both political and aesthetic, 
Brecht was wary of Stalinist orthodoxy (and not only how it applied itself to the arts) and fought to encourage 
openness and debate (also, the choice to name the Rosa Luxemburg fruit-growing commune as such seems to be 
suggesting that Brecht was siding with that particular revolutionary instead of many other Soviet rulers after whom 
the commune could be named). It is for this reason why Brecht added the vital introduction to the Kaukasische 
Kreidekreis, in order to make clear the open, productive politics that the play ultimately suggests. Loren Kruger 
recognizes this deep connection between politics and aesthetics in the following passage: “It is this particular 
experience of defending pluralist socialism against a monolithic socialist party at the historical moment of post-
imperialism, rather than a generalized Marxist attitude, that enabled Brecht to refine the theoretical as well as the 
political point of his key terms, estrangement and realism, and their critical relation, and to argue convincingly that 
estrangement was under the circumstances the most realistic method.” Loren Kruger, Post-Imperial Brecht: Politics 
and Performance, East and South (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004): 16. Yet this open political 
aesthetics is often lost on contemporary readers. Some strangely have read Brecht as a pure propagandist for a 
Stalinist politics. The revolutions of 1989 have therefore made these later works that I’ve dealt with in this Chapter 
“in the canons of modern dramatic literature a conspicuous anachronism.” See Tony Calabro, Bertolt Brecht’s Art of 
Dissemblance (Wakefield, New Hampshire: Longwood Academic, 1990): xiii. Calabro’s text is motivated by a 
reaction against the political trajectory of Brecht (as much of Brecht is equivalent to Stalinism, the failure of 
Stalinism means the necessary failure of Brecht). For a good (and often seething – perhaps necessarily so) analysis of 
the (mis)interpretations of Brecht’s works by American critics see Westgate ed., Brecht, Broadway and United States 
Theatre. 
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for the children of tomorrow – to be named “The Garden of Azdak” – is humourous yet draws us 
furthertowards the reality that this parable needs finishing by those in the position of actually 
making history in the now. The principle of usefulness is still to be resolved. The time of the now 
is still the question, yet at this point the question is addressed through the prism of historical 
chalk lines. 
 
Concluding the Historical Brecht 
 
What I have attempted to argue in Chapters 2 and 4 is that there is a dominant motif 
running through Brecht’s work, beginning from earlier pieces such as Mann ist Mann and 
continuing into plays such as Mutter Courage und ihre Kinder.352 This motif, that the 
oppositional text must be as attuned as possible to the demands of the present, and that this 
requires both a commitment to experimentation and revision, is focused on making the audience 
as active a critic of Brecht’s arguments as possible. Far from diverting from this path, Brecht’s 
move into historical settings and formal strategies is a continuation of his earlier work, and marks 
a continuation of a fundamentally productive aesthetic. A key aspect in this chapter has been to 
show how the suffering of the peasant (and especially the time of peasant suffering) was utilized 
by Brecht as a means to make a political aesthetic argument for the present, chiefly here about the 
importance of learning from those that do not. In this regard, much of this chapter has focused on 
the way in which this suffering has come about and played out in the lives of the chief characters 
discussed herein. We have the Little Monk (and his absent family) and the disillusionment that 
                                                        
352 My argument stands in contrast to that of James Lyon who argues that there were “almost as many Brechts as 
there were people who knew him.” James Lyon, Bertolt Brecht in America (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University 
Press, 1980): 205. This is a problem in Brecht scholarship that attempts to resurrect aspects of Brecht “for today,” 
but to varying degrees offer little in an overall understanding of Brecht. 
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comes from Galileo’s retreat, Grusha’s self-sacrifice in keeping the small child alive, and Mother 
Courage’s lifelong struggle to maintain her family, and more importantly, her business. Yet 
through this depiction of struggle we are invited not to be a mere recipient of their stories. Rather, 
the question of political decision, a question that we will see again in Blake’s texts, is a constant 
in Brecht’s understanding of his position as a cultural producer in the now and this was carried 
forward from before his exile. Benjamin explores the question of political decision, and its 
importance in Brechtian oppositional culture, by critiquing dominant literary trends found in 
Brecht’s contemporaries: 
 
I have spoken of the way in which certain modish photographers proceed in order to make 
 human misery an object of consumption. Turning to the New Objectivity as a literary 
 movement, I must go a step further and say that it has turned the struggle against misery 
 into an object of consumption. In many cases, indeed, its political significance has been 
 limited to converting revolutionary reflexes in so far as these occurred within the 
 bourgeoisie, into themes of entertainment and amusement which can be fitted without 
 much difficulty into the cabaret life of a large city. The characteristic feature of this 
 literature is the way it transforms political struggle so that it ceases to be a compelling 
 motive for decision and becomes an object of comfortable contemplation; it ceases to be a 
 means of production and becomes an article of consumption.353  
 
There is a connection which Benjamin makes here between the political significance of a work of 
art and the way in which that work is received. This link was understood by Brecht, and Brecht’s 
historical turn aided this purpose.  
 An integral aspect of this turn rejects fundamentally a fidelity to history, that is, an 
adherence to the process of analyzing a moment of history, as Benjamin notes, “how it really 
                                                        
353 Benjamin, Understanding Brecht, 96-97. 
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was.” Instead, Brecht follows Benjamin. Benjamin notes in his On the Concept of History that 
“To articulate the past….means to take control of a memory, as it flashes in a moment of danger. 
For historical materialism it is a question of holding fast a picture of the past, just as if it had 
unexpectedly thrust itself, in a moment of danger, on the historical subject.”354  
It is notable that in each of the plays dealt with, a dominant theme of danger occupies 
them all. Mother Courage is constantly in fear of her life, her family and her capital. Grusha 
rescues the child as the castle she works in is being sacked, and afterwards she continues to move 
with the child, even though death seems always around the corner. And finally Galileo, despite 
his status, has his life threatened by the brutality of the Inquisition, to whose power he ultimately 
bends. In this way Brecht’s history plays, stitched together, bear a striking resemblance to 
Benjamin’s reception of Paul Klee’s Angelus Novus.355  
In the central metaphor that Benjamin takes from Klee’s painting, we see a reduction of 
history as well. The Angel of History, while gazing towards the past, is propelled forward by the 
storms from Paradise and in so doing witnesses that “the pile of debris grows skyward.”356 To 
acknowledge this process sets the historical materialist apart from the rest, states Benjamin. To 
not do so, to not set one apart from the story of history “as it really was,” leads to empathy for the 
historical victor. This has repercussions for the contemporary moment. As Benjamin notes, “…if 
one asks with whom the adherents of historicism actually empathize the answer is inevitable: 
                                                        
354 Benjamin, Illuminations, 255. 
355 Brecht himself suggested that Theses on the Philosophy of History had been written after Benjamin read a 
fragment of his “Caeser” project. Although Wizisla suggests that this was unlikely as Benjamin had been thinking 
about the same issues for “some twenty years”, he further suggests that Brecht has most likely thinking about the 
proximity of the ideas to each other and “probably did not mean his statement quite so literally.” That being said 
there are striking resemblances between the texts. Wizisla notes that “…the correspondence in intention and concept 
between Die Geschaeften des Herrn Julius Caesar (“The Business Affairs of Mr. Julius Caesar”) and the theses….is 
by no means accidental. Brecht’s sentence, ‘The triumph of the commanders were triumphs over the people’, is 
reminiscent of the ‘triumphal procession’ of the rulers.” Wizisla, Walter Benjamin and Bertolt Brecht, 176-7. Paul 
Haake has also covered these matters here: For connections between Benjamin and Brecht on the philosophy of 
history read: Paul Haacke, “The Brechtian Exception: From Weimar to the Cold War,” diacritics 40 (2012): 65-6.  
356 Benjamin, Illuminations, 258. 
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with the victor. And all rulers are the heirs of those who conquered before them. Hence, empathy 
with the victor invariably benefits the rulers.”357 Thus, the historical materialist must 
acknowledge of history and making use of it in the moment of the now, “The awareness that they 
are about to make the continuum of history explode is characteristic if the revolutionary classes at 
the moment of their action.”358 Yet just as history in Brecht necessitates a contraction, a process 
of making more finite the seemingly infinite history of catastrophe, so the moment of the now 
contains an exaggeration, an exploration of the present that demands experimentation. In this 
regard the compression of history is not a failure of Brecht’s (the inability to fully understand 
accurate historical terms with a specific period) but rather the strength of an aesthetic project that 
works to aim for precision in the moment of the now. History offers for Brecht a means to depict 
the present conjuncture more clearly, and thus to reach back into the past to salvage something 
for the time of the now. As McNally notes, “Rather than something laid down once and for all, 
the past is a site of struggle in the present.”359 By seemingly moving away from his own time, 
Brecht is actually, as I’ve tried to argue throughout this chapter, making himself productive in the 
present.  
                                                        
357 Benjamin, Illuminations, 256. 
358 Benjamin, Illuminations, 261. 
359 McNally, Bodies of Meaning, 191. 
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Chapter 5: Blake, Milton, and Historical Redemption 
 
 In this, the final chapter, I will be drawing on many of the central ideas and authors of the 
previous ones, particularly Walter Benjamin, Michael Löwy and E.P. Thompson. I will be 
arguing that the alternative understanding and usages of history as seen in Brecht (in Chapter 4) 
and Benjamin are also to be found in Blake’s epic poem Milton.360 I will argue that Blake’s return 
to history is geared towards offering something in the present. The present more broadly, but 
definitely Blake’s present specifically, is engulfed by a failure, a failure which keeps being 
repeated. This failure is in constant danger of repeating itself anew (and is doing so) in every step 
of repeating the past’s failures. In this sense, history is viewed as something not only that we can 
learn from, but also in some form as a means of access for creating a redemptive hermeneutic 
moment in the present.  
 Unlike in Brecht, where the historical setting of his plays acts as a backdrop to illuminate 
the present, for Blake, history and/or the backward reference and inspiration, is mobilized to 
access something that the present is unable to access as the organizational patterns of society 
(capital, exploitation, a life [understood as the realm of possibility] destroying and quantifying 
rationalism, manacles on the mind, the tradition of Newton) section off humanity from its 
potential. In this sense, whereas for Brecht history was mobilized to more deeply access the 
present, Blake looked to history to fill in for that which was absent in his own world. Despite this 
different stress in each of their uses of history, a key aspect in common for Brecht and Blake is 
the way we are not dealing with “history as it really was” and the way that both saw in their 
                                                        
360 Few historical writers stand as high for Blake, as Jackie DiSalvo notes: “Blake’s poetry is scarcely 
comprehensible outside its Miltonic context.” Jackie DiSalvo, War of the Titans: Blake’s Critique of Milton and the 
Politics of Religion (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1983): 5.  
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presents the lack of sufficient energies to enrich and produce a comprehensive oppositional 
aesthetics. In the move towards history, both Blake and Brecht disregard a realist, naturalistic 
fidelity to the past.  
 While in this chapter I will also be investigating the way in which Blake uses and 
develops a conception of history in Milton, I will also be drawing on E. P. Thompson’s work on 
the historical legacy in which Blake’s work is framed. It should be noted that Thompson wrote 
relatively little on Milton in his text on Blake, and for that reason I will be attempting to apply his 
important insights to Blake’s later work. My purpose in this is not to be overly exegetical in 
trying to parse out how all characters relate to his earlier works, a field that is very well tilled, but 
rather to explore how Milton is structured as a text of redemption. This redemption does not seek 
to make peace with historical events, but rather to negotiate with these specifically unresolved 
tensions for contemporary purposes.361 In what follows I will not be restating the complex 
mythology of Blake’s poem as multitudes of Blake scholars have already sketched this out 
(sometimes producing internecine fallout); I will be focusing rather on the importance of previous 
historical moments and artists for Blake’s conception of history. Important here will be dealing 
with the question of labour in Blake’s text, particularly the notion of a redemptive vision of 
labour – a labour that redeems the past and makes possible a future beyond its own conceptions 
of labour itself – which has often been lost from academic view (essentially a self-annihilating 
                                                        
361 Saree Makdisi has argued in a different context on Blake’s strategy of drawing on historical traditions for his own 
ends. Makdisi’s thesis articulates the same thrust as is being attempted here. He writes: “What I want to propose is 
that through this investigation of Blake’s anti-imperialism we will discover how he found a way to draw on and 
reformulate certain premodern traditions in order to produce a critique for his own time – rather than as a quasi-
reactionary attempt to return to some lost original fullness – both of the ancien regime and of the bourgeois 
radicalism which attacked it; a way to refuse the logic of the State and of the discourse of sovereign power itself in 
the name of what he would call “Immortal Joy.”” See Saree Makdisi, “Immortal Joy”, 20-21. 
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project, given how vital the importance of his own material labour [conceived as such] was to his 
way of analyzing and producing his reality). 
 
Blake Contra Newton 
 
 To begin the discussion of Blake’s use of history, historical figures and the Bible I should 
at first respond to and disabuse a reader from the notion that Blake is a solitary figure, operating 
outside of his social or political spheres, a hermit-like figure creating mystical interpretations of 
scripture.362 Although this has not been argued as such, Blake’s usage of the Bible cannot be read 
merely as metaphorical. Rather, it seems appropriate to describe Blake’s reading and faith in the 
Bible as itself a radical one, a reading whose logical conclusions extend beyond the mere text 
itself. The text, whether historical or contemporary, is very much a living one for Blake. For this 
reason I think we should take seriously Blake’s criticisms of Newton who, beside Milton, is the 
historical figure with whom Blake concerns himself most. Donald Ault, in his analysis of Blake’s 
dialogue with Newton, notes that despite his death in 1727, “Newton’s centuries of triumph were 
the eighteenth and (in a fuzzier way) the nineteenth.”363 The figure of Newton as he appears in 
these “centuries of triumph” may in fact be quite dissimilar from his biographical record, but it is 
the figure of Newton and all that figure stands for that looms large for Blake. It is this 
triumphalist figure (and defining what exactly he is a figure of triumph of) whom Blake engages.  
                                                        
362 While Ian Balfour in his own text on “Milton” notes that there is a long tradition behind this notion, he argues that 
later generations find it easier to understand Blake due to “the greater availability and circulation of his texts, and the 
critical and scholarly efforts of a large community of readers who have elucidated literary and historical contexts 
framing Blake’s works.” See Ian Balfour, Rhetoric of Romantic Prophecy, 128. 
363 Donald Ault, Visionary Physics: Blake’s Response to Newton (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975): XII. 
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 As discussed in Chapter 3, in Löwy and Sayre’s analysis the criticism of the 
Enlightenment is not principally about rationalism in and of itself, but about a particular type of 
mechanical rationalism, on the one hand, and a rationalist abstraction, on the other. Attempts to 
cast Blake as anti-rationalist are thus wide of the mark. His seemingly exhaustive critique of 
rationality is a qualified one. In Blake’s constellation, the figure of the rational intellect, Urizen, 
is criticized not tout court, but only because he is out of balance with the other Zoas.364 The 
problem of Newtonian-infused Urizen is that he becomes over-extended and, therefore, out of 
proportion with his world.365 Without being checked, rationalism in Blake’s cosmology produces 
a self-generating process of accumulation of other ideas, so much so that it begins to impose its 
worldview onto all it surveys. And this brings us much closer as to what Newton represents for 
Blake. Nicholas Williams notes that: “Newton provides for Blake an oppressive model of self-
motion, or rather an evacuation of self-motion in favour of an anatomizating view of the body as 
a collection of mechanically interactive parts.”366 When Newton, coursing through the Urizenic 
world, operates out of proportion, or when Urizen becomes too powerful in itself, the effect is the 
creation of “Newtonian Voids between the Substances of Creation.”367 These voids are 
effectively moments which block the ability of the artist to create as they attempt to initiate a 
worldview which would depict the creative process as irrelevant. Blake’s worry, echoed in Ault’s 
                                                        
364 Noting the effect of Urizen being so out of balance, Peter Otto explains that “…the end result of Urizen’s activity, 
is to create a world of self-enclosed globes that outlaw all difference.” Peter Otto, Blake’s Critique of 
Transcendence: Love, Jealousy and the Sublime in “The Four Zoas” (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000): 267. 
While this text is heavily reliant on Derridian deconstruction, and thus difference signifies more to Otto than it would 
to Thompson or Erdman, in its usage above, depicting Urizenic methodology as blocking off other possibilities, there 
would most likely be little disagreement. 
365 Urizen’s consuming ways even goes so far as colonizing religion. “Blake’s argument to the Established Church 
asserts that rationalistic moralism that governs atonement as they conceive it is the very thing that cannot possibly 
achieve it. If this is so even according to its own rules how much more does it fall short of accomplishing the kind of 
atonement that Blake envisions. A salvation obtained through mercy and forgiveness is wholly beyond the 
recognition of the satanic Urizen governing the Church.” Jennifer G. Jesse, William Blake’s Religious Vision: 
There’s a Methodism in His Madness (New York: Lexington, 2013): 122. 
366 See Nicholas Williams, “Blake Dead or Alive,” 492. 
367 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 138.  
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statement above, is that Newton as spirit becomes more than itself, it becomes Newtonian, and 
thus a movement springs up which aspires to something greater than it can contain in itself, and 
greater than even Blake himself can contain in his own poetry. The danger consists less in 
Newton as historical figure and more in Newton as “world-spirit,” an abstracting force whose 
distorted products become “irrational” in that they are “invisible to the Vegetable Man.”368 
Newton is opposed to that which is living, and his creations more generally disguise from 
humanity its creative potentialities rather than open up possibilities for creation, and for Blake 
specifically artistic creation which is inspired by the force of God’s power. Indeed, Newton takes 
the potential of God’s power and inverts it. In this sense the problem is that, as Balfour notes, 
“Newton is systematically reviled in Blake’s work as a proponent of mathematical reason, one 
who views God as the overseer of a machinelike universe devoid of living form.”369 The absence 
of living form should ring alarm bells, for as I argued in Chapter 2, the eschewing of human 
“living form” denotes for Blake a fundamental rejection of the divine image in which it exists. As 
the Newtonian worldview begins to colonize to an ever greater extent, Newtonian motion will 
become its opposite, seeing itself to its own rational and fully definable end.370 In Blake’s 
mythology, the figure of Newton is not only in and of itself devoid of living form, it must also 
become (through its own logic) an instantiation of the “absurd.” The absurd not in the sense of 
unusual but rather abhorrent in its destructiveness. In Plate 40 of Milton Blake pronounces: 
 
                                                        
368 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 138. 
369 Balfour, Rhetoric of Romantic Prophecy, 142. 
370 As in Blake’s “Holy Thursday,” there is an open question as to whether the establishment that Blake’s skewers 
saw themselves in the evil with which they, perhaps unbeknownst, preached. As Florence Sandler usefully notes, 
these rulers “…were likely to wear the mask of bland civility and present their ideology as benevolence. They might 
even believe themselves to be benevolent and their Age of Opacity to be Enlightenment, like Satan in the Bard’s 
Tale in Milton, whose demonic nature is not perspicuous even to himself.” See Florence Sandler, “‘Defending the 
Bible’: Blake, Paine, and the Bishop,” in Blake and His Bibles, edited by David V. Erdman (West Cornwall, CT: 
Locust Hill Press, 1990): 44. 
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In Self annihilation giving thy life to thy enemies 
Are those who contemn Religion & seek to annihilate it  
Become in their Femin[in]e portions the causes & promoters  
Of these Religions, how is this thing? this Newtonian Phantasm  
This Voltaire & Rousseau: this Hume & Gibbon & Bolingbroke  
This Natural Religion! this impossible absurdity  
Is Ololon the cause of this? O where shall I hide my face  
These tears fall for the little-ones: the Children of Jerusalem  
Lest they be annihilated in thy annihilation.371 
 
There is a suggsestion in the above that for Blake Newton’s “Phantasm” is an “annihilating” one 
which seeks to take over fully and extinguish the power of a strong messianic spirit. Annihilation 
is not solely a negative qualifier for Blake, and it is in part a necessary force that one must accept. 
That is, as any being will be in and of itself fallible, one must be open to self-criticism which will 
require one’s Self-annihilation. And this is in part why Blake has summoned Milton in the first 
place. Leonard W. Deen sketches this out nicely: 
 
In The Four Zoas, the true poet ceases to belong to the Devil’s party. In Milton, he comes 
into full understanding. Milton becomes a true poet because he sees his error, which is his 
own distortions of vision and their effect on the religion that prevails in England. Inspired 
by a Bard’s Song in which Los is divided in a family quarrel that issues in the warring 
nations of the fallen world, Milton descends from heaven to earth, annihilates his 
Selfhood by overcoming Urizen-Satan, and redeems his Emanation, Ololon. …In Milton, 
then, a figure of identity is divided and falls as Los. As Milton, he is integrated with 
Blake, wrestles with his Spectre-Selfhood, and is reunited with his Emanation. Each of 
these events creates its appropriate human-centred world, fallen or redeemed.372 
                                                        
371 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 142. 
372 Leonard W. Deen, Conversing in Paradise: Poetic Genius and Identity-as-Community in Blake’s Los (Columbia: 
University of Missouri Press, 1983): 166-7. This humanizing of the world also extends itself to engulfing “natural 
processes” as well. “In Milton, Blake substitutes an organic model of the city for the model constructed through labor 
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And this is precisely the problem for Milton. If Milton’s errors and their effects carry on, not 
merely in his purgatory, mulling over his mistakes, but in part because of the specific residual 
effects that his errors produce in those who follow in his tradition, he must be absolved for those 
in the present. Errors compound themselves, and the dangers they breed are omni-present.373 
These dangers never end, and self-criticism, even of those so important to Blake as Milton must 
come under sustained focus. And this unlocks a democratic model of criticism, for if such a 
monumental figure as Milton inspires and requires a fundamental critical reading, so to must 
readers of Milton draw critical attention to Blake.374 Yet Blake’s criticism of Milton is different in 
tenor to that of Newton. Milton is among the cherished, and as Christopher Warley explains: 
“Milton is a champion of the anonymous, but he never forgets that champions are always those 
with a name.”375 While there are disagreements as to what exactly Blake wishes to redeem in 
Milton,376 it should be clear that Newton and Urizenic inspired forces are another entity 
altogether and redemption for them is debatable.  
                                                        
in The Four Zoas. Conversely, however, Milton describes organic creations as works of art, thus further undermining 
the dichotomy between “nature” and “art” or “civilization.” …“The result is to humanize both nature and the city, so 
that the entire visible world becomes a product of human art, and the city becomes the body in which that art 
develops.” Michael, Blake and the City, 116.  
373 As John H. Jones intelligently explains in his text, “Yet, self-annihilation in Milton is not without risk and comes 
only after great difficulty. As Milton enters self-annihilation, he and the other Sons of Albion view his change as 
going to “Eternal Death.” Since self-annihilation involves such a radical interchange between addresser and 
addressee to allow for the transcendence of the finite boundaries of Selfhood through dialogue, it implies a 
dissolution of identity that those in Selfhood see as death or worse.” Jones, Blake on Language, Power, and Self-
Annihilation, 137. 
374 William Richey argues that Blake himself was implicated in his criticisms. “For Blake, the Son’s concession [in 
Paradise Regained] became symptomatic of the classic moralism that “curbd” Milton and thus prevented him from 
achieving his imaginative potential. But, as we have seen, Blake had come to realize that this failure was also his 
own. He, too, had failed to purge his pre-1804 compositions of their moral self-righteousness; he – no less than 
Homer or Milton – had celebrated the heroic individual’s ability to assert his superiority over his rivals.” William 
Richey, Blake’s Altering Aesthetic (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1996): 114.  
375 Christopher Warley, Reading Class through Shakespeare, Donne, and Milton (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014): 122. 
376 While this is a deep debate, this contrast falls into aesthetic ideology here: “At some level Blake indeed saw 
Paradise Regained as more complete than Paradise Lost. However, rather than a perfect unity of iconoclasm and 
aesthetics in the later work, it is the perceived lack of unity between ideology and aesthetics that compels Blake’s 
attempt to redeem the poet in Milton.” Cato Marks, “Writings of the Left Hand: William Blake Forges a New 
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 Coupled with Newton, standing as he does as the key English Enlightenment figure, is a 
conflation with the presence of the “Natural Religion.” The critique of Natural Religion is 
profound for Blake, as it further removes from humanity any connection to the Divine and thus 
denies also the part that the corporeal was to have in maintaining this connection by establishing 
an “increasingly remote and impersonal image of God.”377 This phantasm seeks to deny in God a 
possibility of accessing its presence. What is left then is a God at a (safe) distance, and this is 
exactly the problem for Blake and why one must have the introduction of the connection between 
the material world and something which has the potential to transcend the world as we see it at 
any particular moment (the factuality of the world, as it were). Safety as referenced above does 
not seek to respond to Benjamin’s notion of danger, that moment when memory explodes 
involuntarily onto the scene, exposing the fault-lines of repression. Safety is an attempt to further 
repress those fault-lines by removing the avenues through which the danger can be fully exposed. 
Donald Ault argues this point, making the connection between these “safe” drives and the 
subduing of the potential for their unraveling (the Imagination): 
 
Blake never rejects his most basic conception that the crisis of process is rooted in  
the Satanic power to abstract static and dynamic elements from the interlocked  
structure of Eternity in order to construct a counter-system to Eternity to lure the  
Imagination from its true drives.378  
 
                                                        
Political Aesthetic,” Huntington Library Quarterly 74 (2011): 44. and radical theology here: “Notwithstanding his 
admiration, Blake felt Milton’s radicalism to be compromised. His relationship to the poet was therefore one of 
creative antagonism. Blake sought to address this by re-writing and re-interpreting his predecessor. Milton, chiefly 
written between 1803 and 1808 (with a possible addition after 1815), is Blake’s attempt to rectify Milton’s 
theological errors by the substitution of a creed of self-sacrifice and forgiveness for one of punitive judgment.” 
Michael Farrell, Blake and the Methodists (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014): 136-7. 
377 Thompson, Witness Against the Beast, 111. 
378 Ault, Visionary Physics, 165. 
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The shift towards abstraction and the move away from “the interlocked structure of Eternity” is a 
way in which we can foreground a specific form of Blakean materialism, which is expressly 
pronounced throughout the text, not least in the often repeated “vegetation” (of which more 
later), with its attendant notions of being at once “of the ground” (static)379 as well as 
simultaneously growing and creating (dynamic). Given the prominence of this other form of 
living, which ridicules the Blakean Imagination380 through the dominant ideology of “Newtonian 
Phantasms,” the question which Blake seeks to address is how can we respond in ways that our 
capabilities and own rational usefulness could be harnessed to halt this annihilation? The 
response in Milton will be driven by that which the current capitalist-rationalist consensus cannot 
of its own exclusionary nature fulfill.  
 
The Importance of What is Missing 
 
 If we accept the assumption that Blake’s reach back to history in Milton is intricately tied 
up with the history of religious prophecy and action since the English Civil War, a position which 
is argued more generally by Thompson throughout his text, I believe one must also accept that 
                                                        
379 On the interplay between the connection between the forms of stasis and dynamic change in Blake, John Hutton 
notes that: “Instead of reconciliation as stasis, as the end to change, Blake presents a constant negation of the 
negation, as a means to strip away barriers, to free all the possibilities for change.” As I shall later argue, Blake does 
not simply construct the final conflict in Milton as an end in itself, but rather that the second coming opens up the 
space for productive change. In this regard, the wish to abolish poverty seems to me a precondition in Blake for (this 
time with my emphasis) the possibility to and for change. As Hutton argues, “Blake’s is a notion of change and 
existence which presents history as an open-ended spiral, a continuous and growing revelation which bridges a gap 
between metaphorical truth and that of lived reality.” See John Hutton “‘Lovers of Wild Rebellion’: The Image of 
Satan in British Art of the Revolutionary Era,” in Blake, Politics, and History, edited by Jackie DiSalvo, G. A. 
Rosso, and Christopher Z. Hobson (London: Routledge, 1998): 161. 
380 This is representative and provides an explanation of the almost dichotomous relation of the purely biological 
brain as opposed to the creative faculties. As Sarah Haggarty explains: “Certainly, while Blake writes positively of 
the mind and the imagination, he represents the brain more ambiguously. Later in Milton, it will be the suspect 
Urizen who “stoop’d down/ And took up water from the river Jordan: pouring on / To Milton’s brain the icy fluid 
from his broad cold palm.” Sarah Haggarty, Blake’s Gifts: Poetry and the Politics of Exchange (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010): 149. 
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that history, defined by heightened class consciousness and a thoroughgoing struggle against the 
established powers, was no longer present in Blake’s England.381 This, however, is not to dismiss 
this inheritance. As Aijaz Ahmad argues: “The origins of English Romanticism are inseparable 
from the anti-capitalist passions of Blake, and it had the Cromwellian radicalism of Milton in its 
past…”382 Yet this was the past, and Blake’s society was in a much different position, especially 
after the failures of the French Revolution. In part this is reflected in Los’ speech in Plate 25, 
where the call to “preach righteousness & punish the sinner with death”383 is refused by Los, a 
figure so often connected with fire and judgment, who “now moves history.”384 Instead of opting 
for wrath, the watchword here is mercy. This world is full of division, and purity is in short 
supply. “As it concerns Milton, the implication of the Bard’s Song is that in Paradise Lost the 
source and father figure is Milton, and that Milton, like Los, is divided.”385 Given the poem’s 
structure, that a difference in chronological time needs to exist between Blake and Milton, the 
world that Blake inherits cannot be Milton’s own, and thus one’s level of historical consciousness 
during Blake’s era was limited (distance equals limitation). To judge those who merely went 
along with the current order, or even those who sought to continue the losses imposed on 
                                                        
381 For the definitive longer text on this see Christopher Hill, Milton and the English Revolution (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1977). Hill also argues that Blake is the inheritor of the “dionysian freedom favoured by the Ranters” (the 
Ranters being an important part of the dissenting social forces of the time. See Christopher Hill, The World Turned 
Upside Down: Radical Ideas During the English Revolution (London: Penguin, 1991): 356. 
382 Aijaz Ahmad, In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures (London: Verso, 1994): 50. 
383 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 121.  
384  The figure of Los is central not only as regards labour but as regards agency and the role of human potential in 
reorganizing the social world. “In Milton, which prefaces Jerusalem, Blake puts off apocalypse in order to prepare 
more carefully for the decisive role of the poet-prophet in its coming. Milton continues the account in The Four Zoas 
of the fall into the claim to be God and the rise into and recovery of the human. But the triumph of the human is 
greater and clearer now because Milton begins with a Los who retains the mature but beleaguered humanity he 
learned in The Four Zoas. Los now moves history by identifying himself with particular poets, with English 
prophets. The figure of the bard singing of a human Los leads to the figure of Milton and then to Blake, and finally to 
the forming of one man from the Bard, Los, Milton, and Blake. The result is a human poet-prophet, the Awakener, 
who unites myth and history and who prepares for apocalypse in a much more deliberate and internal and 
psychologically subtle way than Blake had ever done.” Deen, Conversing in Paradise, 164. 
385 Deen, Conversing in Paradise, 167. 
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Milton’s age, would be a penalty for outweighing the proportion of just judgment.386 One must 
know one’s crime to be guilty of it. Blake response is fitting with the larger framework not to 
condemn, judging in alignment with the divine position in the Songs of Innocence.  It is for this 
reason that the group most anathematic to Blake’s worldview, “the Elect,” must be ultimately 
saved.   
 
The Reprobate who never cease to Believe, and the Redeemd,  
Who live in doubts & fears perpetually tormented by the Elect 
These you shall bind in a twin-bundle for the Consummation – 
But the Elect must be saved [from] fires of Eternal Death387  
 
The fires of “Eternal Death,” life as we know it, are not denied them even though they may, in 
Blake’s worldview, reject that which will ultimately save them from damnation. This in part 
explains Blake’s motive for moving back into/towards history. As Erdman neatly explains, “The 
trouble is, however, that Blake is not content to formulate a message for the times...”388 Unhappy 
with the current consensus, Blake seeks to channel a different historical setting to get himself out 
of the limited possibilities of his own age.  
 There is something out of sync in Blake’s mythology that cannot gradually proceed from 
the current moment. The annihilating force of the quantifying logic of capital seeks to make 
impossible the liberating potential that a return makes possible. Those that seek to a “make a 
Heaven out of our misery” need not only occupy the present, but to eliminate the idea of the 
messianic impulse, especially as emanating from the “danger” that is the unoccupied past, as the 
                                                        
386 Although the world he inherits is not similar, the desire to recreate and re-imagine is deep in the text. For an 
exhaustive examination of how deep this desire went – so deep that Blake is argued to be attempting “to outdo 
Milton” – see Paul Miner, “Blake: Milton Inside ‘Milton,’” Studies in Romanticism 51 (2012): 233 – 276.  
387 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 122. 
388 Erdman, Blake: Prophet Against Empire, 396.  
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idea of a moment of uncontrolled judgment terrifies them. In this regard, Los’ reaction to (what 
he mistakenly takes as) the permanent absence of Rintrah, a symbol of revolutionary wrath, is 
instructive, as it seems to mirror Blake’s own historically limited situation (minus the error in 
mistaking the temporary for permanence). Los sits down “on his anvil-stock; and leand upon the 
trough. Looking into the black water, mingling it with tears.”389 That which is missing is, 
however, not irretrievable. This would be an historical slippage as great as if Milton had never 
existed in the first place. But Milton’s existence, connected with Rintrah’s, results in Inspiration 
being found in Prophecy. In a moment of desperation this prophecy hastens “That Milton of the 
Land of Albion should up ascend…and set free / Orc from his Chain of Jealousy.”390 In the 
moment of absence, Blake reaches back into history in order to recall what is missing in the 
present, having found that it is in fact something that can be made possible, despite the fears that 
such gestural igniters had been extinguished.391 
 The prevailing forces of Blake’s social order define what is missing in the present. It is in 
this sense that Blake’s particular use of prophecy is always looking backwards. As Balfour notes, 
“…if prophecy is always oriented toward a future – even when it does not take the form of 
prediction – it is also profoundly a thing of the past, an echo, a citation.”392 This motion towards 
the merging of prophecy and history should not be confused with nostalgia, a critique often 
leveled against the Romantics in general.393 Rather, the attempt here is to make the link to a 
                                                        
389 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 115. 
390 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 115. 
391 Orc is an important figure in this regard as his enslavement points to, in part, the reason why Blake has 
summoned Milton, as Christopher Z. Hobson argues. “…in keeping with Milton’s overall concerns, the hope is that 
Orc’s imprisoned social and sexual energy will be freed by Milton in a larger liberation of human potentiality. 
Despite this shift, Orc’s most prominent meaning in this poem is as imprisoned energy and elemental rebellion…” 
Christopher Z. Hobson, “The Myth of Blake’s ‘Orc Cycle,’” in Blake, Politics, and History, edited by DiSalvo, 
Rosso and Hobson, 22. 
392 Balfour, Rhetoric of Romantic Prophecy, 129. 
393 While the critique is nevertheless sometimes valid, it should not be used overused and generalized. For instance, 
Löwy and Sayre argue that “In the constellation of Romanticisms, “restitutionism” occupies a privileged place… In 
addition, it is obvious that the restitutionist perspective is in a way the closest to the essence of the overall 
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notion of history that is fundamentally productive. In this regard, Makdisi’s borrowing Cesare 
Casarino’s work in describing Blake’s aesthetic practice as a “philopoesis,” that is a description 
of how life is a process or making and remaking (as well as being a process of consistently being 
under threat), is persuasive.394 Makdisi emphasizes the “political and ontological” qualities of 
Blake’s work, and the undergirding of how we exist and the quality of that existence. He writes 
that:  
 
For the question that Blake pushes us to ask is not whether life is made, but how, and 
under what circumstances; whether that making, and life itself, are to be sorrowful – a 
matter of lamenting, shrieking, howling, gnashing – or rather a matter of joy, celebration, 
piping and singing; whether life is to be dominated by “happy chear” which we “weep 
with joy to hear,” as in the introduction of Songs of Innocence, by the “bells cheerful 
sound of The Ecchoing Green, by the “tender voice” of the lamb, by The Laughing Song’s 
“sweet chorus of Ha, Ha, He” or instead by the howling and shrieking of life perverted, 
abstracted, and stolen: the harlot’s curse, the soldier’s sigh, the chimney sweeper’s “weep, 
weep, in note of woe!”395  
 
If we follow Makdisi, we can see the figure of Los as mourning and at his wits end, as it were, is 
telling in that it describes a process more clearly related to Blake’s own worldview. Los, we 
should remind ourselves, is at his anvil and stops working when he fears the worst. The 
connection here with labour, specifically labour as a creative and itself a redeeming act (as 
opposed to labour as a stealing, oppressive entity from which we are or will be estranged), in this 
                                                        
phenomenon, given that nostalgia for a pre-capitalist state lies at the heart of this worldview. Now this restitutionist 
type is defined precisely as aspiring to the restitution – that is, the restoration or the re-creation – of this pre-capitalist 
past.” See Löwy and Sayre, Romanticism Against the Tide, 59. I think that in Blake’s case it is better to focus on the 
way in which he looks to learn from history, particularly as he looks to learn from historical failure. Blake does not 
wish to merely recreate, but rather to take inspiration from the past in order to ultimately set it right. In so doing 
Blake looks to “correct” the past while channeling it, a process which is far more akin to Benjamin’s notion of 
history in the final thesis on history than a process of mourning for mourning’s sake.  
394 Makdisi, William Blake, 265. 
395 Makdisi, William Blake, 265. 
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sense cannot be underestimated. As I shall discuss in more detail shortly, the primacy of labour, 
of creation, is a structuring principle in Blake’s thought. And it is for this reason as well that 
Blake should not be read as a forerunner of post-modernism, a bricoleur avant la lettre, taking a 
thing frozen in time for his own purposes.396 In other words, Blake is not merely sampling, but 
taking from the historical past another conception of history itself, not one in which that which is 
threatening is denied, but rather a conception of “unfinished business” that art can channel and 
make real in the contemporary. This requires, as Erdman notes in the following passage, a 
different conception of historical time, but also an account as to why this different conception is 
necessary:  
 
… as William Blake reaches identity with Los, his function as the God of Time is 
emphasized. God’s wheel of fate has Seven Eyes; each of the first six fails to  
serve as an eye for Albion, but the seventh, Jesus, comes at the right moment and  
thus marks or produces the complete revolution which makes any further rotation  
of human misery unnecessary.397 
 
What makes this leap possible is an alternate conception of time (and historical time especially) 
that the established church and other authorities cannot accommodate. Blake’s conception of time 
is highly influenced by his affinities with antinomianism, which, as Thompson notes, takes on an 
oppositional tone for Blake in that it represents a position or a strategy that dismisses the world 
that the present (in Newtonian form) dictates. Antinomianism “is not a place at all, but a way of 
                                                        
396 There is a belief in a sub-current of recent scholarship that Blake is a forerunner of postmodernism. It should 
suffice to say that while his intervention into the political moments of his day did not rely on a sampling of different 
trends that he chose to tap into, but rather a targeted response to the deep structures of his society which were 
quashing, both literally and figuratively, the political and physical progressive spirits of his day. Jon Mee deals with 
this in the first section of his Dangerous Enthusiasms.  
397 Erdman, Blake: Prophet Against Empire, 399. 
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breaking out from received wisdom and moralism, and entering new possibilities.”398 If we 
understand Blake as operating within this tradition, despite the caveats that were raised in 
Chapter 2, we see his approach to the historical world as deviating from those, especially those 
more dominant positions, that seek to make of it something safe, something at the very best that 
we can mourn over. This contested terrain is an example of what Raymond Williams termed 
“residual culture.” On this historical form Terry Eagleton argues that “A good deal of culture as 
identity or solidarity is in this sense residual – enclaves of traditionalist resistance within the 
present which draw their strength from ‘some previous social and cultural institution or 
formation.’”399 In Blake’s  contesting of this “settled” version of events, his radical poetics 
require, therefore, the “rewriting of history.”400  
 
Filling in That Which Is Missing 
 
 While Blake’s Satan in Milton represents the established Church and the quantifying logic 
of capital, it is important to note what Satan is not able to be a part of. This allows us to see how 
his conception of life is different from Blake’s worldview and also what Milton offers that works 
against the aforementioned evils. The space in which the conception of oppositional time (in 
contrast to the dominant form) is most directly stated is Plate 29. Blake lays out his conception of 
time as follows: 
 
For in this Period the Poets Work is Done: and all the Great  
Events of Time start forth & are concievd in such a Period 
                                                        
398 Thompson, Witness Against the Beast, 20. 
399 Terry Eagleton, The Idea of Culture (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000): 123. 
400 Thompson, Witness Against the Beast, 20. 
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Within a Moment: a Pulsation of the Artery.401 
 
Blake’s framework for revolutionary time is captured in the metaphor of the heartbeat, a pulse 
which operates in contrast to “clock time” which “is a mental nightmare like all other abstract 
ideas.”402 Blake recovers human time of the body from the quantifiable impulses of the capitalist 
age. In his commentary to Blake’s Milton, Harold Bloom describes this passage and the one 
above as “a saving vision of time.”403 He continues: “The poet’s work conquers the Eternity that 
teases us out of thought, for imaginative time triumphs over clock time by denying its 
categories.”404 Los, through his labour, creates a conception of time and space that bucks any 
attempt to quantify it. Los is also the creator of all that is truly visionary.  
 
For every Space larger than a red Globule of Mans blood. 
Is visionary: and is created by the Hammer of Los 
And every Space smaller than a Globule of mans blood. Opens 
Into Eternity of which this vegetable Earth is but a shadow405 
 
Space is, like Time in the previous plate, unable to be quantified. As Blake notes in a fairly 
deliberate jab at the “Newtonian Phantasms”: “The Microscope knows not of this nor the 
telescope.”406 As with Brecht, facticity is a betrayal of the possibilities for a time outside of the 
immediately presentable, even though as we see in the Galileo example, the telescope portends a 
                                                        
401 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 127. Mark Bracher argues a similar point in his analysis of historical time and its 
reception in the poem. He writes, “Everything remains because ontologically everything is interwoven with 
everything else from the beginning of time.” Mark Bracher, Being Form’d: Thinking Through Blake’s Milton (New 
York: Station Hill Press, 1985) 128. 
402 Frye, Fearful Symmetry, 46. 
403 Harold Bloom in Erdman, Complete Poetry, 922. 
404 Bloom in Erdman, Complete Poetry, 922. 
405 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 127. 
406 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 127.  
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world outside of the taken for granted and commidified world. Beyond the vision of what exists 
before us and is quantifiable exists another world of inarticulable power. 
 We should be clear to note that Blake is not arguing that a fundamental shift in human 
relations can happen at any moment of historical time. As Erdman’s point above regarding the 
particular war-dominated situation shows, Blake knew that his England was not ripe for such a 
transition.407 Rather, what we are witnessing here is an argument against quantifying time which 
rejects a notion of history for a conception of historical recovery akin to Benjamin’s rejection of 
“history as it really was.” The opening of Benjamin’s 2nd thesis reads as follows: “Like every 
generation that preceded us, we have been endowed with a weak Messianic power, a power to 
which the past has a claim. That claim cannot be settled cheaply. Historical materialists are aware 
of that.”408 Benjamin’s construction of the past as having a claim on the present is powerful, and 
is useful in directing us towards locating in the past that to which the present cannot fully 
respond. As Balfour notes:  
 
The paradoxical task of politics, then, as of history generally, is to prophesy the  
present. And to make matters more complex, one achieves this visionary  
perspective on the present by turning one’s back from one’s own time to the past,  
not unlike the stance of Klee’s Angelus Novus, whose back is to the future.409 
 
                                                        
407 On the question of a revolution in Blake’s time, John Beer notes interestingly that in many of his texts dealing 
more directly with the French Revolution Blake “would not concern himself with chronological or geographical 
accuracy if change or invention provided a vivid means of suggesting a significance.” See John Beer, “Blake’s 
Changing View of History: The Impact of the Book of Enoch,” in Historicizing Blake, edited by Clark and Worrall, 
159. 
408 Benjamin, Illuminations, 254. It would be a misreading of Benjamin to argue that any moment could be open to 
revolution, although nor would it be too far to state that, given the volatility of his own time, that the possibility of a 
revolution in his own time was something to be dismissed. Nevertheless, his point rather is that it is necessary to 
recognize and to be open to this possibility. 
409 Balfour, Rhetoric of Romantic Prophecy, 16. 
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In part what Benjamin is responding to here is his fear of “political progressivism,”410 a diluting 
the revolutionary potential of the workers’ struggle. Yet the connection between the backward 
reference and the present as a necessary one is clear. While I agree with Balfour in noting the 
complexity in this task, one must acknowledge in Blake it is only the refiguring of time that 
makes possible history’s reception in the present. What is interesting is that, given these 
complexities, and Blake’s acknowledgment of the inauspicious nature of his time, it was Blake’s 
goal to counter this trend and the overwhelming tide that was clearly moving against him, not 
least since the demise of the early promise of, among other events, the French Revolution. There 
is an argument to make that an achievable goal is to keep a heart of resistance beating. The weak 
Messianic power that Blake himself saw in his own time needed to find a long-term strategy. The 
move towards history and its opening up is both a theoretical strategy for his own time, but also 
for those who come after. The former aspect is perhaps clearer in that Blake, furious at the weak 
opposition to the clear injustices he witnessed, wanted a way of addressing his own time. Yet the 
latter is also interesting in that Blake, by bringing in another notion of historical time and 
redemption, makes it possible for future generations in similar positions to explode the past in aid 
of the present. Precedence, as in the case of John Milton, is vital. 
 
Milton’s Entrance 
 
 Milton’s appearance in the text comes in two forms. While on the one hand he enters 
Blake’s left foot in a moment of inspiration (again suggesting the importance of being grounded, 
yet also reminiscent of vegetative growth, as well as a reference to the conversion of Paul of 
                                                        
410 McNally, Bodies of Meaning, 217. 
 188 
Tarsus411), it is through Albion’s heart that Milton first has to transcend Eternity in order to 
operate in the present world. Blake’s movement into history is not history as it is generally 
known – in that it is not a fixed item, a series of knowable and indisputable facts. It is, as with 
Brecht, made plastic and available as a resource to those who aim is to liberate both those 
oppressed groups of the past, but also as material to liberate and awaken the present. In Blake, 
this resuscitated history is akin to inspiration, and thus often it is depicted as divine. And as God 
is omnipresent, history acts and attains meaning in the present. One must be careful here not to 
imagine that this shift to history is merely one reference (or citation) amongst others. As Ian 
Balfour has written, “the text [is] open for interpretation, open to an uncertain future.”412 This 
open future would be possible only if that which were being denied in the present413 could be 
fulfilled (or enlightened) by previous struggles. In this regard the connection between the 
historical past and the moment of the now – in all its variant uncertainties – is one that Blake’s 
poetics retains.  
 Yet while we can make presumptions as to the political-aesthetic task at hand which 
makes the summoning of Milton possible and desirable, the question needs to be posed as to who 
in fact does the summoning and to what end. While basic questions, they are nevertheless ones 
which centre on a specific historical trajectory which is key in understanding the particular uses 
of Milton as a spirit made real, but also the importance of Milton as a spirit itself. Milton’s 
                                                        
411 This notes a reference to conversion for Paul/Saul and Milton. “As Erdman and other commentators have noted, 
the word tarsus punningly connects this episode to Saul of Tarsus’s conversion into St. Paul. Much in the way that 
Saul suddenly renounces his self-righteous persecution of the early Christians to become an apostle of Christ, both 
Blake and Milton in the course of this poem cast off their judgmental neoclassicism to adopt a more genuinely 
Christian vision.” Richey, Blake’s Altering Aesthetic, 122.  
412 Balfour, The Rhetoric of Romantic Prophecy, 172. 
413 Makdisi usefully describes the tension between Blake and his own time and the desire to move outside of such a 
limiting historical period as follows: “Blake’s language of power was obsolete by the 1790’s…only in the sense that 
it was allowed no room in the historicist discourse of modernity, and in the culture of modernization, which had to 
purge itself of such enthusiastic tendencies.” Makdisi, William Blake and the Impossible History, 3. 
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presence in Blake’s world comes at a moment of terror, reminiscent of Benjamin’s notion of the 
past being taken hold of in a moment of danger (of which more shortly), where the possibilities 
of Blake’s contemporary world seem exhausted.  
 
The Sin was begun in Eternity, and will not rest in Eternity 
Till two Eternitys meet together.  
Ah! Lost! Lost! Lost! For ever! 
So Leutha spoke.414  
 
What is interesting here, besides the provocative notion of two Eternitys meeting and that which 
is dominant being crushed, is that the denial of their meeting is put forward by Leutha, a 
character who in this plate is noted as repentant but was once in the service of Satan. Her despair 
is expressed at a moment of shock at what she has done, and the feeling of hopelessness given 
her admission of guilt. Plate 13 continues: 
 
But when she saw that Enitharmon had 
Created a New Space to protect Satan from punishment; 
She fled to Enitharmons Tent & hid herself.415   
 
So there is protection for those causing damage. This protection for some only further intensifies 
the havoc wreaked on others. In Plate 12, Blake moves through Harrow, London, which is 
reacting to pre-repentant Leutha’s destructive movements. The situation here is unambiguously 
noted as “A Hell of our making.”416 Because of the problems of Theodicy (the explanation of evil 
                                                        
414 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 107. 
415 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 107. 
416 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 106. 
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in God’s loving world), Albion is in a moment of crux, of dialectical anxiety. Blake expresses 
this contradiction as follows: 
 
To do unkind things in kindness! With power armd, to say 
The most irritating things in the midst of tears and love.417  
 
There is neither love nor care here, and the extinguishing of the radical power of God for those in 
need, and the establishment of every manner of support for those in power makes the contrast all 
the more galling. The twisting here of power in the name of the “Moral Law” is profound.418 But 
where to find succour in these moments? Blake is clear that it is certainly not in institutional 
learning.  
 
…in Cambridge and in Oxford, places of Thought 
Intricate labyrinths of Times and Spaces unknown 
that Leutha lived 
In Palamabrons Tent, and Oothoon was her charming guard.419  
 
In these passages we cannot be freed from the original failings of the historical fall, and we are 
left with the introduction of Oothoon, a figure of free love and of openness and compassion, as 
the only buttress against an almighty power. This is clearly not enough, and if we continue on 
this path history as it has unfolded this will continue to maintain its course. If we are damned 
                                                        
417 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 106. 
418 Jennifer G. Jesse notes clearly the distinction between what those in need need, and what they receive by the 
Established Church. “By the time Blake produced Milton and Jerusalem, the primary activity he associates with 
Jesus is the forgiveness of sins and, more often than not, this is described in contrast to the Anglican interpretation of 
Jesus as a representative of the moral law.” Jennifer G. Jesse, William Blake’s Religious Vision: There’s a 
Methodism in His Madness (New York: Lexington, 2013): 121. 
419 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 107. 
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with this history, how do we make a break? It is in this context that Milton arrives. In Plate 14 
Blake writes: 
 
Shaking the roots & fast foundations of the Earth in doubtfulness 
The loud voic’d Bard terrify’d took refuge in Miltons bosom 
Then Milton rose up from the heavens of Albion ardorous!420  
 
While the explicit identification of the Bard is at times unclear (he is seemingly a compilation of 
various figures in Blake’s mythology, including Blake himself), it is instructive that at a moment 
of deep doubt, feeling an inability to properly function, Blake summons Milton. Milton arrives as 
a source of power, and he is among the greats to whom one may go back to for inspiration. Blake 
at his most in need looks backward to Milton (and perhaps we can also note the connection 
between the move outwards for help when one is in need, as well as the stress on care, in The 
Songs of Innocence and Experience). And despite the complicated nature of “The Bard,” John 
Sutherland notes that in this position, “the Bard himself seems to represent Blake at his most 
inspired.”421 His summoning of Milton is significant for two reasons. First, Blake “took refuge” 
at a moment when his conception of life was being threatened deeply by capitalism’s quantifying 
logic and the “Moral Law.” It was an impossible situation which required, in the notion of 
recorded time as put forward by the authorities of his day, an impossible solution. Second, this 
introduction occurred during a moment of utter despair, with the almost complete abolition of 
hope prompting the need to take refuge. This is recorded as a flash, which will radically alter our 
dangerous present from its unsettled history. Benjamin writes: 
 
                                                        
420 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 108. 
421 John H. Sutherland, “Blake’s Milton: The Bard’s Song,” Colby Quarterly 13 (1977): 145. 
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The danger affects both the content of the tradition and its receivers. The same threat 
hangs over both: that of becoming a tool of the ruling classes. In every era the attempt 
must be made anew to wrest tradition away from a conformism that is about to overpower 
it.422 
 
If we follow Benjamin in highlighting the importance of tradition on tradition’s receivers, given 
that the focus here is on Milton, the question becomes, how does Milton figure in Blake’s 
philosophy of intervention? Milton is of course a ready response against the conformism of the 
ruling class attempt to, again, “make a Heaven out of our misery.” Yet the use here also is heavily 
indebted to the question of what Milton offers in relation to the reception of religion in Blake’s 
time. On the question of this tradition and Blake, E. P. Thompson is categorical. He writes, “The 
strongest influence upon Blake comes from one major source – the Bible – but the Bible read in a 
particular way, influenced by Milton and radical Dissent…”423 Such is the impact of Milton that 
in Blake’s framework Milton’s presence becomes the fulfillment of prophecy. Blake, by creating 
the idea that Milton has been present from time immemorial, makes his summoning of Milton the 
potential for new forms of love. In order to make clear what Milton’s purpose on earth is, Los 
states:  
 
o Sons we live not by wrath. By mercy alone we live! 
I recollect an old Prophecy in Eden recorded in gold; and oft 
Sung to the harp: That Milton of the land of Albion. 
Should up ascend forward from Felphams Vale & break the Chain 
Of Jealousy from all its roots;424 
                                                        
422 Benjamin, Illuminations, 255. 
423 Thompson, Witness Against the Beast, 33. 
424 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 119. One way in which we can read that Blake wished for the work to move beyond 
the text is found in the fact that as John B. Pierce perceptively notes, “…the moment of action for the character of 
Milton in the poem springs from a specifically oral event – a Bard’s song.” See John B. Pierce, “Rewriting Milton: 
Orality and Writing in Blake’s ‘Milton,’” Studies in Romanticism 39 (2000): 449. And as Pierce argues, it is this 
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Thus Blake conjures Milton, but only in so much as Milton was always already waiting to be 
conjured. His presence resembles in this regard Jesus himself, as both were intended to live, die 
and then return. The connection here between the three is no passing idea. As Makdisi notes, “For 
on [Blake’s] own account, his work is little more than dictation inspired by Jesus Christ, or John 
Milton, or the “eternals”…”425 What prophesying the past makes possible is that the true path of 
history may be understood, and thus the task before Blake is to be able to prepare oneself to be 
inspired by it. Only then can one be among those to receive history. As Blake notes in the Bard’s 
Song: 
 
The Bard replied. I am inspired! I know it is Truth! For I sing 
According to the inspiration of the Poetic Genius 
Who is the eternal all-protecting Divine Humanity 
To whom be Glory & Power & Dominion Evermore Amen.426 
 
Here we begin to see the fundamental importance for Blake of “Poetic Genius”. Milton has been 
waiting for this time of inspiration, he who “walkd about in Eternity / One hundred 
years…Unhappy tho in heav’n.”427 Blake pictures Milton as unhappy because, as Erdman notes, 
“history has not gone according to his vision of it.”428 Milton’s return makes possible for Blake 
the illuminating process of fulfilling this lost history, or, alternatively, of addressing this long 
history of loss.  
                                                        
making real (my phrasing), which translates into “The union of thought and expression, inspiration and execution in 
turn prevents the work of abstraction.” Pierce, “Rewriting Milton,” 458. 
425 Makdisi, William Blake, 242.  
426 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 107-8.  
427 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 96.  
428 Erdman, Prophet Against Empire, 397. 
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 In this respect Milton occasions a point of departure from the quantified temporality 
(clearly associated with Satan and his twisted invocation of God) as well as a passive, 
unresponsive reception of life. This contrasts with his conception of the poet’s (Blake and 
Milton’s) reception of historical time, which while not always accessible, nevertheless stretches 
beyond any quantifiable moment and is ever-present, if one is open to its reception. It is not the 
raw material of history of which we are to make sense; rather this conception of historical time is 
the key principle in understanding where we are at any given moment in time. Despite our 
predicament, it is always there. Blake notes: 
 
I in Six Thousand Years walk up and down: for not one Moment 
Of Time is lost, nor one Event of Space unpermanent 
But all remain: every fabric of Six Thousand Years  
Remains permanent:429  
 
The reference to six thousand years, the time of existence according to scripture, provides an 
oppositional form of thinking and being in the world. It is a conception of time that rejects the 
facticity and capitalist temporality of Blake’s present. As Frye notes, “History as linear time is 
the great apocrypha or mystery which has to be rejected.”430 Yet what is at stake here is not 
merely the redeeming of another view of time for its own sake, although this is indisputably part 
of Blake’s framework. It is not merely another version of time that Blake is looking to construct. 
Rather, the task is in creating an oppositional form of life which offers a way out of the present 
distorting consensus. For this reason the emphasis on creativity, and specifically labour as a 
                                                        
429 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 117. While I disagree with S. H. Clark’s argument that in stating that in this passage 
“History becomes sealed and finite”, his qualified notion that “Time is the element in which constructive intervention 
becomes possible and so provides a merciful release from “eternal torment,” is nevertheless an useful description of 
the role of Los (historical time) in Blake’s text.” See S. H. Clark’s “Blake’s ‘Milton’ as Empiricist Epic – ‘Weaving 
the Woof of Locke,’” Studies in Romanticism 36 (1997): 476. 
430 Frye, Fearful Symmetry, 340.  
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broadly creative act, is a way of articulating a liberating politics for both Blake as an artist and for 
the world as a whole.  
 
Blake Labouring in History 
 
 As is the case with analyses of Benjamin which attempt to de-contextualize the explicit 
politics of his work (in particular his rejection of social democracy in the Theses),431 so with 
Blake it is important not to disregard the importance of labour and its representation in his text. 
Labour in Milton is chiefly articulated in two ways. Firstly, labour is equated with work as it is 
now commonly understood, and particularly with agricultural work. Secondly, labour is defined 
in relation to cultural production. In this second sense labour is principally associated with 
Blake’s own creative work. While I wouldn’t want to suggest that labour in the second 
manifestation is not in effect “real” or equally valid as the first, labour often stands as a metaphor 
for a “mental fight” which is a necessary requirement for the battle against Satan and for the 
inspiration to channel Milton in re-entering the world, and in this to correct his own errors and to 
aid the contemporary conjuncture. The conduit through which Milton rushes is made up of 
several constituent labouring parts, but fundamentally defines labour as a thinking, working, 
spirit.  
 
Properly understood, then, labor is not opposed to inspiration. …Invention, the labor of 
the mind, is coterminous with execution, the exercise of the hands. Copying is not a time-
bound mediation (even though it benefits from practice), but an unmediated access, 
instantaneously, to a tradition of inspired originality. The spiritualization of labor, and as 
                                                        
431 Although commenting on Blake, Julia Wright’s following remark could equally be applied to Benjamin. She 
writes “Social and political change do not arise from historical evolution, the slow steady march toward civilization, 
but from beyond such chronological constructions…” See Julia M. Wright, Blake, Nationalism and the Politics of 
Alienation (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2004): 54. 
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it were the bringing down to earth of inspiration, bring a capable, persevering humanity 
into contest with a captivating divinity.432  
 
I should keep within my frame of reference a distinction which Blake makes explicitly clear early 
in the text, that between the contrasting notions of “proportion.” Blake writes, “When Satan 
fainted beneath the arrows of Elynittria / And Mathematical Proportion was subdued by Living 
Proportion.”433 That Satan is identified with Mathematical Proportion should make clear that this 
is a negative reference, and that Living Proportion is positive. The concept of Living is 
interesting as it has more than an undertone of being productive, as opposed to being overly 
abstract and thus non-reproductive and non-responsive to the current situation, and also to 
historical reception. The centrality of living structures the representation of work in Blake.  
 In Plate 8 Blake draws a line between two places of labour. On the first we are presented 
with “Satan returning to his Mills” where he does not see that he has “opress’d nor injur’d the 
refractory servants.”434 Satan possessing his mills and servants makes clear that slavery still 
exists in capitalism, and with whom it is identified. Yet Blake is quick to counter these “Satanic 
Mills” with an opposition movement which was always there (“remained permanent”). Los, often 
depicted as a harvester throughout Blake’s work (admittedly among other descriptions), responds 
to the Satanic Mills as follows: 
 
Ye Genii of the Mill! The Sun is on high 
Your labours call you! Palamabron is also in sad dilemma; 
His horses are mad! His Harrow confounded! His companions enrag’d. 
Mine is the fault! I should have remember’d that pity divides the soul 
And man unmans: follow with me my Plow. This mournful day 
                                                        
432 Haggarty, Blake’s Gifts, 150-51. 
433 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 99. 
434 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 101. 
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Must be a blank in Nature: follow with me, and tomorrow again 
Resume your labours, & this day shall be a mournful day435 
 
I am not arguing, it should be made clear, that mills, plows, and labour as metaphors are not also 
deeply imbedded in Blake’s references to redemptive religion. My point here is that the 
predominance of these metaphors is just as meaningful as is their place in religion more broadly 
in articulating Blake’s worldview. The fact that Satan returns to “his Mills” locates a sense of 
ownership and materiality (of property and labour time), while at the same time the reference to 
those that work at the Mill connotes a magical note which squarely identifies the workers as the 
creators of all wealth. As Makdisi notes, “Who works, how he or she works, and the conditions 
under which she works are all inextricable questions for Blake.”436 As Los calls on the labourers 
to leave the Mills, this raises the question as to the nature of their Labour under Los, and to how 
it prefigures the industrial nature of production that Blake is critiquing. 
 Los himself suggests how he is identified within this unique labour process. In Plate 25, 
as previously, he cautions against vengeance “till all the Vintage of Earth was gatherd in.”437 Yet 
while Los calls to wait for vengeance (for reasons again suggested by Erdman above), how he 
frames his call is instructive. 
 
And Los stood & cried to the Labourers of the Vintage is now upon Earth 
Fellow Labourers! The Great Vintage & Harvest is now upon Earth438 
 
Los is the leader of the harvest, but allies himself clearly with the “labourers” in his great caution. 
Los stands here as a sort of vanguard, but a vanguard that is not divorced from the workers but 
                                                        
435 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 101-2. 
436 Makdisi, William Blake, 113.  
437 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 121. 
438 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 121.  
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rather one of them. Further, his caution recognizes the potential of the former slaves to not heed 
his call. They have the agency to seek vengeance, and it is necessary to caution against it. Agency 
places everything in play. As Sarah Haggarty notes, this means dictates from above will not 
wash. “The struggle dramatized by Milton, then, is not quite between God and man, dictator and 
secretary, but between the capacity of a man to act divinely and his corporeal aspect. And it is 
precisely a struggle.”439 These labourers have the possibility of making history, and are in this 
regard at one with Los in this creation. It is at the moment that “fellow labourers” are summoned 
to take part in making history (as opposed to being passive pawns in the history of their own 
lives) that we should reflect that this process has, of course, occurred before.  
 On the link between labour and past history in Blake, Thompson’s work is most 
convincing, as what he sets out to do is to place Blake’s “very unusual and probably unique, 
position” in an “obscure antinomian tradition.”440 While Thompson focuses on a crucial 
developmental period in Blake’s work between 1788 and 1794, his argument concerns the 
structuring of Blake’s key ideas, which carry forward particularly from this period. While the 
antinomian tradition had “become obscure by the 1790s,”441 by “1810 Blake’s views had become 
so strange that Henry Crabb Robinson could comment that ‘his religious convictions had brought 
on him the credit of being an absolute lunatic.’”442 The disjunction between this tradition and its 
potential reception is interesting in keeping in our frame how unfashionable Blake’s holding on 
to this tradition had become, but it is interesting nonetheless that there is something that is 
consistent in Blake’s work.443 Thompson definitively provides this consistency in the last two 
                                                        
439 Haggarty, Blake’s Gifts, 150. 
440 Thompson, Witness Against the Beast, xix. 
441 Thompson, Witness Against the Beast, 62. 
442 Thompson, Witness Against the Beast, 63 
443 This thesis is in direct contradiction to Nicholas Williams’ work, who attempts to construct, not unlike 
Althusser’s reception of Marx, with which he is sympathetic, an earlier and mature Blake. See Williams, Ideology 
and Utopia. 
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lines of his text. He writes, “But there is never the least sign of submission to “Satan’s 
Kingdom.” Never, on any page of Blake, is there the least complicity with the kingdom of the 
Beast.”444 In part, this helps illuminate the above quoted passage wherein Los, entering Blake in a 
moment of inspiration, declares that all time “remains permanent.” Nothing can slip outside such 
a framework, even though it is, again, seemingly not always accessible.  
 This compressed history, that is history which in some discernible way works in a 
continuum, operates on the level of continuity but also has particularities to it as well. For this 
reason Milton is positioned as a Reprobate while Cromwell, given that he did not fulfill his role, 
is only ready for redemption (that is, a member of the “redeemed” class), and further that Kings 
Charles and James, are positioned as members of the “Elect.” As the “working” class (not exactly 
the working class as it will later be defined in the Marxist tradition) produces in the continuum 
and in the instance, so too does the Elect “class.” While in Milton the Elect are somewhat 
repentant for their actions, specifically what they are repentant for is instructive. Blake writes: 
 
Charles calls on Milton for Atonement. Cromwell is ready 
James calls for fires in Golgonooza. For heaps of smoking ruins 
In the night of prosperity and wantonness which he himself Created445 
 
The “fires of Golgonooza” are meant to burn up and cleanse the errors of the past, yet the notion 
of prosperity as a negative qualifier allies Blake clearly with an oppositional understanding of 
history as well as the present. This further raises the question of who benefits from the creation of 
                                                        
444 Thompson, Witness Against the Beast, 229. Following E.P. Thompsons’s point that Blake never wavered, Jon 
Mee writes that far from there being a “break” between the “radical Blake” of the 1790’s and of that in the time of 
writing Milton, “Although after 1795 Blake published nothing of his own work till Milton in 1804, there is little 
evidence in either his annotations or notebook that he renounced his political perspective on state religion.” See Jon 
Mee, Dangerous Enthusiasms, 213 This text also provides a useful analysis of Blake’s work during that decade, 
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445 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 99. 
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wealth. In this sense there is a good deal of wish fulfillment here, as Kings James and Charles are 
both confronted with the wreckage of their disastrous histories (although their descendants are 
sure to have profited from the original theft) and held to account.  
 While Blake wouldn’t have been alone in presenting this disastrous history and its 
contemporary manifestations in his time, the form in which he does it – the Daughters of Albion 
“sing Creating the Three Classes among Druid Rocks”446 – marks Blake as unique in his age. As 
Makdisi notes, there is a 
 
…distance between Blake and the hegemonic tendency in 1790s radicalism. For  
the latter, as indeed for the conservatives themselves, “labourer” and “employer”  
are categories to be taken for granted; whereas for Blake, they are socio-bio- 
psychological organisms, the products of a particular social organization.447 
 
If they are both products of a particular social organization and socio-bio-psychological 
organisms, then this offers up the very interesting question about what specifically this era (the 
era of Milton, of the English Civil-War, the advent of capitalism) means for Blake. This seems to 
suggest that Milton is something larger than a mere reader of the Bible, and his particular return 
(and the fact that Blake looks for redemption and inspiration in Milton) offers up concretely a 
way of getting at the heart of the predicament in Blake’s age.448  
 The way in which Milton makes himself known in Blake’s world is instructive in framing 
that world. Blake sets up a contrast in the way that Milton enters from a position of height in 
                                                        
446 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 99. 
447 Makdisi, William Blake, 113. 
448 Describing the way in which Blake contrasts the mythology of the essay in comparison to the second coming of 
the end (of which more later), Andrew M. Cooper argues that “Milton strives toward an unqualified affirmation of 
concrete human life.” While this essay is heavily indebted to a Freudian structuralism (note the title), the article, as 
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M. Cooper, “Blake’s Escape from Mythology: Self-Mastery in ‘Milton,’” Studies in Romanticism 20 (1981): 88. 
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relation to the heavenly “in the Zenith as a falling star,”449 yet as previously mentioned he enters 
Blake through his foot – where he stands – “And on my left foot falling on the tarsus, entered 
there.” Together, the connection between the two symbolizes the process of something organic, 
both in a similar sense to Makdisi’s “socio-bio- psychological organisms,” but also as further 
articulating a moment of specificity. In other words, the two worlds of God and the physical 
universe are important for highlighting the moment of the now in the process of (always already) 
historical reception. This moment of historical redemption comes not as something alien to it, but 
rather as an entity that is part and parcel of the earth’s own essential character. This essential 
character is essentialist itself. While Blake is far and away ahead of his times on representation of 
women, the mixture and manipulation of genders and gender norms is a core ingredient of the 
advancement of a broader commonality of humanity, one side is still more equal than the other as 
David Shakespeare notes:  
 
In Milton, a mix of vision and concealment, and an accompanying mix of genders, are 
what lead to redemption. This gender mixing is less “sexual” than it might be both in the 
modern sense of sexual acts and in the sense contemporary to Blake that Susan Matthews 
delineates – heterosexual gender roles. It is not copulation, nor even a joining of properly 
male and female figures, but an ideal of androgyny where the feminine remains 
subordinate, but makes a tangible contribution.450  
 
Yet this essential character that brings together Blake and Milton is itself coloured by a specific 
return to a definitive place. While Milton returns to “eternal death” (our lived reality), he enters 
                                                        
449 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 110. 
450 David Shakespeare, “‘The Sight of All These Thing’: Sexual Vision and Obscurity in Blake’s Milton,” in Sexy 
Blake, edited by Helen P. Bruder and Tristanne Connolly (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013): 113. There is also a 
clear discrepancy as regards which gender and possession of knowledge and inspiration. “…throughout the poem the 
masculine figures not only have the privilege of access to visions divine and immanent, but they are often 
consolidating their privilege by doing the hiding.” Shakespeare, “‘The Sight of All These Thing,’” 114. 
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“Albions land/ Which is the earth of vegetation on which I now write.”451 The literalness of this 
passage (“on which I now write”) sits out of place with much of the poem. Shortly thereafter, 
when describing Milton’s entrance into Blake’s world, he describes the connecting point as both 
of and outside the moment they live in. He notes:  
 
But Milton’s Human Shadow continu’d journeying above 
The rocky masses of The Mundane Shell… 
The Mundane Shell, is a vast Concave Earth: and immense 
Hardend shadow of all things upon our Vegetated Earth  
Enlarg’d into dimension & deform’d into indefinite space,”452  
  
The fact that space is “deform’d” when it is made indefinite provides a clue as to the sense of 
urgency in location, and as well the importance in moving from abstraction (“mathematical 
proportion”) to a vegetating or growing space (“living proportion”).453 There is a belief or 
doctrine of “growing” in Blake, and this belief resists any attempt to provide a final destination 
point wherein life will be ultimately fulfilled.454 In this regard it would be remiss not to note that 
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discrete spacetime.” Lussier, “Blake’s Deep Ecology,” 406-7. 
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reach of Satan’s destructive power. One such example of this necessity lies in sexuality. A Christopher Z. Hobson 
notes: “Rather, as in Milton, Blake shows the disruption of same-sex subjectivity by outside enforcement and internal 
self-affirmation of social gender norms, leading to a different sex-subjectivity in which the repression of same-sex 
potential poisons personal life and helps form a world of gender and social oppression.” Christopher Z. Hobson, 
“Blake and the Evolution of Same-Sex Subjectivity,” in Queer Blake, edited by Bruder and Connolly, 32. 
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the larger metaphors of nature which abound in the text are deeply related to the possibilities of 
framing historical reception. The notion of the end point of the harvest cannot simply be viewed 
as a totality in and of itself. As Balfour has argued, “The vintage and harvest are plausible as 
figures for the end because they mark the end of a given cycle of nature – and yet it is precisely 
the cyclical character of the seasons that prevents any harvest or vintage from being the last.”455 
 While Balfour is absolutely correct in pointing out that the “Last Harvest” is not at all 
“the last”456  (and in this regard it deserves noting that there are two “Last Harvests” in the 
poem), this should not preclude us from examining the importance of what the last does 
ultimately represent in Blake as it relates to “vegetating” and “growing,” which I am here using 
interchangeably. There seems to be a correlation of the two which echoes Marx’s famous 
statement that after a period of revolution we will then only have put behind us pre-history, and 
thus our attempts to revolutionize – the summoning of Milton is for this purpose – our existence 
is about reaching our “nature.” That is a moment where our growing is no longer manacled (that 
most hated of concepts which Blake frequently references) to Satanic Mills or Jealousy. That 
said, I am not arguing that it is within human nature to reach this point, as this would be to read 
into Marx and Blake a teleological form which exists in neither. Suffice to say that there is, I 
would argue, enough to maintain that in Blake’s philosophy it is possible to argue for the 
termination of something odious to human existence. That is, to echo Makdisi, we are able to see 
                                                        
455 Balfour, Rhetoric of Romantic Prophecy, 167. 
456 Steve Vine’s description of the moment of the transcendent sublime in Blake not as a flight from the material 
world, so much as finding fulfillment in it, is useful in providing a link between where one is and the direction where 
one will go. As he writes, “The infinite is always in the process of (its) revelation, for Blake’s corrosive designate a 
process rather than a product, a “displaying” rather than a display. The infinite resides in the corrosion and “melting 
away” of the material, but this process is internal to the material itself. The material is not so much sublimated as the 
sublime is installed in the material.” See Steve Vine, “Blake’s Material Sublime,” Studies in Romanticism 41 (2002): 
242. 
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in Blake a desire for the true potentiality to occur, and to hope and work towards a moment where 
those fires which attempt to extinguish such potential are themselves snuffed out.  
 For this reason we should note that until the “last harvest” is behind us, Blake describes 
humanity on earth as living in “sorrowful Vegetations.”457 Without the second coming we are in a 
position of being literally grounded in historical structures of exploitation and oppression. And 
while Balfour has noted the comparative significance of the introduction of Milton through the 
“feet” and poetic structure (the foot as the form of metre in poetry), I should also point out that 
the resurrection will come, as I have shown, not as something merely magical (falling from the 
sky) but rather through our fulfilling the somewhat base materiality coursing through us, arising 
from where we stand. Only once that has been done will we be able to fulfill the following 
lament:  
 
O when shall we tread our Wine-presses in heaven; and Reap 
Our wheat with shoutings of joy, and leave the Earth in peace.458 
 
Until that moment in time when the lament is fulfilled, Los stands as the “Watchman of 
Eternity”459 and takes up this position so as to warn us of the danger repeating history’s failing, 
principally from recreating a fall. Los warns us against this danger, describing it in the following:  
 
Arise O Sons give all your strength against Eternal Death 
Lest we are vegetated, for Cathedrons Looms weave only Death 
A Web of Death: & were it not for Bowlahoola & Allamanda 
No Human Form but only a Fibrous Vegetation 
                                                        
457 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 119. 
458 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 119. 
459 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 119.  
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A Polypus of soft affections without Thought or Vision.460  
 
Here there is a danger of making impossible imagination which will fulfill our humanity and 
make us the materiality of our salvation. Ultimately though, Milton is the spirit of the 
Apocalypse, and his coming heralds the possibility of ultimate regeneration, not merely shielding 
oneself and the broader community from the horrors that one knows. This regeneration prefaces 
the creative impulse in Blake and its importance in both making something grow, while at the 
same time highlighting the necessity of channeling history in poetry.  
 The notion of the Harvest, one of the dominant metaphors throughout the poem, is deeply 
implicated in the way in which labour appears in the text. I have already discussed the importance 
of Los’ proclamation to “Fellow Labourers” in the text, but the connection exists further between 
labour and a larger politics of creativity in the redemptive historical channeling which Blake 
desires. Instructive in this regard is the final clash in the text between Milton and Satan. In this 
battle, and in the ultimate redemption of Milton, we see the primacy of a life of making, 
philopoesis, and how it is necessary through labour to make this leap into the moment of time 
beyond (perhaps an always penultimate) the Last Harvest. 
 In Plate 38 we witness the battle between Milton and Satan. The description of Satan is 
telling in that Blake offers a clear binary of labour’s competing states of being. The depiction of 
Satan’s properties (that is, both his ownership and stewardship of things and what makes him 
what he is) stand against the notion of labour as a fulfilling practice. Blake writes:  
 
I also stood in Satans bosom & beheld its desolations! 
A ruind Man: a ruind building of God not made with hands; 
… 
                                                        
460 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 120. 
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…its ruind palaces & cities & mighty works;  
Its furnaces of affliction in which his Angels & Emanations 
Labour with blackend visages among it stupendous ruins461 
 
The “blackend visages” is a reference to industrial labour as performed in the “Satanic Mills,” but 
the fact that Satan’s building is not made from human “hands” should be read as arguing that it is 
divorced from the level of human creative (and also labouring) activity. Labour here is inclusive 
of mental labour, and especially cultural labour (with Blake’s own plates and poetry the obvious 
case in point).  
 In his entreaty in Plate 39 to “Awake Albion awake,” Milton uses the common motif in 
inspirational thought to awake the recipient from sleep, yet the entreaty is not finished. The way 
in which awakening comes about is dependent on the role of labour. The repetition of the word 
“labour” and its variant forms in the following is striking. Blake writes: 
 
Urizen faints in terror striving among the Brooks of Arnon 
With Miltons Spirit: as the Plowman or Artificer or Shepard 
While in the labours of his Calling sends his Thought abroad 
To labour in the ocean or in the starry heaven. So Milton 
Labourd in Chasms of the Mundane Shell, the here before 
My cottage midst the Starry Seven, where the Virgin Ololon 
Stood trembling in the Porch: loud Satan thunderd on the Stormy Sea  
Circling Albions Cliffs in which the Four-fold World resides 
Tho seen in fallacy outside: a fallacy of Satans Churches462 
 
                                                        
461 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 139. 
462 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 141. 
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The repeated reference to Labour overcoming Satan in completing this redemption is significant. 
The reference to the Arnon is also fruitful, as Bloom notes in an early reference from Plate 19: 
“The Arnon is a river of error, and like the Red Sea, its crossing symbolizes a movement towards 
life, from Moab to Canaan, from Urizen to a redeemed Luvah who is Christ.”463 To cross this 
river, or to go through it, implies a judgment, a point of definitive departure.  
 While a key feature of Blake’s work is a compulsive dedication to democracy more 
generally and debate in particular, when the final moment approaches, Milton, denouncing 
Voltaire and others, cries out “Obey thou the Words of the Inspired Man.”464 Going further, he 
declares that “the Reasoning Power in Man / This is a false Body.”465 In a further attack, 
seemingly directed towards those who divorce theory from any form of beneficial practice, Blake 
brusquely attacks those whose “Science is Despair”466 by ridiculing the “idiot Questioner who is 
always questioning, / But never capable of answering.”467 Here the question of not being able to 
provide answers should direct us against the notion that a moment of fulfillment is against 
Blake’s “nature.” Indeed, as we see in his final Plate, Blake suggests that labour is not only 
central to humanity and central to its liberation, but also urges that its true fulfillment must be 
achieved rather than continually postponed.468 In the penultimate verse, whilst travelling across 
the city, “Los listens to the Cry of the Poor Man: his Cloud / Over London in volume terrific, low 
                                                        
463 Bloom in Erdman, Complete Poetry, 916. 
464 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 142. 
465 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 142.  
466 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 142. 
467 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 142. 
468 What I am arguing here is that there is something so rotten in the state of things that we require a new way of 
living that will aid us in removing us from our present misery. Yet as “humankind can’t live context-less” 
Thompson, 221.  we must then resurrect other forms of knowing and living that pre-date our current, self-interested, 
context. This will require “some utopian leap’ … ‘from Mystery to renewed imaginative life.’” Thompson, Witness 
Against the Beast, 193. 
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bended in anger.”469 The anger of the London470 labouring “Poor man” is justified in Blake. It is 
they who create, and it is historically their labour which is in need of redemption.471 Hearing this 
cry, Blake ends with the beginning of their redemption: 
 
All Animals upon the Earth, are prepared in all their strength 
To go forth to the Great Harvest & Vintage of the Nations472 
 
The question of going forth, of completion of the act at hand necessitates that history be 
redeemed. To quote Benjamin on Messianism again,  
 
…our image of happiness is indissolubly bound up with the image of redemption.  
The same applies to our view of the past, which is the concern of history. The  
past carries with it a temporal index by which it is referred to redemption. There  
is a secret agreement between past generations and the present one. Our coming  
was expected on earth. Like every generation that preceded us, we have been  
endowed with a weak Messianic power, a power to which the past has a claim.  
That claim cannot be settled cheaply. Historical materialists are aware of that.473 
                                                        
469 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 144. 
470 It is important to restate that London is not merely a setting defined by Blake’s presence, but as Saree Makdisi 
points out, “In Blake’s geography, then, London is the spatial representation of the experience of the Universal 
Empire of modernizing capitalism; a process that was, in Blake’s vision, gradually reterritorializing and transforming 
the globe.” Makdisi, Romantic Imperialism, 157. 
471 It is instructive of a real gap in Blake studies that in a work entitled “William Blake and the Body” there is scant 
discussion reserved in this text of the role of the labouring body. See Tristanne J. Connolly, William Blake and the 
Body. 
472 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 144. Such statements may read as decidedly patriotic, or buttressing nationalist, 
chauvinist, politics. While Blake himself does not advance such a politics, for a contemporary examination of the 
uses of Blake’s Milton and other texts in modern national myth-making that do, see Shirley Dent “Thou readst white 
where I readst black: William Blake, the Hymn ‘Jerusalem’, and the Far Right,” in Re-Envisioning Blake, edited by 
Crosby, Patenaude and Whitehead, 48-62. One need caution, however, that despite such readings, colouring Blake as 
a patriot in this conventional sense is wide of the mark. “Blake seems to have been one of a number of republican 
writers who were seeking other ways in which civic virtue could be conceived and exercised.” David Fallon, “‘She 
Cuts his Heart Out at his Side’: Blake, Christianity and Political Virtue,” in Blake and Conflict, edited by Haggarty 
and Mee, 92. 
473 Benjamin, Illuminations, 254. Werner Hamacher also usefully notes how Benjamin opens up a new conceptions 
of time that is always struggled over: “If the time-form of historical happening is the present – namely the past 
contracted to and fulfilled in the present – then the present is never a transition in a series of other presents and yet 
other ones, but always a singular moment in which the possibilities and demands of the past are contracted and fixed: 
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While I cannot argue that Blake was an historical materialist, I can safely argue that his aim was 
to resurrect the weak Messianic power (which at his time was being destroyed) in order to 
redeem those that have come before, and Blake and his own time as well. Milton is intended to 
show how this is possible.     
 
Brecht, Blake and the Uses of History 
 
 As I have shown in this and the previous chapter, a focus on history can be an active way 
of moving beyond the “merely historical” and position a realignment so that history can be 
brought into a productive conversation in the present. Yet this is, to reiterate, history not as it is 
commonly known and translated in a language that is unfamiliar to traditional historiography, and 
which at any and all times presents the catalogue of human relations as never pre-determined, and 
always, although structured and limited, open. Yet, even this is a pale incompletion of how both 
Brecht and Blake think of the past and its accessibility. History, as the present, is never the past, 
never safe and never secure. In the times of capitalism and previous forms of oppressive social 
relations, the possibilities of alterity abound. And in this sense, while historical time moves in 
way that show it will always be contested, it is always already, to borrow a phrase, a moment 
frozen in time. As Werner Hamacher explains: “When history occurs, it is only in its fixation to a 
moment and furthermore to an image. Whatever occurs, stands still. History does not have a 
                                                        
the present is not the time-form of waiting for a better or simply different future, not the state of waiting that 
preceded the state of redemption, but the standstill where one no longer waits, a standstill into which even waiting 
itself is drawn and in which the demand associated with the waiting has fallen silent.” Werner Hamacher, “‘Now’: 
Walter Benjamin on Historical Time,” in Walter Benjamin, ed. Andrew Benjamin (New York: Continuum, 2005): 
53. 
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course, it pauses.”474 Brecht’s and Blake’s aesthetics are riven through with precisely this version 
of history.  
The moment of historical time in Brecht’s later work exists always where appearance (in 
dates, in costume, etc.) is made to be in fidelity with factual events. Yet we are consistently 
invited by Brecht to renege on that allegiance to appearance, and operate on a level of historical 
understanding that demands a connection to the past so that historical wrongs are just as much 
part of the present as they were the first time they occured. History is a continuum of articulations 
made at moments of danger, and often in the face of danger the response is rarely to confront it. 
So often, except for instances of bizarre, tragi-comic figure of justice in the case of Azdak, those 
in moments of trauma recoil in the face of the truth that stares back at them.  
Likewise, Blake will drive through the past, and move from a standstill – Milton waiting, 
unable to wake himself from the failures of his life (patriarchal, ideological, theological and 
aesthetic) – and shift in a radical heartbeat that tears us into the moment of the now. The hand 
brake of history is pulled so that another history can be made right, and made right by those that 
have been wronged and have wronged others. “I in my Selfhood am that Satan: I am that Evil 
One! / He is my Spectre!”475 exclaims Milton. This arresting of history provides a means to 
redeem it as well, as following the normal course of events will not provide any reasonable 
recourse to justice. As Michael Löwy argues in his reception of Benjamin: 
 
...redemption/revolution will not occur in the mere natural course of things, by dint of the 
“meaning of history” or inevitable progress. One has to struggle against the tide. Left to 
                                                        
474 Werner Hamacher, “‘Now’: Walter Benjamin on Historical Time,” 53. 
475 Erdman, Complete Poetry, 108. “In his epiphany, Milton sees that he yielded to pride, vanity, and power hunger, 
and consequently he emulated tyranny when he promulgated his unsavory portrait of God and, in patriarchal fashion, 
abused his wives and daughters. He became a despot in his home, a little Urizen.” Laura Quinney, William Blake on 
Self and Soul (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009): 128. 
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itself, or brushed with the grain, so to speak, history will produce only new wars, fresh 
catastrophes, novel forms of barbarism and oppression.476 
 
When one doesn’t “struggle against the tide,” the result of the inaction is clear in the texts 
examined in the previous two chapters. The “Little Monk” withdraws, leaving the possibilities 
for those who could have been encouraged by a revolt against the church cast aside. Mother 
Courage consistently meets horror after horror, despite her silent scream, along the same path, 
convinced that this time events will turn in her favour. Grusha finds herself a bargaining chip in 
her own life, consistently the subject of other’s direction. Milton is left to wallow in purgatory 
and encourage those forces who seek, with an Urizenic impulse without control or proportion, to 
threaten the existence of a potential focused nature communing life, which “Blake’s visionary 
poetry admonishes us to realize is not really about technology; what ultimately matters in 
building our own ecotopia is the quality of human vision and the extent of our shared 
commitment to realizing human potential through creative endeavour.”477 Yet the object lesson 
here never teaches that history must be avoided, nor worked around as if it is something that can 
ever be past or de-materialized. Instead, rather than avoid history’s un-fulfillments and the way 
that dominant historiography cuts out the oppressed, both writers engage with humanity’s 
creative faculties to produce new meanings from old truths. In this regard Benjamin is so vital, in 
that he “retains a materialistic understanding of aesthetics by maintaining their connection to 
sensual perception, while also displaying the interactive relation between art and everyday 
                                                        
476 Michael Löwy, Fire Alarm. Reading Walter Benjamin’s “On the Concept of History” (London: Verso, 2005): 49. 
477 James C. McKusick, “Afterword: The Future of Ecocriticism,” in Lisa Ottum and Seth T. Reno eds., Wordsworth 
and the Green Romantics: Affect and Ecology in the Nineteenth Century (Durham: University of New Hampshire 
Press, 2016): p. 239. McKusick further describes this ecotopia by noting that “…William Blake held the strongest 
commitment to such an idealized urban existence. In place of London’s enormous factories and powerful steam 
engines, Blake envisioned the imaginary city of Golgonooza, powered by small, hand-operated machines, including 
a loom where women weave “clothing with joy & delight” and a wine-press where the sons and daughters of Luvah 
“tread the grapes / Laughing & shouting.” McKusick, “Afterword: The Future of Ecocriticism,” 238. 
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life.”478 This means attending to creative meaning but also to challenging and countering 
meaning “from above,” thus providing an oppositional hegemonic analysis of history, and of how 
history gets disordered following the needs of dominant ideologies. Benjamin’s work on history 
helps us think through this process. 
 
Benjamin cuts up preexistent creations that were believed to have been whole, reshuffles 
the pieces, and pastes them together in a new way. As a dialectical thinker, he sees 
aesthetic creation as a two-part process, being as interested in how meanings get created 
as in how meanings are destroyed…479 
 
For both Brecht and Blake, the recreation of meanings, often but not exclusively as dead ones 
resuscitated, provides opportunities for making political aesthetics in the now. Yet the manner of 
their resuscitation is not in sync, especially as regards the place of labour.  
 Labour holds a special place in the course of liberation in Blake. Not labour as an 
occupation or a means to earn money to provide financial sustenance, but labour as an ultimate 
expression of the power of humanity to create and make new things possible. Labour is co-
terminous with ownership, not ownership of another’s labour, but rather the overcoming of 
alienation (here understood in the Marxist sense of the theft of surplus value), and rejection of the 
idea that a project of one’s individual creation should be the project of another’s enrichment, on 
the one hand, and more broadly that a person would be alien to that which they produce, that their 
creative connections would be severed to their creations. As S. Brent Plate makes us aware 
above, this is not – even in the resurrection of historical figures – a negation of the modern world, 
not the technical means by which the world reproduces itself. Labour can be a means to create a 
                                                        
478 S. Brent Plate, Walter Benjamin, Religion, and Aesthetics: Rethinking Religion Through the Arts (New York: 
Routledge, 2005): 22. 
479 Plate, Walter Benjamin, 29. 
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connection with the past but also the present, and aids in imagining worlds that had not yet 
existed. As Jason Whitaker notes: 
 
At roughly the same time as he was composing Milton, Blake seems to have been 
attempting to work out a theory of artistic production which would resolve the dilemma of 
memory and inspiration. ….This meant that history was not the empirical collection of 
facts, but the prefiguring of contemporary and future states, a typology of the existent 
world.480 
 
Brecht’s focus is superficially dissimilar in that his use of labour is merely as a negative 
descriptor, in that labour is most clearly in, for instance, Mutter Courage that which will keep 
you wedded to a system of oppression and loss. The use of peasant time clearly highlights, and is 
meant to highlight, exploitation. Yet there is another sense in which labour is freeing, and that 
exists with Grusha’s example. In her case, productive labour should never be sectioned off from 
that which it produces, and what is produced in that regard is the young, and the promise of a 
new life. The experience of creation is tied inexplicably to liberation, the liberation of the self as 
a creative participant in the world, but of the community of creators/producers more broadly. And 
this necessitates a realignment in the relation of the world to our creative fields, and also to 
ourselves. Epic theatre itself can never be, in this regard, a closed field. By its nature, it requires 
not merely the activity of the players, of the potentially emancipatory labour of the audience’s 
contribution to cultural production. The situatedness of the work requires that, as Sarah Bryant-
Bertail argues, “Epic texts and performances are ultimately concerned with critiquing their 
specific historical situation. They are anything but “timeless,” and herein is their strength.”481 
                                                        
480 Jason Whitaker, William Blake and the Myths of Britain (London: Macmillan, 1999): 104-5. 
481 Bryant-Bertail, Space and Time in Epic Theater, 6. 
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This strength draws both from the work itself and its individual productions, through the 
connections it makes with its audience.   
Built into the process of engagement and liberatory practices in theatre, Susan Buck-
Morss notes how Benjamin sets out to: “undo the alienation of the corporeal sensorium, to restore 
the instinctual power of the human bodily senses for the sake of humanity’s self- preservation, 
and to do this, not by avoiding the new technologies, but by passing through them.”482 In both 
instances the use of history to rescue something from the past for the present, and as a means of 
locating source material for those in the present to learn from it, is used to open the possibility of 
self-preservation, and to suggest ways of liberating ourselves from the current drag on 
humanity’s various potentialities. 
  
                                                        
482 Susan Buck-Morss, “Aesthetics and Anaesthetics: Walter Benjamin’s Artwork Essay Reconsidered,” October 62 
(1992): 5. 
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Conclusion 
 
Over the course of this dissertation I have sought to bring Blake and Brecht together to 
show how each worked through two separate but related moments in their own works, and how 
the work of Benjamin is useful in helping to draw out the processes at work in the two. The first 
moment is their contemporary period, defined largely by a world of commodified social relations 
in which a fully formed (although still ever-forming) capitalism shows its motivations to 
exhaustively make and remake its subjects in its own image are dissected, and the ways in which 
one can work around, against and through that system are engaged. Both Blake’s and Brecht’s 
complimentary strategy has been to construct their own rejections of capitalism by attempts to 
understand its logics and manifestations, as to not do as such would produce an ineffective 
opposition to the system as a system. Although the two engage capitalism from different starting 
points and through different mediating social and political axes, both demonstrate a 
comprehension of the system’s processes and seek, from that point, to articulate their 
oppositional aesthetic politics. In this way Brecht and Blake begin to develop a politics of 
experience through the connection to their particular oppressive societies. Capitalism rules in 
making impossible a life that is redeemable, fulfilling and compassionate. Yet in its stead, 
masking itself in all those institutions and forms of life that could be potentially life-affirming, it 
provides existential danger and continual exploitation as both rewards and punishments for 
maintenance of its own workings. This process is something that Benjamin understood and 
grappled with as Michael Jennings insightfully notes in the following: “The essay [The Work of 
Art] proceeds from the conviction – best articulated in “Experience and Poverty” – that one of 
capitalist modernity’s principle effects is the destruction of the conditions for an adequate human 
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experience.”483 Once this destructive drive is acknowledged and called out (named) for what it is, 
one cannot expect to cast aside all that capital (through labour power) produces without foraging 
through and using what one can to undermine capital’s power. This dynamic of standing opposed 
to a system while acknowledging that one can also use its logic and processes in opposition to it, 
was a motivator for Benjamin in his examination of the function of the technological 
manifestation of new experience in capitalism. As Jennings continues, “...for Benjamin, 
technology is at once a main cause of this destruction of experience and its potential solution.”484  
Experimentation in the “now,” the moment of the possible, is a means by which one may 
articulate a new that is both creative and also offers an acknowledgement that there is no other 
space possible than the one that determines contemporary human experience. Capitalism’s 
various determinations may leave one with little space to operate, but therein is the dilemma of 
modern oppositional cultural production. And at no point is there or can there be an escape from 
capitalist forces’ desire to take that which has been made oppositional (or has an oppositional 
spirit, in potentia), and to reproduce it in its own image. In some cases, as for instance in the 
potential in Messianism for Blake and Benjamin, capitalism’s nullifying forces are radically not 
subtle.  
The coercion of oppositional impulses in part revolves around the way in which 
authorities take what is promising in life – what is life giving and making – and turn it into its 
opposite. This is a clear form of appropriation, and was supported in Blake’s historical period 
down the barrel of a gun, at times literally, as David Worrall historical study illustrates in the 
following: 
                                                        
483 Michael W. Jennings, “The Will to Apokatastasis: Media, Experience, and Eschatology in Walter Benjamin’s 
Late Theological Politics,” in Walter Benjamin and Theology, edited by Colby Dickinson and Stéphane Symons 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2016): 96. 
484 Jennings, “The Will to Apokatastasis,” 96. 
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In Edmonton, Middlesex, a loyalist procession dragooned the church band to accompany 
a “triumphal Arch” supported by five men on which a dove held the motto “No 
Revolution”, while “the rear was brought up by Women and Children; before night they 
were half Seas over and sang God save the King &c.” Children, songs and socializing 
were all enlisted in scenes of social conviviality glimpsed at in the text and design of 
“Laughing Song” and “The Little Vagabond” whose “Ale-house” is not only “’healthy & 
pleasant & warm” but likely to be a place where political meetings were held.485  
 
In this regard the daily, grinding problem of Capitalism is unavoidable, and one has no option but 
to go through the system and make of one’s humanity the best possible outcome, albeit starting 
from this degraded status. There is no way around this prison-house of experience without at 
once destroying and working from the rubble of existence and experience that one is caught 
within.486 It is this dilemma that Benjamin will refer to as the “poverty of experience” in his essay 
of the same name. He writes:  
 
This should not be understood to mean that people are yearning for new experience. No, 
they long to free themselves from experience; they long for a new world in which they 
can make such pure and decided use of their poverty – their utter poverty, and ultimately 
also their inner poverty – that it will lead to something respectable.487  
 
                                                        
485 David Worrall, “Blake and 1790s Plebian Radical Culture,” in Blake in the Nineties, Clark and Worrall eds., 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999): 204 – 205.  
486 To my argument that the Songs are structured so as to speak two separate (yet in no way wholly but rather 
dialectically contradictory) forms of life and experience, the postmodern retort to my argument is expressed by 
Edward Larissy. Larissy argues that; “Thus, one may concede that there is undoubtedly a strategy in Songs of 
Innocence and of Experience which leads us towards mutual ironizing as constitutive of the relationship between the 
two ‘contrary states’…” Edward Larrissy, “Blake and Postmodernism,” in William Blake Studies, edited by Nicholas 
M. Williams (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006): 255. While I have tried to argue contra this position passim, it is 
useful to restate that this position, not merely as expressed by Larissy but also his, leads us away from any 
conception of opposition, or oppositional forms of life, and in the offers no way out of the abyss of petrified 
experience that capitalism offers. 
487 Walter Benjamin, “Poverty of Experience,” in Selected Writings: Volume 2, Part 1 1927 – 1934, Marcus Bullock, 
and Michael W. Jennings, eds. (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 1996): 734. 
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For Blake and Benjamin, it is first important to know one’s condition, and the conditions of one’s 
oppression and exploitation, in order to lead out from that experience into new possibilities.  
As regards Brecht and Benjamin, one should be careful of making the claim that the 
connection to the contemporary moment is always similar, even though the two clearly learned 
from each other throughout their collaborations. For instance, on Benjamin’s Kafka essay, Brecht 
objects that Benjamin’s lauding of “depth” in Kafka (depth meaning the level of Kafka’s inquiry 
into his own historical moment) is insufficient. Rather, there must be an outcome or direction that 
comes out of the delving into. Brecht’s objection is not in the direction of the examinations 
themselves, but “their insufficient extension, that they don’t emerge on the other side” and thus 
becomes narcissistic or “diary-like.”488 For this reason Brecht begins, particularly in his teaching 
plays, by taking “nothing that is based on experience for granted – neither Marxism nor 
humanity.”489 Change exists in that space of contradiction between one’s ability to change 
oneself in relation to one’s world, and that society’s social processes which must be combatted in 
order for new experience (not the “poverty” of post World War One economic, social, and 
political destruction that defined western Europe), in which revolutionary change can begin, to be 
conceived of and created. 
When the momentum behind pushing this new experience cannot be found in the 
contemporary, Brecht and Blake’s resources fuel them to move into history, while holding in 
their opposition a realist conception of history that masks or confuses liberatory potential with a 
“progressiveness,” then on the rise in Western social democracy and in the Stalinist distortions of 
the Soviet Union, that waters down a politics of action and which ultimately represents the 
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York: Fordham University Press, 2013): 225.   
489 Oessmann, Staging History, 133 
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“enemies of production.” As the engagement with the contemporary moment requires an extra 
step, history becomes a refuge in the sense that it provides a moment in which a world of 
lessening possibilities can be pried open to reveal a moment outside of itself that it can reflect on, 
and prompt change. The retreat to history cleaves open historical time that capital and its 
enforcers wish to have remain closed.  
While I would tweak the following in order to highlight the coercion involved in the 
surrender of history, nevertheless Benjamin usefully provides an articulation that history provides 
something that the present cannot provide. And nor should it be able to. He writes: “We have 
become impoverished. We have given up one portion of the human heritage after another, and 
have often left it at the pawnbroker’s for a hundredth of its true vale, in exchange for the small 
change of “the contemporary.””490 In this regard, the dissertation’s second movement, examining 
history and historical allegory in Blake and Brecht, has shown a contested and fraught affair. The 
moments at which history is being accessed, and the type of history that is being engaged, are 
particular painful moments, coloured by loss, failure and suffering. In this regard, as Fredric 
Jameson notes in The Political Unconscious, “History is what hurts.”491 The historical periods 
that Brecht and Blake make use of in the works under discussion here are ones marked by the 
dominance of a “peasant structure of feeling” more generally (even if in the case of Brecht the 
structure of feeling is determined by capitalist relations of production and represents the drives 
and imperative of this system), but are more properly situated at the moment of capitalism’s more 
clearly formed introduction, and in Milton, Mother Courage and Galileo, at a more precise 
beginning point of its hegemonic dominance. Navigating the interstices between feudalism and 
capitalism involves a rejection of capitalism’s enclosing of historical imagination and an 
                                                        
490 Walter Benjamin, “Poverty of Experience,” 735. 
491 Jameson, The Political Unconscious, 102.  
 220 
imperative (turning capitalism’s imperatives on its head) to read history against the grain, while 
recognizing the danger involved given one’s unequal footing in relation to capitalist power. This 
reading and accessing of history for a specific cultural-political purpose is not a straightforward 
procedure given that it need be mobilised through oppositionally constructed worldviews. The 
work in accessing the contemporary needs to be performed, as with accessing history and the 
contemporary together, through one’s own mediation to them. In this regard, as Robert S. 
Lehmann notes, history “reached only through a certain labour.”492  
The retrieval of history can neither be an end in and of itself, even inside the artwork. In 
this way, the possibility of a better future, or indeed of utopian futures (a requirement that mirrors 
that breaks open the history of the present), is achievable through “just” judgments (a decision 
that implies a changing of one’s theoretical position), performed herein by Adzak and Blake 
himself in Milton, that reach beyond the individual and thus necessarily involves community 
justice. While acknowledging this communal element has not been an issue in Brecht studies, for 
Blake studies the same cannot be said. It is ironic that given the revolutionary judgment involved 
in the retrieval of Milton, Blake has been at times “configured as a soft liberal who was buoyed 
by the false hopes of a foreign revolution only to soften into respectable quietism in later years 
when that revolution supposedly revealed its true nature.”493 Yet Blake was well beyond the “soft 
liberals” of his day. As Makdisi notes, “For most of the radicals of the 1790s – with the notable 
exception of Blake – individual self-control was the key to Liberty.” The notion of freedom here 
is one of individual liberty, de-coupled from care of community as a responsibility.494  
                                                        
492 Robert S. Lehman, Impossible Modernism: T.S. Eliot, Walter Benjamin, and the Critique of Historical Reason 
(Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2016), 192. 
493 Makdisi, William Blake and the Impossible History of the 1790s, 19.  
494 Saree Makdisi, Making England Western: Occidentalism, Race and Imperial Culture (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2014): 14.   
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 It is partly in the gaps that Blake leaves behind a heightened individualism and therefore 
understands his role in connection with other traditions that put community struggle ahead of 
individual liberties. In making the links between Blake and Marx (et al.), Makdisi argues they 
were indebted to older communist traditions that were: 
 
…principally concerned with questions of being and ontology, and in seeking to ground 
not just religion but politics (as well as economics and indeed aesthetics) in ontology it 
differed markedly from a parallel and to a certain extent competitive movement in 
political thought – democratic liberalism…495  
 
The connection between ontology and being grounded in religion, politics and history operates as 
an opening to utopian futures, though for Blake his specific form of utopian thought carries 
community along with it.496 David Fallon argues this point using Bloch’s distinction between 
abstract and concrete utopia. He writes:  
 
Bloch’s model of utopia in The Principle of Hope is illuminating in relation to tensions in 
Blake’s poems. Bloch distinguishes between ‘abstract utopia,’ largely individualistic 
daydreams which provide refuge from a reality corrupted by ideology, and ‘concrete 
utopia,’ the dimension of present reality which anticipates and reaches towards real future 
possibilities just beyond the horizon of the present.497  
 
                                                        
495 Saree Makdisi, “Blake and the Communist Tradition,” in William Blake Studies, edited by Nicholas M. Williams 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006): 237. 
496 In his investigation of Blake’s America, Makdisi highlights the oppositional nature of the longer term project that 
Blake is engaged in in the prophetic brake on history. He writes; “if this disruption is produced by the prophecy’s 
attempt to blast a hole in what the radicals (and generations of scholars since them) understood to be a continuous 
and progressive history, it also has the effect of bringing that narrative, and whatever might be understood as the 
continuum of history, to a sudden and grinding halt.” Makdisi, William Blake and the Impossible History of the 
1790s, p. 156. Makdisi notes that he is “deeply indebted here to Walter Benjamin’s discussion of historical time in 
“Theses on the Philosophy of History,”” although his use of Benjamin is not spelled out in citation form. Makdisi, 
William Blake and the Impossible History of the 1790s, 349. 
497 David Fallon, Blake, Myth, and Enlightenment: The Politics of Apotheosis (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017): 
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Rejecting a liberal individualism that could not imagine a way out of its own dilemma, history, 
and in particular the history of struggles against destruction of social change by social actors, 
initiated a consideration of the stakes at play in history. “Blake, too, was working at a moment 
when it seemed essential to preserve a sense of the connection between history and ontology, and 
to maintain a way of thinking of history itself as ontological struggle.”498 Viewing history as an 
ontological struggle hints at the level of danger involved if it is merely left for liberal 
individualism, or worse. 
 Similarly for Brecht history is engaged as an ontological struggle, yet there is a more 
pressing note of danger that inhabits his text. In part this relates to the notion of “experience” 
examined shortly ago, and its formation in response to the devastation of World War One, and 
the impending and ultimately fully realized horror of fascism. Given these atrocities, it may seem 
incongruous to discuss history and utopia in Brecht. Yet while history is destruction, it is 
specifically it’s allegorical use in Brecht and Benjamin that offers a way out of capitalism’s crises 
and wars. “For Benjamin, the exemplary rhetorical figure for the representation of history is 
allegory,”499500 and I would argue that likewise allegory is similarly prized by Brecht. For the 
two, desiring the righting of the world, of making the right choice between socialism and 
barbarism, requires in the presentation of history an act outside of the presentation of it, wherein 
experience can be a worthy ontological topic again.501 In this sense, “...Benjamin establishes a 
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relation between the messianic hope of seeing the “disfigured” world put back in order and the 
materialist hope for revolution, which was proper to Brecht.”502  
Putting this “disfigured” world back in order required a realignment of historical 
worldviews. To make history open (and even possible) became a precondition of making the 
contemporary a place for contestation. When Brecht (and definitely Blake) make history unsafe 
for capitalism, they make it and the contemporary that much safer in the present. Yet for Brecht, 
the role of the utopian possibility, the sounding out of a possible future, must always be balanced 
by these two states of history and the present. As Gerhard Fischer notes: 
  
Brecht’s utopian image is thus not based on a supposedly scientific conclusion, a final 
stage of history as a classless society, but rather emphasizes the contradictory dialectic of 
past and present as well as the tentative, hesitant, anticipatory and preliminary nature of 
the political and socio- cultural openness provided by the historical situation.503  
 
 
This tentative approach, involving a sceptical attitude that utopia can even be spoken (similar to 
what for Benjamin would be his “antifetishism”504) is dependent on a critical engagement with 
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what Benjamin describes as the “consciousness of historical man, whose deepest emotion is an 
insuperable mistrust of the course of things and a readiness at times to recognize that everything 
can go wrong.”505 This dual perspective of history and the now heavily defines Brecht and 
Blake’s oppositional aesthetics.  
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